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Abstract
Epidemic disease outbreaks of zoonotic origin such as Avian Influenza, SARSor
BSEare increasingly common lately. The thesis aims at exploring the underlying
reasons for risks occurrence in the public health sector due to the increase in
animal production. It adopts an economic perspective and compares human
health systems and animal health systems. A comparative literature review is
undertaken of animal health and its human health counterpart
It explores the underlying economic reasonsfor the weakening of public health
and animal health systems. The role of the structural adjustment programmes,
followed by market-based economic principles (especially privatisation of public
services) is analysed. The market failures existing in this field are examined
along with associatedpolicy implications.
Characteristic of the thesis is the underlying comparison of human and animal
health systems from the funding mechanism to service delivery. In the latter
case, community-based systems in both the human and animal fields are chosen
as a comparative case-study.
Hence, the thesis presents first, the possible options to fund activities in the
animal health field to prevent the spread of such types of diseases.The recent
Avian Influenza outbreak in Vietnam (2004-2005) is taken as an example of
implementation of funding mechanisms. In addition, data about financing animal
health systems from Senegal was gathered through a questionnaire to the
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relevant authorities. Second, when focusing on community-based systems, a field
research in Kenyan arid and semi-arid lands. was performed on animal health
services.
The gaps in the public health arena likely to influence the increase of zoonotic
and emerging diseases occurrence are pointed out throughout the thesis.
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1 Introduction
1. 1 Background
The past decade has witnessed a frightening increase of disease epidemics
coming from animals and transmitted to humans (i.e. zoonoses). Casessuch as
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS),Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (AI) have been increasingly debated
both in the scientific arena as well as, and more importantly, among the
population. Risk perceptions of the population about such diseaseshave heavily
pressuredgovernments to react promptly in order to prevent diseasespread (The
EconomistNovember 10th, 11th and 17th 2005).
As the World Health Organization (WHO)states, "several factors contribute to
the emergence and.re-emergence of infectious diseases, but most can be linked
to the increasing number of people living and moving on earth: rapid and intense
international travel; overcrowding in cities with poor sanitation; changes in
handling and processing of large quantities of food; and increased exposure of
humans to disease vectors and reservoirs in nature. Other factors include a
deteriorating public health infrastructure, which is unable to cope with
population demands, and the emergence of resistance to antibiotics linked to
their increased misuse" (WHO1997).
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Emerging zoonotic diseaseshave effects at two levels, namely (human) health
and the agricultural sector, especially livestock production. Whereas the
consequencesof the first relate to public health and the associated economic
burden for national health systems(NHS),the consequencesof the latter refer to
the economic burden derived from loss of livestock production at national level
from the imposed international trade barriers, animal disease containment etc.
The economic burden of such types of diseasesis generally difficult to calculate
given the spectrum of their consequences.However, an example could be the
recent AI outbreak in Vietnam, which for the period January to December 2004
amounted USD 120 million (Riviere-Cinnamond 2005). This figure however,
reflects only direct costs on the agricultural side for the Government of Vietnam.
Similarly, on a wider scale the economic burden of SARSwas evaluated at the
beginning of the outbreak. Asmentioned by Kickbuschin 2003 "just a few weeks
after its [SARSvirus] identification - the World Health Organization is calculating
that the global cost of the diseaseis close to USD30 billion" (Kickbusch2003).
Linked to the recent occurrence of these disease epidemics and to the
aforementioned WHOcalculations are the estimates of the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) on livestock production trends for 2020
(Delgado, Rosegrant, Steinfeld et at. 2000). It is predicted that for developing
countries in 2020 there will be an increase in meat and milk production of 40%
and 60%(Delgado,Rosegrant,Steinfeld et at. 2000) respectively in relation to the
production levels in the 1990s. Consequencesderiving from such a production
increase will arise at four levels: (i) nutrition, food security and poverty
alleviation, (ii) environmental sustainability, (iii) world trade and food prices
and, of especial interest for the thesis topic, (iv) public health. These issueswill
be discussedin more detail in chapter 3.
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Public health consequencesof what has already been labelled as the "Livestock
Revolution" (Delgado, Rosegrant,Steinfeld et al. 1999)derive from the expected
increase, not only in animal-human contact, but also to the intensification of
livestock production systems. Emerging diseases therefore reflect the
"evolutionary response to environmental changes caused by humans" (Gilbert,
Wint and Slingenbergh 2004) or human activities. Occurrence of such diseases
may be aggravated due to the increase in trade of livestock and derived products
not only within developing countries, but also between developing and developed
countries. Thus, the diseasesmentioned earlier may well fall under the fourth
consequence(i.e. public health) derived from this livestock production increase.
It is therefore expected that other zoonotic disease epidemics similar to those
recently witnessed will arise in the incoming years. It is also expected that these
epidemics will Originate in developing countries given that meat production
increases are estimated to be four times higher than in developed countries for
the same period of time (Delgado, Rosegrant, Steinfeld et al. 2000; Delgado,
Rosegrant and Meijer 2001). Preventing emerging zoonotic disease episodes is
therefore crucial in order to reduce public health risks and the associated
economic burden. Prevention here is thus closely linked to animal diseasecontrol
and hence, to animal health systems(AHS).
Interestingly, AHSin developing countries (especially in Africa) have undergone
important changesover the past three decades. Suchchangeswere often rooted
in the lack of public funds to sustain AHS.Therefore, following guidelines from
international organisations (namely World Bank (WB) and International Monetary
Fund (IMF)), structural adjustment programmes (SAP) were implemented at
18
national level during the 1980s in order to reduce public spending. Such
adjustments also applied to the agricultural sector and, as a consequence,to the
animal health sub-sector.
It has already been acknowledged that such SAPdid not yield the expected
results. Bennell undertook a survey on the privatisation process in Sub-Saharan
,
Africa (SSA)from 1980 to 1995 (Bennell 1997). Data for the study was collected
from five main sources, namely:
(i) Candoy-Seksedatabase for 1980-1987and Sader database from 1988-92.
These databases were those used by the World Bank in assessingthe
results of privatization. However, in the first case, the transactions
assessedconcentrated in only six countries, and in the seconddatabase in
three;
(ii) Unpublisheddata obtained from the World Bankwhich aimed at updating
Saderdatabaseuntil 1995;
(iii) "Reports and other documentation produced by government commissions,
committees and units that have been especially established, often with
technical assistanceof the World Bank and other donors" (Bennell 1997)
in order to put in place the privatisation process. Datawas obtained from
Burkina Faso, Cote d'ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria,
Tanzania, Ugandaand Zambia;
(iv) "Information obtained from country desk officer from SSA,and staff from
the Private Sector Department at the World Bank" (Bennell 1997); and
finally,
(v) Other publications, which included local as well as international business
media. These information types were obtained for 1165enterprises in 32
African countries.
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In Bennell's words: "it is manifestly the case that no SSAcountry can be singled
out as a very successful privatizer in the same way as, for example Chile has
been in South America" (Bennell 1997). Furthermore, in countries such as
Senegalwhere privatisation was undertaken early, "the collective performance
of SOEs[state owned enterprises] in Senegal deteriorated after privatization"
(Bennell 1997). Indeed, even the World Bank acknowledged in the case of
Senegalthat "there seemsto be no major improvement in the financial situation
of public enterprises under performance contract"! (World-Bank1996).
Along the same lines, Schatz (1996), with the same data and categories used by
the World Bankin the report "Adjustment in Africa: reforms, results and the road
ahead" (World-Bank 1994), showed that the structural adjustments promoted in
Africa not only did not yield the results outlined in the report, but
"implementation of structural adjustment most often causespoorer economic
performance" (Schatz 1996) (emphasis by the original author). Similarly,
Helleiner in his critical paper on the shortcomingsof African stabilisation andSAP
during the 19805 pointed out that two important aspects were the "relative
neglect of the provision of crucial public goods, especially agricultural
infrastructure" and the "overestimation of the efficacy of privatization,
especially in agricultural marketing and input distribution" (Helleiner 1992).
When focusing specifically on the impact of privatisation in the agricultural
sector, thus consequently in the AH sub-sector, Dorward notably has
demonstrated that SAPhave not led to the expected increase in effectiveness
and efficiency (Dorward, Kydd and Poulton 1998). Conversely, it has lately been
1 Page 11.
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argued that the rationale behind such privatisation process in developing
countries may have not been appropriate and that in certain areas of the
agricultural sector there is a need to increase public sector intervention.
Privatisation of animal healthcare systemsin developing countries, particularly in
sub-SaharanAfrica, has not yielded the expected results (Dorward, Kydd and
Poulton 1998; Leonard 2000). Introduced with inadequate transition time and too
few resources, many livestock owners either cannot afford or, just as likely, are
unable to gain access to the services they need (Catley, Blakeway and Leyland
2002). Poor livestock owners in remote rural areas suffer the greatest
disadvantage. This fact is undisputed but, since privatisation, the primary focus
has been on analysing the performance of animal healthcare delivery systems(Ly
2000; Catley and Leyland 2001). and few authors have studied the underlying
economic assumptionsthat have driven privatisation policy nor examined in what
ways these assumptionsmayor may not have been detrimental (Leonard2000).
To date, the perspective taken in the economic analysisof animal health systems
has been derived from Samuelson'sgoods and services categorisation following
the rivalry and excludability principles. Such economic perspective was
subsequently adopted as the rationale for privatisation of AH systemsunder the
SAP(deHaanand Bekure 1991; Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan 1992; Umali-
Deininger, Narrod and Deininger 1994; Holden 1999). Taking into account "the
profundity of market failure in developing countries" (Schatz 1996), this view
failed to addressseveral factors suchas failures in the animal healthcare market,
especially in rural and remote areas. Analysing the reasons for 'failure' of the
privatisation processmay prevent future errors in similar situations.
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However, lack of resources, especially financial, still remains one of the critical
challenges for most developing countries' animal health services. Whether AHS
have been privatised or not, animal health or livestock departments (or
ministries) are pleading for increased budgets (Evans, Doering, Clarke et al.
2003; Gimeno 2003; Sidibe 2003). It is true however that increasing animal health
budgets will not be equivalent to 'increased performance'. However, to date
animal health literature is scarce in studies dealing with the different ways in
which revenues may be raised to fund AHS (Anteneh 1984). It is especially
important in the context mentioned at the beginning of the section, whereby the
expected increase in livestock production over the coming years might entail an
increase in public health hazards (humanand environmental).
In most developing countries, and especially in Sub-SaharanAfrica (SSA), the
widespread lack of funds also harmed human health service delivery. To
counteract such trend, in 1978, during Alma Ata conference (organised by the
World Health Organisation - WHO) (WHO2003), the idea of primary health care
(PHC) arose and a common objective was set through the "Health for All"
programme. Most countries adhered to this view and hence ministries or
departments of health (MoHor DoH)around the world and other stakeholders put
effort into attaining this goal. No such initiative can be found in the AH sector.
The main difference between the HH and the AH sectors is that during the SAP
period, while PHCwas implemented in the HH sector, privatisation in the AH
sector was already underway.
Nonetheless it is important to highlight at this stage that both systems convey
different ideas, given that basic (human) health is seen as a 'human right'
whereas animal health, though conveying public health risks, has also economic
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(production) connotations. Hence, the perspective of the analysis throughout the
thesis focuses on the economic rationale for funding such systems.
1.2 Justification
As seen from the previous section in comparison to the human healthcare sector
an exhaustive analysis of AH systems has not yet been undertaken. To date, most
of the existing analysis in the AH arena focus on animal health service delivery
and do not seem conceptually to include these services as part of a broader
system. AH systems start to be seen as an articulated structure and not as
separate pieces without linkages as it has previously been (see for example
Leonard's first system approach analysis in 2000 (Leonard 2000)). Thus, if AH
systems are to be seen as an integral organisation, their structure, components
and service delivery mechanisms need to be analysed. Closely related are the
funding sources for the activities performed through this system. This analytical
viewpoint comes in a period where, as mentioned earlier, emerging disease
spread from animal origin is becoming of great concern for national governments
as well as for international organisations.
The thesis therefore intends to shed light on the different economic approaches
that could have been used during the SAP programmes for the AH sector, based
on economic theory. Hence, a relatively new approach in comparison to previous
economic analysis of animal health systems is presented in the thesis. This has
been propounded recently by a number of economists working in this field
(Ahuja, George, McConnel et at 2000; Leonard 2000). Economic theory, based on
the perspective of 'public choice' and the new institutional economics argues that
the process of decision-making may be highly significant in influencing efficiency
and effectiveness. Traditional 'outcome' analysis omits factors such as self-
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interested behaviour and political interference. These may have contributed to
higher than expected 'transaction' costs and, therefore, to the failure in many
instances of the privatisation process.
The thesis presents three ways in which goods and services may be classified.
These patterns are debated following the public choice economics lens. The first
relates to the World Bank (deHaanand Bekure 1991; Umali-Deininger, Feder and
deHaan 1992) and other authors (Holden 1999) categorisation of goods and
services following Samuelson's classical perspective of the rivalry and
excludability principles (Samuelson1954).
The second approach follows Musgrave's perspective (Musgrave1969). It relates
to mi~ed goods/quasi-public goodswhich basesits classification on the level of
externalities. It is argued that this taxonomic method may be a powerful tool for
policy-making when according an economic value to the evaluation of
externalities. However, difficulties exist in measuring the extent of some
externalities.
Finally, the third classification relates to the degree of consumption sharing,
especially emphasising Buchanan's 'theory of clubs' (Buchanan 1965). This
approach differs from the previous ones in that it does not look individually to
each service but focuses on the degree of sharing of services among a defined
population. It specifically looks into the relationship existing between the degree
of indivisibility and the number of people consuming the good or service. The
perspective'S utility lies in the optimisation of allocation amonggroups, hence it
complements the previous classification as it focusesmore on an implementation
level. The theoretical analysis is consequently applied to rural remote areas
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following two distinct settings: where no privatisation process has been
undertaken and where privatisation has taken place. The analysis highlights that
much greater attention than in the past should be paid to issuesof governance.
In the future, governments may be expected to act not only as external agents
with regulatory power but as part of the nation's animal healthcare systemwith
responsibility for defining overall goals and harmonising and facilitating the
market economy. Hence, exploring the available options for decision-makers to
raise revenue for AHS is essential. Given the lack of literature in the animal
healthcare sector in relation to funding mechanismsfor AH systems, the thesis
also presents a framework of the options existing in different regional areas to
fund these systems. Especial attention is given to the implications of choosing
one funding mechanism over another, or more usually the implications of a
particular mix-funding source mechanism. The analysis combines theory and
empirical evidence, as well as providing examples of current structures (and
surrounding debates) of AHS. It aims at bringing together issuesrelated to animal
and human health and examines the relationship between funding and resource
allocation.
To that aim, two approaches needed to be taken. The first one analysing the
functional components of animal health services, and the second one whereby
practical approachesto funding mechanismsare analysed, as well as the derived
implications for servicesprovision.
The first approach takes a theoretical perspective in the analysis of the
functional components of AH systems. Drawing from Musgrave's analytical
framework for public finances (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989) as well as on
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organisational structure analysis of health systems of Murray and Frenk (2000)
and Mossialos, Dixon, Figueras et al. (2002), the analysis concentrates on the
different modes of revenue collection, fund pooling and purchasing adapted to
the context of animal health services. Other influencing factors in the system's
performance - such as the type of integration of collection, pooling and
purchasing mechanisms, non-financial resource generation and governance - are
also assessedin the context of animal healthcare.
The second approach takes a more practical and descriptive perspective to the
available and existing paths down which revenues may be collected. Thus,
taxation, national insurance schemesfor livestock and/or animal health, private
insurance schemesand user charges or out of pocket payments are analysed in
the AHScontext. Livestock insurance schemesexist in developed countries and
also in certain Asian countries. These schemes exist in order to reimburse
farmers in case of animal death or ill-health. However, attention should be
drawn to the different focus that National Insuranceschemes(NI) in the livestock
sector may take. These schemesmay include compensation funds for lossesdue
to particular diseasesand/or animal health servicesneeded to prevent or contain
such diseases. Therefore, NI schemes in the livestock sector are conveniently
divided into National Livestock Insurance (NU) and National Animal Health
Insurance (NAHI).
Examplesillustrating general (e.g. India (Ahuja, George, McConnelet al. 2000))
and earmarked (e.g. Australia (Government-of-Australia 2003)) taxation are put
forward through data obtained from the existing literature. Similarly, national
(i.e. compulsory) animal health (e.g. Australia's "Animal Health Authority"
(Animal-Health-Australia 2003)) and livestock insurance contributions (e.g.
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Nepal, Thailand (Mathemaand Joshi 2000)) are also discussed,aswell as private
schemes for animal health and/or livestock insurance (e.g. Israel (Efron 1997)).
In the latter, similarities with "health maintenance organisations" (HMOs)are put
forward. Finally, the use of charges or out-of-pocket payments for animal
healthcare servicesis also discussed,with especial focus on rural areas.
The latter option links to the chosenservice delivery mechanismanalysed in the
thesis: community-based initiatives. Although many ways exist in which services
may be delivered, both in the human and animal health fields, the rationale
behind this choice is that most livestock keepers in developing countries live in
the farthest places and the settings are characterised by their remoteness and
difficulty of access.Community-basedinitiatives have been, for both human and
animal healthcare, a mechanismof reaching these areas. However, as opposedto
human health, the AH sector has not been able to describe a common goal or
purpose during or even after the privatisation process, and this applies not only
to national governments but, more importantly, to the international community.
Consequently, there has been an uncoordinated transition without a common
vision. Such lack of coordination has led to an important increase in transaction
costs, especially in the delivery of AH services in remote and rural areas through
community-based programmes.
The relevance of comparing human and animal community-based delivery
systems relates to two aspects. First, as mentioned earlier, it is clear that AH
systemsdo not convey the sameethical implications as human health systems. In
addition, economic consequencesapart, the lack of efficient AHS may incur
public health hazards. The clear dichotomy between human and animal health
systems in terms of system's structure and funding impedes the proper analysis
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of zoonotic and emerging disease spread. Second, and probably more obvious,
the comparison relates to their structural organisation and by consequencetheir
governance mechanisms. Using Williamson's viewpoint on institutions of
governance, "transaction-cost economics concurs that the transaction is the
basic unit of analysis and regards governance as the means by which order is
accomplished in a relation in which potential conflict threatens to undo or upset
opportunities to realize mutual gains" (Williamson 1998). Hence, as mentioned
earlier, given that AH service delivery hasto date been seenas a separate arm of
the animal health structure, Williamson's viewpoint helps in elucidating critical
governanceaspects.
Following those lines, Berman pointed out, in relation to the human healthcare
sector and the Health for All programme, that in order to expand and integrate
community-based programmes into a national structure, there should be an
enabling institutional context (Berman, Gwatkin and Burger 1987). This implies
not only a common goal and willingness on the part of the involved policy
makers, but also, and following Williamson's lines, an enabling contractual
context. Given the areaswhere community-based systemsexist, the latter tends
to be based on 'trust', which is clearly highlighted in chapter 5 under the case
study in Kenyanarid and semi-arid lands.
The thesis therefore aims at analysing community-based animal health initiatives
as the delivery branch of a national structure for animal health. The debate
surrounding the integration of community-based initiatives into a wider health
system (widely debated in the human healthcare literature (Nichter 1986;Chabot
and Bremmers 1988; Sauerborn, Nougtara and Diesfeld 1989)) serves as a
framework for comparison. CAH initiatives analysed in chapters 4 and 1 follow
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the evaluation criteria applied in the human health counterpart. These are (i)
efficiency, (it) equity, (iii) accessto services, (iv) quality of care, (v) financial,
and (vi) human resources.
The policy and development implications associatedwith animal health systems
are elaborated in chapter 6. This chapter builds on the analysis performed in
previous chapters putting AHSwithin a broader context. Hence, it discussedthe
rationale behind focusing on AHS by debating their role under a development
perspective, as well as under the public health lens. Regardingthe latter, issues
associated to animal health systems' role and whether and how they could be
financed are presented following Pearce's environmental economics lens.
The research questions derived from this section that this thesis aims to tackle
are: What was the economic rationale behind the privatisation guidelines
released during the 1990s?Are there other perspectives that may be usedin such
analysis and what are the implications? What are the elements into which AH
systemsmay be divided? What mechanismsmay be used to fund AHSand what
are their implications? Focusingon AH service delivery through community-based
initiatives, what are the criteria needed to assesssuch delivery systems?What
are the key elements needed for these systemsto be sustainable?
These issueswhere first pointed out by the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (UN-FAO).To elucidate these issues, the UN-FAOrequested the
author to undertake a study on AH systems.Topics that were of especial interest
to FAO were the economic rationale behind government intervention in AH
systemsand the existing funding mechanismsand options for the activities that
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fall into the public sector domain. Linked to the latter is the delivery AH
services.
From 2002 to 2005 the author was based in a Department for International
Development (DfID, UK) funded project within FAO's Department for Animal
Production and Health (AGA), in the Policy Branch's (AGAL)Pro-Poor Livestock
Policy Initiative (PPLPI). In that context, the author was able to participate in
FAOofficial missions during the AI outbreak in Vietnam during 2004 and 2005.
Hence, the author was sent as an international consultant to assist the
Government of Vietnam in restructuring the public finance component of the AI
emergency control strategy.
In addition, from September 2002 to January 2003the author performed the field
data collection with the African Union/International Bureaufor Animal Resources
(AU!IBAR) in Nairobi at the Community-based Animal health and Participatory
Epidemiology Unit (CAPE), also a DflD-funded project'. The field collection
focused on the sustainability of community-based animal health service delivery
was undertaken in Kenya'spastoral areas.
The outcomes of both missions are documented in a join publication of FAO-
AU/IBAR in the case of Kenya (Riviere-Cinnamondand Eregae 2003), and in an
official FAO internal report in the case of Vietnam (Riviere-Cinnamond2005).
These two documentswill therefore be quoted in this thesis.
1.3 Objectives
The overall objectives of the thesis are the following:
2 Project in collaboration with FAD PPLPI.
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1. To demonstrate the usefulness of applying a new perspective in the economic
analysisof animal health systems(chapter 2);
2. To identify the structure and components of animal health systems and the
possiblemechanismsfor financing animal health activities (chapter 3);
3. To elaborate a conceptual framework in which to assesscommunity-based animal
health service delivery in rural areasat national level (chapter 4);
4. To assessthe "ideal qualities" needed in animal health workers in order for
community-based animal health systems in Kenyan pastoral areas to be
sustainable (chapter 5).
However, for each of the chapters, detailed objectives are elaborated.
1.4 Methodology and materials
It is important to highlight that the perspectives used in the thesis to analyse
animal health systemsand their interaction with the public health arena had not
been previously used. The viewpoint of the thesis is therefore novel, highlighting
the gap existing in the literature regarding the health-agriculture divide.
Thus, characteristic of the thesis is the underlying comparison, in all sections, of
animal healthcare systems and human healthcare system. Similarities between
the two systems have already been described in earlier papers (Leonard 2000).
Leonard stated that "the two professions [human and animal medicine] are close
enough that [their] differences help each to look at its own structures and
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operations in new and illuminating ways" (Leonard 2000). The theoretical
framework used for analysing human healthcare markets is therefore used in this
study to illustrate the mechanismsunderlying the animal healthcare market.
As previously mentioned, the thesis tackles three main subjects (economic
analysis of animal health services, funding mechanisms, and service delivery in
remote areas). Each of the sections requires specific methodologies and
materials, which are detailed below.
1.4.1 Economic analysis applied to the animal health sector
The way in which economic analysis of animal health services has evolved since
the 1990sis described in chapter 2. A comparison is madewith economic theories
underlying the provision of human healthcare serviceswhere the debate started
much earlier (in the 1960s). Special emphasis is put on how these perspectives
have influenced the privatisation policy. Particularly, the analysis focuseson how
the way in which 'public good' is defined affects their financing and provision.
Key references quoted are authors such as Stiglitz and CuUis and Jones. In
particular, Stiglitz is quoted in the context of market failure, which is
consequently applied in the AH health sector, and CuUisand Jones regarding the
classification of goods. Other authors include Meade 1952; Samuelson 1954;
Buchanan 1968; Musgrave 1969; Stigler 1971; Coase 1974; Evans 1974; Sandler
1977;Wiseman1980.
1.4.2 Funding mechanisms for animal health systems
A literature review on the existing mechanisms to fund AHS was needed.
Nonetheless, key authors in this section are Musgravewhen dealing with the
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public finance structure, and Murray and Frenk when analysing the structural
components of health services. The literature reviewed relates to three main
subjects:
(i) Public finance economics (e.g. Musgrave 1959; Musgrave 1969; Buchanan
1975; Musgrave and Musgrave 1989; Cullis and Jones 1998; Stiglitz 2000;
Stiglitz 2002),
(ii) Healthcare systems financing (e.g. Propper 1995; Kutzin 1997; Murray and
Frenk 2000; Kutzin 2001;Mossialos,Dixon, Figueraset al. 2002; Normandand
Busse 2002; Precker, Jakab and Schneider 2002). However, Murray and
Frenk's article "A framework for assessing the performance of health
systems" (Murray and Frenk 2000) is used as a basis to describe the
organisation of animal health systems. The rationale behind the use of this
article is that it focuses precisely on the perspective that is lacking in the
animal health literature, that is, looking at AHS as a whole system.
Additionally, the article is interesting in that it introduces a wider definition
of 'health systems', which clearly points out the public health role of animal
health systems. Nonetheless, it could be argued that Murray and Frenk's
article is too descriptive, but this is compensated by usingMusgrave'spublic
finance theory. And, finally,
(iii) The few examples in the animal health financing literature (Anteneh 1984;
FAO1992; FAO1997;Mathema and Joshi 2000; Smith 2001; Jabbar, Ehui and
von Kaufmann 2002; Evans, Doering,· Clarke et al. 2003; Gimeno 2003;
Gongora 2003; Government-of-Australia 2003; Sidibe 2003; Van Asseldonk,
Meuwissen,Huirne et al. 2003).
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1.4.2.1 Methods
However, literature on funding mechanisms for animal health services is very
scarce. Therefore, to obtain such data it was necessary to generate a
questionnaire. The aim of the questionnaire was to gather details on the current
mechanismsand options governments have to fund their animal health services.
To that purpose, a close-ended questionnaire was produced (available in annex
1).
Inputs from FAOsenior staff members were given during the elaboration of the
questionnaire, which was tested (in Guinea, because of FAO contacts at
governmental level) and consequently modified. Originally, the questionnaire
was supposed to be generated by FAO and distributed to the animal health
departments of OlE member countries (Office International des Epizooties -
World Organisation for Animal Health, which is the international body dealing
with animal health. It is also the standard setting body for sanitary standards in
the animal health field under the World Trade Organisation (WTO)). However,
due to time constraints and political disagreement between senior management
in both organisations it was only possible to perform this questionnaire in Senegal
(however, it is expected that when discrepancies between entities are resolved,
the questionnaire will be sent to OlE member countries). Senegalwas chosen
because the regional hub coordinator for West Africa (Dr Sheik Ly) of the Pro-
Poor Policy Initiative where the author was working, is based in Senegal. It was
therefore easier, through Dr Ly, to hire a local consultant (with adequate
knowledge of economic and financial concepts) to perform the questionnaire. To
that aim, the consultant (Mr Brice Laifa) was in charge of finding out the
different persons concerned with the financial and structural sections the
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questionnaire seeks to tackle (given that not all the information was
concentrated in one single ministry).
As mentioned in the previous section, one of the aims of the research is to
analyse AH systems as a whole entity, from financing to delivery. Therefore,
having examined the economic rationale behind government's involvement in AH
systemsas well as the ways in which these may be financed, the last section of
the thesis focuseson service delivery.
1.4.3 Service delivery through community-based initiatives
In order to analyse the community-based service delivery branch of AHS, and
following the comparative rationale of the thesis between human and animal
health systems, the methodology included:
(i) A comparative literature review between community-based (human) health
workers (CHW) (e.g. Walt 1981; Ofosu 1983; Rifkin 1983; Berman 1984;
Nichter 1986; Bender and Pitkin 1987; Chabot and Bremmers1988; Rifkin,
Muller and Bichmann 1988; Walt 1988; Bentley 1989; Walt, Perera and
Heggenhougen1989; Walt, Ross,Gilson et at. 1989) and community-based
animal health workers (CAHWs) (e.g. Holden, Ashley and Bazeley 1996;
Holden and Chema 1996; Holden 1997; Koma 2000; Woods2000; Catley and
Leyland 2001; Heffernan 2001; Huttner, Leidl, Pfeiffer et at. 2001; Huttner,
Leidl, Pfeiffer et at. 2001; Catley and Leyland 2002; Catley, Lynen and
Nalitolela 2002; Catley andMariner 2002; Curran and MacLehose2002; GI-LSP
2003; Sonesand Catley 2003), and
(ii) A case study (field research data collection) on the selection process and
sustainability of CAHWsin pastoralist areas in Kenya. The research was
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undertaken as one objective of the KenyanVeterinary Board is to standardise
CAHWselection, training and supervision procedures with a view to ensuring
quality at national level. Experience to date indicates that draft policies and
guidelines tend to prioritise the views of central policy makers above the
perceptions and needs of livestock keepers. For example, in the area of
CAHWselection it is widely believed by veterinarians that CAHWsmust have
received someeducation and be literate. Theseviews tend to contradict field
experience and the relatively high drop out rate of literate as opposed to
illiterate workers.
Nonetheless, the economic analysis performed in chapter 2 is used as the
analytical tool throughout the service delivery chapter as well as the case study
(namely, chapters ~ and l).
1.4.3.1 Methods
The choice of country for the data collection was based on the interests
expressed by the AUIIBAR Community-based Animal Health and Participatory
Epidemiology (CAPE) Unit and in collaboration with UN-FAOand local non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), namely Intermediate Technology
Development Group (ITDG), Wajir South Development Association (WASDA)and
Community Initiative Facilitation Assistance (CIFA). Especially relevant to this
section is the current situation in East Africa regarding policies in the animal
health field. Policy makers in the animal health field in EastAfrica are currently
reviewing policy and legislation on CAHWs. This process is coordinated by
veterinary boards but involves various central-level stakeholders such as State
Veterinary Services, veterinary associations, veterinary schools and NGOs.CAPE
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Unit from AU/IBAR is currently supporting policy and legislative change in the
Horn of Africa (HoA) region.
The field research in Kenyan pastoral areas of West Pokot, Wajir and Marsabit
(see annex 4) intended to compare the views of policy makers (PM)and livestock
keepers (LK) vis-a-vis the qualities regarded as "ideal" for CAHWs.Deriving from
these selection procedures of CAHWs, their impact on sustainability of
community-based AH systems is also debated. The fieldwork draws from a
methodology used in a previous study in the human health community-based
service delivery in Guatemala, performed by Ruebush (Ruebush_lI,Weller and
Klein 1994). This study therefore adds, in the animal health arena, an innovative
perspective in the analysis of CAHsystemsby investigating sustainability issues.
Chapter 5 will describe in detail the methods used during the field research as
well as for the analysisof the results obtained.
Having seen the methodology and materials needed, next section briefly
introduces the way in which the thesis is structured.
1.5 Organisation of the thesis
Following the logic of the previous section, the thesis will be divided into six
main chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the backgroundand objectives of the study
aswell as the methodology and materials needed to obtain these objectives.
Economic analysis of animal healthcare services is introduced in chapter 2.
Although this chapter presents the trends in economic analysisof AHSduring the
past decade, it focuseson the implications of the use of one Singleperspective.
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It therefore proposes and examines the implications of using three different
economic perspectives in the taxonomy of goodsand services.
The analysis of the existing options to fund AH systemsis provided in chapter 3.
It therefore presents a theoretical framework to assessfunding mechanisms.
Several examples of mix-funding sources from the literature are examined. The
chapter also includes the data obtained through the questionnaire on financing
AHSadministered in Senegal.
Chapter 4 focuses on service delivery through community-based initiatives. The
chapter presents a comparisonwith the human health counterpart of community
health workers. It exposesthe different directions, though convergent, the two
systemshave taken as well as the underlying reasons. Service provision in AH is
consequently analysed through a new prism in the animal health literature.
Criteria such as equity, efficiency, access, quality of care, financial and human
resources are elaborated as main areas to be taken into account when
implementing community-based initiatives at a national scale in the AHsector.
Specifically focusing on the human resource criteria presented in chapter 4,
chapter 5 presents the data collection in Kenya. The field study, which was
performed in pastoral areas, namely West Pokot, Wajir and Marsabit, aimed at
elucidating the selection process of community-based workers and their role in
the sustainability of CAHsystemsin arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL).
The descriptive analysis performed in chapters 3, 4 and 5 are discussed in
chapter 6 under the economic lens introduced in chapter 2. Chapter 6 draws on
the similarities arising between the thesis topic and Pearce's debate over
38
environmental economics putting forward the poUcy impUcations associated to
AH. The last section of chapter 6 pulls together the main conclusions of the
research and provides an insight of the areas that would need further research.
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2 Economic analysis applied to the animal health
sector
2. 1 Introduction
2.1.1 Background
The first economic analysisof the provision of animal healthcare services (and of
livestock services in a broader sense)was undertaken by the World Bankin 1991-
1992 (deHaan and Bekure 1991; Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan 1992). As
previously mentioned, its aim was to provide guidance to governments in
developing countries, especially in sub-SaharanAfrica, on the privatisation of
services based on economic principles. In most developing countries however,
privatisation has not delivered the desired results (Dorward, Kydd and Poulton
1998). Since privatisation, the primary focus of research into livestock services
has been directed towards analysing their performance while only a few authors
have revisited the underlying economic theories that had driven the policy of
privatisation in the first place (Leonard 1985; Leonard 1993; Ahuja, George,
McConnelet at. 2000; Koma2000; Leonard2000; Ly 2000).
The perspective taken in the present study differs from most previous ones.
Firstly, it takes a retrospective look at the evolution of the application of
economic theory to animal health service privatisation, providing alternatives for
examining the sector following various economic theorists and their underlying
(different) philosophical perspectives [such as Williamson, Buchanan, Peston,
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Coase, Cullis and Jones, Stiglitz]. Secondly, the study builds on a comparative
analysisusingeconomic theories developed in the human healthcare sector in the
1960sand 1970s,much earlier than their application in the animal health sector,
in order to identify reasons for the failure of the process of privatisation of
animal healthcare in many developing countries.
The study focuses on the rationale for comparing human and animal healthcare
sectors, reviews the different perspectives taken by economic theorists in
empirical economic studies and examines the implications of differing
perspectives for the analysis of the animal healthcare sector. It aims to provide
guidance on the possible role of government in countries where the privatisation
of animal healthcare services has been undertaken and attempts to identify the
actors and factors that determine how these services function and, in tum, how
these actors and factors can be influenced. Further, the study endeavours to
draw lessonsfrom past experiences that could be of use for those countries that
still have to adopt privatisation polictes in their animal health services.
2.1.2 Objectives
The specific objectives of this chapter are:
1. To highlight the evolution of the perspectives taken in the past in relation to
the economic analysisof animal health servicesand their implications;
2. To explore the value of adopting a new approach to the empirical economic
analysisof animal healthcare systems;
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3. To examine what the role of government should be in the animal healthcare
sector;
4. To provide guidance on how to smooth the transition processof privatisation
of animal health systemsin developing countries.
2.1.3 Organisation of the chapter
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2.2 introduces the underlying
rationale for the comparison of animal and human healthcare sectors, followed
by a definition and description of AHSand related activities. This section also
presents the philosophical perspective taken in the study and argues the reasons
for market failure in the AH sector. Section 2.3 provides an overview of the
taxonomy of goods (and services) following different viewpoints in economic
theory and their implications. Section 2.4 focuses on publicly provided private
goods and the role of government, with special attention on remote rural areas
in pre- and post-privatisation settings. Finally, section 2.S presents the
conclusionsand proposessomepolicy recommendations.
2.2 Economics of animal health systems
2.2.1 Rationale for the comparative analysis of human and animal
healthcare sectors
Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan (1992) were pioneers in analysing the
livestock service (and thus animal healthcare) sector from an economic
perspective, as was Leonard (2000) by comparing animal and human health
systems. The underlying rationale of Leonard's comparison was based on the
similarities existing between the two systems at scientific and
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structural/organisational levels. Hence, Leonard's starting point for the
comparison lies in that "the biological science that undergirds human and
veterinary medicine is the same; in fact a great deal of medical research on
which the treatment of humansdepends is actually veterinary research, for it is
conducted on an array of animals. Although the various species of mammals do
have important differences in their responsesto disease and treatment, there
are significant physiological parallels and many diseases- and cures - passback
and forth across the human / animal divide" (Leonard 2000). Not only did he
match the scientific side of the two professions but he also highlighted that
"physicians and veterinarians receive similar training, work in professions that
are structured much like one another, and oversee analogous hierarchies of
paraprofessionalsand auxiliaries", and enjoy an information advantageover their
clients (Leonard2000).
However, important differences exist between the two professions. First, the
two professionshave different histories and thus different conventions and goals.
Second, specialisation is not as extensive in veterinary medicine as in human
medicine. Third, hospitals play different roles in the two professions in relation
to treatment. Fourth, distance is a heavier constraint for receiving or obtaining
professional care in the animal health field than in the human health one
(Leonard 1993; Leonard 2000). And fifth, different values are attached to human
and animal life.
While accepting that there are differences, nevertheless their similarities give
sufficient common ground to enable empirical comparisonsbetween the systems.
However, before beginning a market analysis of animal healthcare systems it is
necessaryto define their componentsand structure.
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2.2.2 Defining animal health systems
Several authors (deHaan and Bekure 1991; Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan
1992; Holden 1999) have attempted defining the boundaries of AHS. Some
services, for example clinical services, are always included in such definitions.
However, other aspects affecting animal and human health, e.g. extension,
public health, are not always systematically taken into account. As an
illustration, public health would not only include the classical zoonotic disease
control and prevention and meat inspection, but also some aspects generally
neglected to date such as hygiene, food processingand conservation, as well as
animal waste management. Other aspects related to public health are those
linked to research and development such as the use of animals as models for the
development of new technologies.
One of the main purposesof AHSevidently is to improve animal health in order
to increase animal productivity and hence humannutrition and welfare. There is,
however, another aspect of AHSthat is usually overlooked: its contribution to the
protection of human health. This follows the lines of thought of Murray and Frenk
(2000), who define human healthcare systems after the concept of 'health
action'. Thus, a health action is defined by "any activities whose primary intent
is to improve or maintain [human] health" (Murray and Frenk 2000). Their
definition puts forward the conflict arising when dealing with some parts of the
animal healthcare sector. Due to the dual nature of public health aspects of AH
systems, frameworks for analysing the subject with a systematic and methodical
approach (of either economic aspects or funding mechanisms)have not yet been
sufficiently developed.
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The next sections introduce the different components of the 'broader' definition
of AHSthat will be followed by a taxonomy of AH services along the perspectives
of different economic schools.
2.2.3 The structure of animal health services
Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan (1992) divided animal health services (AHS)
into three main categories: (i) curative services, (ii) preventive services and
regulatory bansand (iii) pharmaceutical supply. In this study, this categorisation
is enlarged to include three other components: (iv) public health, (v)
education/extension and (vi) research and development. Of course all these
elements are closely intertwined.
First, curative services relate mainly to the treatment of diseased animals
through diagnosisand the useof drugs. Second,preventive servicesare meant to
stop occurrence of new casesof diseasein animals. This is achieved through the
use of vaccines, the eradication or control of vectors and/or carriers, and
through the application of measuressuch as segregation. Examplesof preventive
services include: dipping, quarantine, slaughter of at risk animals, movement
restrictions, import and export control of livestock products, inspection and
control of animal products, etc. Third, the supply of pharmaceuticals for
livestock (for both curative and preventive measures)includes the production of
veterinary pharmaceuticals, and the quality control, marketing and distribution
of the products. The fourth category, public health, relates to the control of
zoonotic and food-borne diseases, hygiene, food and feed safety and
environmental aspects, which relate to, for example, water contamination due
to mismanagement of animal waste, vector control (e.g. zoonotic vector-borne
diseases control such as Sleeping Sickness, Rift Valley Fever, Chagasdisease,
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etc.). The fifth component encompasses extension in animal health and nutrition
and public health education. Finally, the sixth component relates to research and
development. Although Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan (1992) included this
category in preventive services it is important to treat it separately as it
concerns not only research in livestock vaccines and disease-resistant or tolerant
breeds but also to the elaboration and assessment of new technologies and
delivery mechanisms.
Prevention
Vaccination
Vector control/eradication
Regulatory bans
Slaughter of diseased animal
Movement restrictions/quarantines
Zoonotic / food-borne
disease control
Meat inspection
Food and feed safety
Environment
Extension/Education
Health extension
Nutrition extension
Public health education
However, rather than by technical aspects, animal health services can also be
classified and defined following economic concepts. Some of these economic
viewpoints, which are important for the analysis of animal healthcare systems,
are introduced in this chapter.
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2.2.4 A public choice approach to the analysis of animal health
services
In 1975, Buchanandrew attention to methodological issuesregarding the analysis
of public expenditure and the nature and structure of collective decisions of
what was the traditional public finance approach (Buchanan 1975). Following
theories on government behaviour, the government's role can be analysed (i)
through the public interest approach or (ii) through the public choice school
(Cullis and Jones1998).
The public interest approach looks at markets and governments in an idealised
way, based on the underlying assumption that public interventions are able to
eliminate inefficiencies caused by market failure. Using this approach, to date,
economic analysis in the animal healthcare market has mostly focused on
outcome efficiency. This refers to the Pareto optimum or top-level efficient
economy. This is the perspective that was taken by most authors in the AH field
at the beginning of the privatisation processin developing countries (deHaanand
Bekure 1991; Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan 1992; Umali-Deininger, Narrod
and Deininger 1994). Briefly, what this perspective emphasizes are the
requirements that allocation of resources should reflect individual preferences,
ensuring that each good or service is priced at its marginal cost, relative to other
services these resources might have produced. This traditional 'outcome'
approach, exemplified in the economic literature by Musgrave (1959, 1969) and
Musgraveand Musgrave (1989), is normative in its orientation as it attempts to
determine how 'economically correct' decisionscan be established for the public
sector (Cullis and Jones1998).
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The public interest perspective was taken by the above-mentioned authors with
the aim of advising governments in developing countries, especially in sub-
SaharanAfrica in view of the fiscal collapse of most of the states, also known as
the 'Great African Depression' during the 1980sand 1990s (Leonard 2000), on
which components should be privatised in the animal healthcare sector. This
approach was new in the early 1990s and economic theory backed up the
reasoning. But it should be noted that, to date, as pointed out in section .L.1, the
privatisation process (in most countries) did not yield the expected positive
outcomes (Helleiner 1992; Schatz 1996; Bennell 1997). The same holds true for
the privatisation of AHS (Dorward, Kydd and Poulton 1998). Hence, there is a
need to consider other economic theories that could be applied to the analysisof
AHS, to assessthe main differences between the previous and other economic
theories, and to identify possible reasons for the failure of the privatisation
processwhile giving feasible alternatives to redressthe current situation.
The perspective taken in this paper for the analysis of AHS is that of public
choice theorists, who consider that public interventions and interests can add
inefficiencies to the existing regulation. They believe that governments are not
free in their choices but depend on powerful interest groups. Hence, given the
context and political interests behind national agricultural agendas in most
developing (as well as developed) countries, policy-makers' choices and
behaviours cannot be separated from the interests affected by the decisions
taken. Similarly, an economic perspective first used by Wiseman in the 1960s
(Wiseman1960;Wiseman1980), referred to as processefficiency, recognisesthe
weakness of the principle of marginal equivalence in detracting attention from
the equally important efficiency in allocative techniques, which refers to how
accessto animal healthcare serviceswill be rationed or priorities set to attribute
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resources efficiently. Thus, the perspective has changed from viewing the
government as 'outside' of the analysis and largely 'unproblematic' (interested
in outcome efficiency) to a point of view that Includes non-market determined
decision-making. Wiseman's viewpoint emphasises that attention should be
drawn towards the procedures of decision-making and not exclusively to the
outcomes. The underlying challenge is to determine whether an alternative
decision-making processcould have produced a 'closer to optimal' outcome. In
relation to the AH field, this is the most recent perspective taken and mostly
relates to authors like Leonard, Komaand Ahuja. This perspective is new in the
AHSin that previous authors did not consider decision-making processesmight
hinder reaching optimal outcomes.
Along the lines of public choice theory, Stigler (1971) first discussedthe idea that
regulation is the result of special interests that provide financial and political
support in return for favoured legislation (Stigler 1971). Hence, there is a
demand for political favours arising from special interest groups. An example of
this situation is given by the current reluctance of somemembers of the Kenyan
Veterinary Board (KVB)in legalising the status of community-based animal health
workers (CAHWs). Laffont and Tirole (1993) have tried to extend the public
choice perspective to reflect the regulatory environment and capture the nature
of the constraints that prevent the regulator from implementing the preferred
policy (Laffont and Tirole 1993). Three key constraints were highlighted: (i)
information gaps, referring to whether the regulator hassufficient information or
if it has to be obtained, and how costly this process may be; (ii) transaction
costs, given that in the presenceof a regulatory contract the cost of writing this
contract as well as the surrounding contingencies should be taken into account;
and (iii) administrative and political constraints. Relating to the agricultural and
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public health context is the example highlighted by Propper where she raised the
issue of regulatory capture in the context of the British National Health System
(NHS)(Propper 1995). However, the concept of regulatory capture started in the
1960s (Stigler and Fiedland 1962). This refers to a regulating agency, which has
close associationwith the regulated and thus may be more sympathetic towards
the latter than to other stakeholders. The regulatee 'captures' or takes control
of the regulator and sets the regulatory process to work on their behalf. The
handling of the BSEcrisis in the UKprovides an important policy example of the
regulatory capture situation. The UK'sMinistry of Agriculture, Fisheriesand Food
(MAFF)3was 'captured' by powerful industrial interest groups, thus failing in its
way of dealing with the crisis.
In summary, the outcome or 'traditional approach' refers to normative or
welfare economics, which attempts to evaluate or judge alternative policies,
weighing up the various benefits and costs. The outcome approach thus shows
how 'economically correct' decisions can be reached in the public sector. The
process-oriented or public choice school, although implying normative analysis,
takes a more positive economics perspective - that is using and constructing
models that describe and predict either how the economy will change or the
effects of different policies - as it takes into consideration the self-interested
behaviour of the different actors in the public sector context. What these two
schools have in common is the fact that they are based in the so-called
'methodological individualism'. Individuals are thus the units of analysisand best
judges of their welfare, individual valuations of arrangementsare what matter.
3 Now called DEFRA(Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs).
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Given the highly politicised environment surrounding the agricultural sector, a
move from a traditional economic analysis of the animal healthcare market
towards a public choice school analysis is recommended. The reasonsfor market
failure in the animal healthcare sector should also be analysed using the same
'public choice' perspective.
2.2.5 Market failure in the animal healthcare field
Following Stiglitz (2000), there are six conditions under which markets are not
Pareto-efficient. These conditions are referred to as market failures and provide
a rationale for government activity. These are (i) failure of competition, (ii)
existence of public goods, (iii) presence of externalities, (iv) presence of
incomplete markets, (v) information asymmetries or failures and (vi)
macroeconomic distortions (Stiglitz 2000). This section focuseson the conditions
existing in the animal healthcare market. The presenceof failures and rationale
for government intervention are consequently discussed.
For markets to result in Pareto efficiency there must be perfect competition.
This means there must be a sufficiently large number of 'firms or producers' so
that they consider they have no effect on prices. Taking into account that the
'producer' in the AH sector refers to animal health related workers (i.e.
veterinarians, animal health assistants (AHAs),community animal health workers
(CAHWs),etc.) it is possible to highlight at least two settings that are likely to
differ in terms of competition. The first one is the urban setting where, as in the
human health field, theoretically there is more availability of private primary
healthcare facilities and the consumer is able to choose between what the
market offers. Hence, prices are supposed to be 'adjusted' by competition
between service providers. Evidently, at this stage information asymmetries arise
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so that this competition is not perfect. But this is another market failure that will
be analysed later in this section. The second setting refers to remote rural or
pastoral areas. In these areas, there are not enough private suppliers of health
services (either for animal heath or human health) for market competition to
lead to Pareto-efficiency.
For the prices of AH services to be determined by competitive pressure in either
of the two settings there is a need for sufficient availability of veterinarians and
animal health assistants. Because veterinarians and animal health related
professionals usually require licenses in order to practice, licensing patterns are
likely to have an effect on competition. If they are able to control the granting
of licences to prospective colleagues, veterinarians may therefore have a certain
degree of power over market forces. Hence, they may be in a position where
they can restrict the competitive forces that should help minimising animal
healthcare costs.
If entry to the profession is restricted (barriers to entry) the amount of
healthcare provided will be less than what would be expected by market forces
as there will be fewer veterinarians. As there is a limited supply, prices of
veterinary services will be higher than what they would have otherwise been.
Yet, it has often been argued that licensing is required to maintain standards
given that the imbalance of information between consumer and provider arises
also at that level. This however leads to the recurrent problem in most remote
rural settings of unlicensed providers of services and advice. Even if standards
are set to deliver quality animal healthcare services, the lack of staff in remote
rural areas, combined with the existing demand from livestock keepers for AH
services, has led to the emergence of black markets and illegal drug sellers.
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Depending on the country, the fact that there is no staff in those areas is not
becauseof lack of licensed veterinarians but to the fact that they are not willing
to work in remote rural areasdue to the lack of infrastructure and amenities and
often presenceof insecurity. This is the casefor example of Kenya.
Nevertheless, delivering veterinary servicesexclusively through a private market
would also incur failures, as there are public goods that either will not be
supplied by the market or, if supplied, would be supplied in insufficient amounts.
Although the existence of 'pure' public goods has been widely debated in the
economic literature and will be further elaborated in relation to the AH field in
section 2.3, it is possible to acknowledge the presence of goods of low-rivalry
and low-excludability in the AHS.Also, following Stiglitz (2000), public goodscan
be seen as an extreme form of externality. Or, stated in another way,
externalities might be seen as a form of impure public goods. Several examples
can be found in the AH sector which highlight the presence of externalities
arising from farmers' or producers' actions and some are given in section 2.3.
Therefore another market failure applies to the animal healthcare market, as
economic theory predicts that resource allocation driven by pure market forces
under the presenceof externalities will not lead to optimal efficiency.
Public goods and services are not the only goods and services that private
markets do not provide adequately. Whenever private markets fail to provide a
good or service, even if the cost of providing it is less than what individuals are
willing to pay, there is a market failure referred to as incomplete markets. In a
perfect market, "consumers know exactly what they want, when they want it
and where they can get it" (Stiglitz 2000). In the healthcare setting this would
only be possible if the 'consumer' could foresee what will happen in the future.
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There are situations in animal healthcare that can be planned in advanceas, for
example, the avoidance of production losses due to worm infections through
regular deworming. However, there are many items of animal healthcare
consumption that cannot be planned in such way, as animal diseasemay strike
suddenly and/or unexpectedly. In addition, the health care required to overcome
such problems might be expensiveor even unaffordable (either assingle payment
or, if the condition persists over a period of time, through accumulation of
costs). These situations are at the origin of health insurance markets (see
sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4). Thus, insurance markets, whether state owned or
privately run, help counteracting the financial burden of uncertain consequences
of animal ill-health.
Two types of incomplete markets can arise: insurance markets and
complementary markets. The question why insurance markets are imperfect has
been extensively researched in the past two decades (Stiglitz 2000) and three
answers have been put forward: (i) deterrents to innovation; (ii) transaction
costs; and (iii) asymmetries of information and enforcement costs.
Innovation refers not only to the creation of new technologies, diagnostic
methods and drugs, but also to the design of new (animal health or livestock)
insurance policies. When no patent protection system exists for such policy
innovations there is a disincentive to innovation. As a result, it is expected that
there will be under-investment in the development of insurance mechanisms
(Stiglitz 2000). Aspointed out by Williamson (1996), and following Arrow's earlier
debates in relation to property rights and information, "if investment in
innovation cannot lawfully be protected or if nominal protection (e.g. patent) is
ineffective, then (i) the ex-ante incentives to make such investments are
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impaired and (ii) the incentives to embed such investments in protective ex-post
governancestructures are increased" (Williamson 1996).
The lack of introduction of many 'insurance products' is related to transaction
costs. Williamson pioneered in the analysis of markets by using the 'transaction
cost' approach (e.g. Williamson 1979). Analysingmarket from a transaction cost
perspective pinpoints the difficulties in which markets run in the presenceof the
following three conditions: (i) asset specificity with respect to user/s, (ii)
bounded rationality of individuals (i.e. individuals exhibit limited computational
and information processing capacities), and (iii) opportunistic self-seeking
behaviour. In situations where all three apply, contracts cannot successfullydeal
with the situation (Cullis and Jones 1998).The underlying principle introduced by
Williamson into economics is the organisation of transaction costs to minimise
effects of individuals' bounded rationality whilst safeguarding them from
opportunism. Individuals' bounded rationality refers to the limited computational
and information processing capacities of individuals (Cullis and Jones 1998).
Along these same lines, Dugger highlights the role of the state as a transaction
cost minimiser (Dugger1993). However, he regards the state differently than the
traditional public finance school. He sees the state as an agent that "defines
property rights, resolves disputes and monitors performance" (Cullis and Jones
1998). When engaging in the AH market, an insurance firm (for example a
cooperative delivering AHSto several farmers, livestock insurance, etc.) might
be reluctant to invest in the design of an (new) insurance policy if it is unsure
whether anyonewill buy the policy.
Large organisations have the possibility of reducing the costs per unit produced
as they can distribute the fixed costs acrosstheir products leading to economies
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of scale. An example might be marketing as independently of how many people
are insured, marketing costs remain the same. Thus the more people insured the
less expensive are marketing costs per consumer. This also applies for
administrative tasks as processing bills and collecting premiums. In markets
where there are numerous competing insurance companies, economies of scale
are unlikely to arise as each company has its own administrative and marketing
costs. The administrative and marketing costs per individual might be higher than
when these costs are shared within a bigger population size. A larger
administration could spread the administrative costs over more consumersand
thus costs per consumerwould be reduced. However the problem of an insurer
monopoly, which could be exploitative, may arise. A public monopoly would be
an alternative as low costs could be maintained without the risk of exploitation.
This 'friction' or transaction cost could also be reduced if premium collection
was 'piggy-backed' on to the tax collection system.
Neoclassical economic theories consider transaction costs to be very small (or
zero). This is why market mechanismsare often considered a better option than
any government intervention. To decide whether a good or service should be
provided publicly, there is a "need to compare the savings in transaction costs
plus the gain from increasing consumption, with the loss from excessive
consumption of the good plus the loss from distortions created by the taxes
required to finance the provision of the good or service" (Stiglitz 2000).
However, as mentioned above, Williamson showsthat transaction costs are likely
to arise in the real market economy (Williamson 1979).
Transactions costs arise generally because information is imperfect (Cullis and
Jones 1998). According to Cullis and Jones (1998) they can be classified into (i)
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"search costs", which are associated to establishing "the distribution and
location of offers to trade"; (ii) "bargaining and negotiating costs", which refer
to the costs coupled with "establishing what the terms of mutually beneficial
agreement to trade will be"; and (iii) "contract costs", which are those related
to enforcing and monitoring the conditions of trade.
In the animal health sector, as in many others, middlemen exist (formally or
informally) to reduce these transaction costs as they deal with information.
However, when middlemen exist informally, there is no monitoring system, which
may give rise to undesirable behaviour such as moral hazard and opportunism.
This holds especially true in the case of rural remote areas, where information
asymmetries are bigger. Hence, as in the case that will be explored in chapter 5
regarding community-basedworkers, community members rely on "trust" on the
candidate during the selection process. Similarly, during the recent AI outbreak
in Vietnam (in 2004-2005),given that middlemen are usedas links between small
poultry producers and the market, and that they work informally, it was difficult
to monitor animal movements (farmers were also moving their own animals)
(Riviere-Cinnamond2005). Consequencesof such behaviour give rise to, not only
transaction costs given that the farmer tends to receive a much lower amount
than the true market value of the animal, but also, and most importantly in this
case, to public health hazards because the opportunistic behaviour of the
informal middlemen increases the probability of AI spread (as they are difficult
to monitor).
The third set of reasons for imperfections in insurance markets relates to
asymmetries of information and enforcement costs. An insurance company or
cooperative that provides animal health services is normally less aware of the
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animal health risks than the farmer enrolling. Hence, adverse selection is likely
to arise. Adverse selection is a consequencefor insurance markets arislng from
information asymmetry. Insurancecompaniesmay have no idea of the risk status
of particular animals or herds and a premium reflecting the general animal
health risk would be collected. Risk can be calculated in relation to different
variables. These can be the number of animals, type of breeds, diseasestatus in
the zone where the farmer is settled, and probability of diseaseoccurrence etc.
The premium paid by all those who take out insurancewould be the same. This is
called 'community-rating' and reflects the 'average risk' level of the insured
livestock population. For those livestock keeperswho perceive that their animals
are at low diseaserisk, this premium might seem too high.
Therefore they will choosenot to insure their livestock. The consequencewill be
that the average risk of the insured livestock population will rise due to low risk
herders not insuring. As the average risk will now be higher, the premium will
need to rise and other farmers will opt out of the insurance scheme. This
process,whereby the lowest risks drop out of the insured group is called adverse
selection. In a competitive market the responseof insurance companieswill be
to tailor their insurance premiums to the risks of various groups of herders (for
example in relation to the number, age, and breed of animals as well as bio-
security measuresadopted), rather than leaving a low risk group of non-insured
farmers. This method of premium setting is called 'experience rating'. Asa result
of this process, higher risk groups might have to pay higher insurance premiums
to maintain coverage, which they might not be able to afford. It is important to
point out that the higher risk groups could be poor and uneducated (in animal
health) smallholders, but could also include those who are not necessarily poor,
but start raising livestock without animal health knowledge. This process,
whereby low risk individuals are drawn into low-premium plans is referred in the
literature as 'cream-skimming' or 'cherry picking' (Donaldsonand Gerard 1993;
Mossialos,Dixon, Figueraset al. 2002).
Furthermore, in the animal health sector there are also problems associatedwith
the absenceof complementary markets. This is of most relevance in developing
countries where large-scale coordination is required in order to develop certain
types of programmes(Stiglitz 2000). The integration of the sparseinitiatives that
deliver animal health in rural and peri-urban areas (NGOprogrammes, private
initiatives, etc.) into a wider national animal health system will need some
degree of government coordination. Therefore one of the objectives of
government development agenciesis to provide that coordination (governancein
the context of community-based initiatives will be discussedin section 4.4.3).
However, governments too face transaction costs, enforcement problems and
asymmetries of information although in many instances they differ from those in
the private sector. As pointed out by Leonard (1993, 2000), a number of
countries have suffered a significant increase in transaction costs within the
state activities since their independence. These come, for example, from
corruption, patronage and inflated public payrolls. Incentives in these conditions
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tend to be perverse, negative or weak, leading to opportunisms and low levels of
public sector performance (Leonard 1993; Leonard2000).
It has been shown that in incomplete animal healthcare markets there are
information failures. Assumingperfect knowledge in a healthcare market means
that the consumer (herder) is aware of the health status of his animals and knows
all the options available to contribute to the improvement of their health. It is
also assumed that the herder knows how much each of these options can
59
contribute to enhance their animals' health and is able to evaluate the relative
quality of each of these options. From a market economic perspective, customers
of both human and animal health services have less knowledge and information
on the available treatment/preventive options than the physicians or
veterinarians respectively (Leonard 1993; Leonard 2000). Buyersand sellers have
unequal information, which is easily explained by the fact that physicians and
veterinarians have invested considerably in their education and training. For
minor common ailments and chronic diseases,herders may be aware not only of
the condition of their animals but also of the treatment options available (e.g.
mastitis). However, this is less likely to be the case for acute, severe and rare
conditions, while sub-clinical disease would go unnoticed. Accumulation of
knowledge by livestock keepers is determined by the regularity in which they use
the market. Someelements of knowledge are thus obtained by accumulation of
'learning from mistakes'.
Given the technological relationship between veterinary services and animal
health, and taking into account that the health market is not regularly visited,
herders will often not be in a position to judge what the consequencesof certain
diseaseswould be in the absence of a veterinary service. In these cases the
advice of a qualified and knowledgeable 'expert', who is familiar with the
'market', i.e. a veterinarian, is required. The need for an expert is further
enhanced by the nature of the decision faced by the consumer. Dependingon the
commodity, taking the wrong decision might only have minor consequences.
However, in the animal healthcare market errors in decision-making can lead to
serious consequences, which might go well beyond what an individual might
afford. A farmer might for example lose his entire herd, a country might lose an
export market or a zoonotic disease could seriously affect consumers. The
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information asymmetry between practitioner and herder leads to an agency
relationship between the provider and the recipient of animal health services
(this is expanded in section 3.2). Such relationship links with Arrow's agency
theory (Arrow 1985) highlighting the possibility that moral hazard arises.
Following the assumption of perfect knowledge consumers (herders) would act
freely in their own interest when deciding what to consume/purchase and what
not to consume/purchase. Under the same conditions, suppliers (veterinarians)
would also act in their own interest when providing commodities most highly
valued by consumersrelative to their prices. But taking into account the lack of
perfect knowledge in the health care market on the part of the herders or stock
owners, veterinarians are often placed in the position of providing expert advice
to herders about care to be provided by themselves or their colleagues. Thus the
supplier of care is able to influence substantially the demand for that care.
In insurance-basedhealthcare systemsthere is the possibility of 'excessdemand'
not only from the consumer's side but also from the provider's side (Evans1974).
Consumer's moral hazard arises in two scenarios and will depend on what the
stockowner is insured against. First, the fact of being insured reduces the
financial burden of having diseasedanimals. Thus, these situations become less
undesirable and incentives to apply preventive measuresare diminished resulting
in increased probabilities of requiring AH care. Second, should disease appear,
the insured herder does not have to pay (or a small part) for AH services at the
point of use, which encourageshim/her to use more than s/he would otherwise
havedone.
Provider's moral hazard can result from a lack of awareness of costs (for
example, lack of awarenessof the price of the drugs prescribed), or from the use
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of fee-for-service (FFS)remuneration for veterinarians or other AH professional.
in which fees depart from 'market' prices (see section 4.4.2.1). In systemsusing
FFSas a remuneration method, AH professionalsare paid a fee for each item of
service provided to herders. Conventional wisdom in such systems says that AH
professionals have an incentive to provide care in excess of what would be if
consumerswere fully informed. This phenomenonis also known in the literature
as 'supplier-induced demand' (Evans1974). If the fee is greater than the true
competitive price, then there will be an incentive for over-providing. Conversely,
if the fee is lower than its true competitive price, there will be an incentive to
under-provide.
Becauseof the asymmetry of information, consumersare not able to moderate
this behaviour and when using a third party payer or insurer, consumersdo not
even have an incentive to temper such behaviour. It is therefore important to
counteract moral hazard. This is normally done through financial incentives or
disincentives as for example a capitation form of payment. Capitation is often
used in the human healthcare sector as a method of payment in primary care
(this applies to the private - e.g. health maintenance organisations (HMOs)- as
well as public context). "Doctors receive an annual payment in advance to care
for each individual who elects to join their lists. The main advantageclaimed for
this method is that it motivates doctors in the primary care sector to practice in
a way that encourages patients to join their lists although it could be in the
doctor's advantage to attract only low-cost people" (Donaldson and Gerard
1993). Calculating the capitation fee may differ from a single flat rate for all
patients to a risk related calculation fee. However, these mechanisms will
depend on the financing structure of the healthcare system in each country,
which in turn is related to what consumers (herders) want from the providers
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(veterinarians or AH professionals). There is an added agency problem given that
agents (service provider) and principals' (consumer or third party payer) utility
curves differ. The agent may well be able to indulge in many complex moral
hazards as well as over-supply. This agency problem may be acute in remote
rural or pastoral areas, where unsupervisedAH workers are left to undertake
tasks that few canmonitor, hencegiving rise eventually to opportunism.
Finally, the last failure that can arise in the animal healthcare market relates to
macroeconomic distortions. AHsystemsin many developing countries are highly
dependent on foreign aid coming from different countries' donors and/or
development agencies. Recommendations from international agencies on how
funds should be allocated also relate to the overt and hidden agendasof donors,
which may positively or negatively affect the animal health sector.
2.3 Defining public goods
Economic theory and principles have been largely used for the analysis of
different types of markets. The neoclassical economic theory applied to the
human healthcare field developed rapidly in the 1960sand 1970s. In the animal
health sector, however, the debate about the provision of animal health services
only started roughly a decade ago (Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan 1992),
although one might argue that Leonard started talking about user fees for the
AHSin 1985 (Leonard 1985). The fundamental reason for this debate related to,
as mentioned in section ti, the widespread lack of funds in various countries in
the developing world at that time. Given the context of lack of public or
.government funds, animal healthcare services were classified following the
'outcome' approach rationale and governments were advised to privatise all
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animal health serviceswhich fell in the category of delivering 'private goods' and
only to finance those providing 'public goods'.
Given the meagre success of the privatisation process in many developing
countries (Schatz 1996; Bennell 1997; Dorward, Kydd and Poulton 1998), it is
possible that the analysisfailed to take into account someimportant and decisive
factors. As mentioned earlier, this classification of goods or services did not
consider some influencing factors such as the political and institutional context
nor physical constraints. It is therefore relevant to re-examine the taxonomy of
goods applied in the analysis of AH systems under the outcome approach and
highlight the pitfalls and consequences that might have derived from its
application.
2.3.1 The taxonomy of public and private goods
Rather than elaborating on the distinction between private and public goods, this
section focuses on the degree of 'publicness' of goods because this determines
whether such goods or services should be financed and/or provided by the
market or by governments (Cullis and Jones 1998). However, in order to assess
how 'public' goodsand servicesare, they need to be examined and only then can
the appropriateness of provision and finance be determined.
Public goods were categorised by Samuelson (1954) along the lines of the
principles of rivalry (i.e. two personscannot enjoy a specific benefit at the same
time) and excludability (i.e. accessis denied to personswho have not paid for
this product or service). This categorisation has been widely debated in the
economic literature. Samuelson'sdefinition of public goods began a debate in
which several leading economists argued the difficulty in finding public goodsin
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the purest sense.Examplessuchas law and order and defence, typically assumed
to be public goods in the purest sense, were criticised by authors like Margolis
(1955) and Sandler (1977). They argued that even these examples did not fully
comply with Samuelson'sdefinition. For example, "in the provision of law and
order (or medical care), the use of individual A of law courts (or hospitals)
subtracts from consumption by individual B if they must now wait" (Cullis and
Jones 1998). Defence, generally associated with protection, may not either
completely satisfy the 'pure' public good definition. For example, a situation in
which armies are employed in the north, "will this not detract from protection
for communities in the south?" (Cullis and Jones 1998). The same applies to the
classical example of lighthouses, which was counteracted by Coasefor the same
reasons (Coase1974). In the environmental economics literature, Pearce states
that a good with low rivalry and excludability is the ozone layer depletion
(Pearce 1995). Indeed "no one would benefit from its degradation as it is
associated with increased skin cancer incidence" (Pearce 1997). Hence the
debate should not focus on the two extremes, namely pure private goods and
pure public goods, but on the myriad of impure public goods existing between
the extremes.
The reasonsassociated to the role of government in providing private goodsmay
also draw similarities with the parent-child model. Education systems and
immunisation programmesmay be seenas an example. In this caseseveral recent
events in countries such as the UK show that the most educated layers of the
British society do not wish to immunise their children becausethey are afraid of
the secondary effects of the vaccine. However, they enjoy of the positive
externalities of the publicly provided vaccination programmes targeting the
lower levels of the society where children vaccination is performed and where
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parents tend to be lessaware of the possible secondaryeffects of vaccination. In
this case, education affects the behaviour of the society.
Three ways have been argued in which good can be classified (Cullis and Jones
1998). The first derives from Head (1962) and Peston (1972) and focuses on the
characteristics of the good, i.e. the classical approach to excludability and
rivalry in consumption. The second, supported by authors such as Musgrave
(1969) and, in a similar way, Weisbrod (1988), is basedon the assessmentof the
mix of services/benefits that stem from the provision of the good, also referred
to as 'mixed goods or quasi-public goods'. Finally the third, supported by
Buchanan (1965), relates to the different levels of consumption sharing. This
refers to the relationship existing between the degree of indivisibility and the
number of people consumingthe good.
In the animal healthcare sector only one type of analysis has been performed to
date and this relates to the first categorisation (Umali-Deininger, Feder and
deHaan 1992; Holden 1999). This approach is re-examined below and two new
ways of approachingAHservicesclassification are proposed.
2.3.1.1 ExcludabWty and rivalry
One approach to the taxonomy of goods is to focus on their characteristics with
respect to excludability and rivalry. Following Head and Peston's classification,
four categories can be obtained (table 1). Category 0, goods that are non-rival
and non-excludable in consumption, are pure public goods. At the other
extreme, category A, lie the pure private goods,which are both excludable and
rival in consumption. Category B refers to sharing of common resources, known
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as common pool goods, where no one can be denied access but the service
profits exclusively the user and detracts from the possible use by others (for
further detail, refer to Meade (1952) for the classical example of bees from hives
of different beekeepers and the collection of nectar from a nearby orchard of
apples). Finally, excludable but non-rival goods are also referred to as toll goods
(C) because a payment limits the number of users asking of the service, but once
paid, each individual admitted may consume services without subtracting from
the benefit to others (within capacity limits).
Excludable Non-excludable
Rival A B
Non-rival C 0
Table 1: Taxonomy of goods (adapted from Cullis and Jones 1998)
Several authors have used these terms in order to classify goods and services
provided by animal health systems (Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan 1992;
Umali-Deininger, Narrod and Deininger 1994; Holden, Ashley and Bazeley 1996).
However, the most extensive interpretation of this technique was elaborated by
Holden (Holden 1999). Given the previously mentioned controversy regarding the
existence of pure public goods following the two principles, Holden's
categorisation followed the criteria of 'low' and 'high' rivalry and excludability.
She then associated the categorised goods to what empirically is supposed to be
the adequate funding mechanism. The results of her assessment are presented in
table 2. The list of goods and services included in the example is not exhaustive
and does not include some of the major components of AHS (refer to figure 1 in
page 70). The classification of some of the examples is also debatable, as well as
their associated source of financing.
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In relation to goods included in category A, given their characteristics - high
rivalry and high excludability - theoretically there is a strong incentive for the
private buyer or consumer to pay for the good or service. Examplesof these,
mentioned by Holden, include clinical services, use of vaccines and veterinary
pharmaceuticals and prevention and control of endemic diseases.However, one
might argue that even items in category A (particularly item (0») may have
positive spillovers to other herders, for example under common grazing.
However, Holden mentions that "private benefits of vaccination against endemic
diseasesusually outweigh the benefit to others" (Holden 1999), which is true,
but holds equally true for vaccination against epidemic diseases.
Some debate may also surround the association of clinical services (e), and
vaccine and drug sales (b) to private financing (i.e. by the end user). One of the
underlying reasons behind private goods delivery is the need for enough
aggregated demand for these servicesor goodsto be delivered through adequate
market competition. This implies the existence of multiple service providers and
users.Therefore, depending on the context, either physical or institutional, such
aggregated demand might not be sufficient to leave these goodsor services to
end users' private funding. An example of such situation are remote pastoral
areas where subsistencefarming is common. The ability to pay for such services
or goodsmight be too low and the aggregateddemand for the serviceswould not
be sufficiently high to stimulate provision through market competition. Ability to
pay (ATP) is here separated from willingness to pay (WTP) given that several
studies (as for example Ahuja, George,McConnelet al. 2000) have demonstrated
that poor livestock keepers are willing to pay for clinical services but are not
always able to pay for suchservicesgiven their low economic situation. Thus, the
68
goods or services, despite having characteristics of private goods, might not be
adequately delivered without a certain degree of public (co- )funding.
Along these lines but in the HH setting, Philipson investigates "the degree to
which the occurrence of vaccine preventable disease affects vaccination efforts
against such diseases" (Philipson 1996). Indeed Geoffard and Philipson (1997)
conclude that, both price reductions and mandatory vaccinations are "limited in
their ability to achieve eradication because the increased demand of individuals
covered by the program lowers the incentive to vaccinate for those outside the
program, due to any reduced prevalence brought about by a program" (Geoffard
and Philipson 1997). Geoffard and Philipson (1997) argue that the Pigouvian
justification for subsidising vaccinations (given their positive externalities) may
not solve underprovision. The reason is that price elasticity of demand lowers
with increased disease occurrence, "to the extreme of being inelastic to
subsidies" (Geoffard and Philipson 1997). However, they mention that there is
scope and potential profitability for a monopolist to eradicate the disease, even
when it is know that the eradication of the disease will lead to the eradication of
the monopolist's product. Such reasoning can also be applied to the AH setting
and would explain why several disease eradication programmes have not reached
the desired goals (e.g. FMD, CBPP, ECFetc vaccination campaigns).
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EXCLUDABILITY
HIGH Low
PRIVATEGOODS COMMONPOOLGOODS
• Endemic disease control and • Tsetse control on communal land
prevention (a) using traps, targets or aerial spraying (j)
J: • Salesof drugs and vaccines (b)Cl
:i: • Someextension (c)
• Some research (d)
• Clinical services (e)
PUBLIC FUNDING
~
PRIVATE FINANCE B
...J A
~ TOLLGOODS PUBLICGOODS
• Vaccine production (I) • Epidemic or zoonotic disease control
• Diagnostic services (g) (surveillance, movement control,
• Veterinary clinics (h) quarantine services) (k)~
.9 • Dips (i) • Some extension• Some research
• Control of food borne diseases (I)
PRIVATE FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCE
C D
Table 2: Classification of goods following the rivalry and excludability principles
(adapted from Holden 1999)
Given the characteristics of toll goods, economic theory suggests these should
mainly be financed or paid for by end users. Examples mentioned by Holden
include vaccine production units (f), units for diagnostic/laboratory services (g),
veterinary clinics (h) and dipping facilities (t). Holden argues that these services
"may treat several animals or process several samples at one time (i.e. low
rivalry) but can exclude non-paying users from the service (high excludability)"
(Holden 1999).
However, one might argue against veterinary clinics (h) being classified as toll
goods given that services are generally paid as a function of the animal treated
and the amount and type of drugs needed. Therefore, it might be more accurate
to classify them into the private good category. Dipping facilities (i) represent
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another example of the questionability of the applied allocation of goods into
Head and Peston's classification as the efficiency of the product used in the dips
will be reduced by increased use, hence the service is indeed rival. The first herd
passing through the dipping facility will be better protected than the third.
Rivalry might therefore be higher than postulated. The same can hold true for
diagnostic services (g), where the number of samples that can be processedat
anyone time is limited leading to at least rivalry in the timing of consumption of
the service (i.e. some consumersmay have to wait until their samples will be
processed). The characteristic of these examples lead to Buchanan's theory of
clubs (Buchanan1965), which is basedon a classification of goodswhich usesthe
degree of consumption sharing of a good among a certain population. This
classification will be further elaborated later in section 2.3.1.3.
Becauseof their high excludability characteristics, toll goodsare usually financed
privately by the consumer. The same argument would apply to these goods in
relation to the end user payment as was used for the provision of private good,
namely that in remote rural areas these services would not be economically
reachable for subsistencelivestock keepers. Most of these services, though, exist
in highly productive areas. Aggregateddemand in such settings is high enough to
enable market competition; nevertheless some public sector co-financing might
be needed in the first phaseof establishment of these facilities given their high
set-up costs.
It is when talking about categories B (common pool goods) and 0 (public goods)
that we encounter most difficulty in classifying goods into separate and
distinctive cells following Umali and Holden's rationale. Given the nature of
common pool goods, non-paying users cannot be prevented from using the good
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or service, while increased consumption of the good diminishes supply for others.
As non-paying users cannot be prevented access, there is no incentive for the
consumer to pay for the service. Hence people tend to 'free-ride'.
Trypanosomosiscontrol on communal land using traps, targets or aerial spraying
(j) to make the land accessible by cattle is an example mentioned by Holden. In
one sensethis example would perfectly fall into its assignedcategory. However,
trypanosomosis control may have positive externalities not only related to
decreasingcattle mortality rates but also by lowering the occurrence of (human)
sleeping sickness. Therefore, trypanosomosis control may not only have
characteristics of a common pool good but also of a public good if its zoonotic
diseaseaspectsare considered.
Due to the low excludability of public goods, accessto their benefits cannot be
restricted to the people paying for them. Thus, as with common pool goods,
there is a tendency for some people not to pay for the good or service and free-
ride. These situations tend to lead to under-provision or no provision of such
goodsby private providers. The control of highly contagious animal diseaseswith
high mortality rates and severe socia-economic implications (for example
Rinderpest), and of zoonotic diseaseswould fall into this category. In the event
of occurrence of such diseases, the socia-economic and/or public health
repercussionsfor the nation can be high, which might be especially important in
developing countries given their relatively high contribution of agriculture to
wealth generation and employment. State intervention through a form of
taxation can force all beneficiaries to pay for the good or service. Therefore,
vaccination, surveillance, quarantine and movement restrictions for epidemic
diseases and the control of zoonotic/food-borne diseases tend to be covered
through state finance. When focusing on the control of food-borne diseases(I),
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Holden rightly mentions that this task has "traditionally been considered as
public good as the state benefits from lower health care costs" (Holden 1999) in
addition to the difficulty, generally, in individualising the source of the public
health damage. Food-bornescareshave recently put pressureon governments to
control the eventuality of such public health hazards. Therefore there is a
tendency to rely on standards and regulatory frameworks that put legal pressure
over producers and retailers to ascertain a level of health standards (Hensonand
Caswell 1999; Loader and Hobbs 1999). Along these lines or reasoning, Holleran
shows the incentives for food-processing companies to adopt food safety and
quality assurance standards, thus moving away from the traditionally state
centred control (Holleran, Bredahl and Zaibet 1999).
However the above examples of public goods raise the issue of who is the end
beneficiary of animal health services: society as a whole, the population of
farmers or the state government?To put it differently: What 'public' is referred
to when talking about 'public goods'?The example of an outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease (FMO)in a meat exporting country may be taken to illustrate this
potnt, In the event of an FMOoutbreak in this country, the poorest consumers
may be the main beneficiaries as prices of beef and other exported bovine
products are likely to fall as export markets close down. However, farmers and
governments will not benefit as export bans will be imposed, reducing their
economic benefits (lower prices for beef in the case of cattle farmers and less
revenue from export duties for the state). Hence, there are distributional issues
pointing out that Holden's strict categorisation is indeed difficult, highlighting
the various degreesof publicnessof goods.
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The above example relates to the previously described influence of powerful
'interest groups' over decision-makingprocesses(section 2.2.4). Economictheory
defines a goodas 'public' when it affects society asa whole. The extent to which
an export ban due to an outbreak of FMDnegatively affects society as a whole is
debatable and will vary between countries. In most instances, the control of
epidemic livestock diseases, although requiring government participation to put
into place the adequate legislation for avoidance of free-riders and enforcement
of control measures,providesa 'public' goodonly for a subset of the society.
Although the financing of public goodswill need to be of public origin, the actual
delivery of the good or services can be contracted out to private service
providers. At this level, regulation and enforcement are of crucial importance to
guarantee the quality of servicesdelivered. Regulation and quality assuranceare
not always simple and an added incentive for the provision of quality services is
through enhancement of consumerawarenessabout the service they can expect.
The BSEepisode in the UK represents an important example of power shift from
an industry to consumers. Consumers' associations pressed for increased
transparency in relation to the origin and processingmethods of food products.
As painful as the episode might have been, the results are that consumersare
more 'educated' and sensitised in relation to hazardscoming from the food they
consume. They therefore demand the enforcement of regulations for consumer
protection, diminishing the power of the food industries in the decision-making
processes.
It must be remembered that the economic nature of given services is dynamic.
Rivalry and excludability of a service are subject to change over time.
Development of new techniques for disease control, changes in the regulatory
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framework or in the information environment may alter a good or service nature.
An example of technological improvement is trypanosomosiscontrol. Originally,
trypanosomosis control was carried out through aerial spraying, benefiting all
farmers in an area, regardless of who had paid for the service (i.e. low
excludability). However, technological advanceshave led to the development of
drugs and 'pour-on' insecticides, therefore changing the degree of publicness of
trypanosomosis control as the intervention can be more 'individualised' and
therefore of higher excludability (Holden 1999).
Head and Peston's technique might be questioned in so far as the "same 'good'
may fall into one category under one set of circumstances and into another
category under other sets" (peston 1972). Even so, within the different
categories it is possible to develop the requirements for efficiency in provision.
Perhaps the most susceptible category for that is category C (Buchanan and
theory of clubs). Valid as it might have been, Umali and Holden's categorisation
of goods, as it has been argued, can be contested. Two main questions derive
from the above debate that might shed light on the reasons for failure of the
privatisation process.Theseare: (i) Forwhom is a good "public" in the AHsector
(i.e. what is the targeted population)? and (ii) What is the context (physical
and/or institutional) in which it hasto be delivered?
The following sections will re-examine the classification of goods taking into
account the two above questions and will highlight their implications for policy
making.
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2.3.1.2 Mixed goods/ quasi-public goods
The second type of approach to the classification of impure public goods focuses
on the mix of services that stem from the provision of the good. This approach
was first taken by Musgrave (1969) and in the AHS field it has been adopted by
Leonard (2000) and Koma (2000). Research of the latter in Uganda strongly
suggested that the method of conceptualising goods based on their externalities
is preferable to the initially used public-prtvate good categorisation. The reasons
stated were, first that the externalities approach provides a gradient of
differences between goods, given that public versus private classification is
categorical and handles mixed-goods types awkwardly; and second, that the
approach "leads one to do a better job in evaluating the adequacy of private
demand, because it quantifies rather than categorises both internal and external
benefits" (Leonard 2000). However, Bohm's results to a test involving five
different approaches to estimating the demand for public goods showed the well-
known risk to its misrepresentation of preferences (Bohm 1972).
Starting with two abstract examples, extension (c) and research (d) have shown
the difficulty of categorising goods in separate 'cells' following the public-private
good technique. The outcome of research might have characteristics of a private
good in that a patent on a product results in economic profits for a specific
company. However, at the same time, it enhances knowledge on, for example,
disease prevention and treatment. This has external benefits therefore bears
characteristics of a public good, as the whole society will profit from it.
Similarly, education/extension directed towards individual farmers might have
the potential of increasing the farmer's future production and income. But at the
same time it may, for example, (i) limit disease outbreaks which could have
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affected other farmers or even a nation's economy, (ii) might increase future
generations' knowledge regarding production management and (iii) facilitate
basic research, creating non-rival and non-excludable knowledge or information
which benefits others in the community. Of course, it can be argued that these
examples are distant consequencesof extension and education, and therefore
disagreewith the classification of impure public goodsin relation to their degree
of externalities .
.This perspective contrasts with the previous categorisation as, in the case of
extension, public good characteristics were considered only if the extension
messageswere broadcast (radio etc.) and were classified as private goodsonly if
given to farmers individually. A more concrete example would be a farmer who
vaccinates his herd against Contagious Bovine Pleura-Pneumonia (CBPP). He
benefits from the protection conferred to his animals, but at the sametime as he
creates a personal benefit he may also create an external benefit in so far as the
chance of infection of the neighbouring herds is diminished. It is clear that the
external effect of the consumption of a private good (the vaccine) may bear
characteristics of public- good. Recognition of private-public mix means that
goodscan be viewed as having private benefits aswell as external effects, which
support the characteristic of public goods (for a clear distinction between public
goodsand externalities see (Evans1970).
This externality approach to dealing with the blend of privateness and publicness
in goodswas dealt with by Musgravein 1969 and its significance lies in that it
provides a framework for policy purposes. It would allow the effects of a new
policy to be determined by calculating the costs and benefits of its introduction.
However, given the pervasive characteristics of externalities, operationalising
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this approach may prove to be difficult. One attempt may be to take the ratio of
spillover benefit to private benefit and classify items in a range order between 1
and 0 (Cullis and Jones1998).Measuringthe effect of spillover at different levels
(animal and human) might be a cumbersome and debatable task, although one
way to approach it would be through cost-benefit analysis «(BA), taking "the
ratio of external benefits to private benefits as an indicator of the private-public
mix and the extent of publicness" (Cullts and Jones 1998).
(BA can be used in the 'private' (i.e. firm level) as well as in the 'public' (i.e.
government) context. In the case of 'private' CBA, the objective is to decide
whether to undertake investment in the context of a particular firm, in the case
of livestock a farm. In the public context, social (BA is a useful tool for deciding
whieh policies to implement. Pearce, in the field of environmental economies
takes a comparative approach to the use of CBAs in evaluating public
interventions between the USand the UK (Pearce 1998). Two main differences
have been put forward between firm level and social (BAs (Stiglitz 2000). First,
in relation to 'private' (BA, profitability is the major concern whereas, in the
government context, concerns focus on a much broader range of consequences
(e.g. public health, environment, equity, etc). Second, while 'private' (BA uses
market prices for evaluating costs and benefits, social (BA often cannot use
market prices in evaluating projects, especially for outputs and inputs that are
not sold in the market (such as clean water or lives saved). Social (BA focuses
on developing systematic ways in which costs and benefits can be analysedwhen
market prices do not reflect social costs and benefits (Stiglitz 2000). However,
this technique is not exempt from criticisms (Boardman,Greenberg, Vining et al.
1996; Pearce 1998).
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When talking about the evaluation of public expenditure through CBA,concerns
focus on how governments 'should' evaluate different expenditure projects. (BAs
have been established on the hypothesis that governments search "benevolently
to maximise social welfare" (Cullis and Jones 1998). It is a framework in which to
incorporate the various considerations arising when evaluating projects'
desirability. However, "no claim is made that it is a perfect instrument, capable
of yielding unambiguouslycorrect estimates of changeof welfare associatedwith
different investment programmes" (Cullis and Jones 1998). It should rather be
viewed as a method for governments to tackle the questions arising when
appraising public sector investment.
Two problems arise in CBAin the public context. First, and in relation to positive
economics, problems occur when trying to estimate social benefits obtained from
a certain animal health intervention. In the case of performing CBAsfor an
animal health intervention, the obstacles and criticisms, and especially technical
difficulties and surrounding controversies, will arise from (i) giving an economic
weight to a certain human health condition (in the case of zoonosis), (ii) to give
an economic weight to the consequencesin human health due to protein loss for
human diet as a consequence of animal mortality or productivity loss, (iii) to
evaluation of the health care costs incurred due to the (human) disability
condition and (iv) estimating the social costs experienced by an epidemic animal
disease which, for example, bans animal and derived products exports for a
determined period of time. This is not an exhaustive list, therefore other causes
may feed into the above-mentioned controversy. In other words, the problem
relates to how investments are valued. Several authors in the AH field have
attempted to make the casefor further elaboration of CBAtechniques in relation
to animal healthcare services (Marsh1999; Morris 1999; Rushton, Thornton and
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Otte 1999). However, as argued by Ramsay,Philip and Riethmuller (1999), most
of the existing studies lack carefully documented analysis and procedures or, as
mentioned by Roth (personal communication, 2002), there is a lack of reliable
data.
Second, and in relation to normative economics, CBAsare not exempt from
political influence and interference (Pearce 1998). The question behind the use
of CBAfor normative issuesis that of which investment should be chosen. Hence,
the public choice analysis of how investment is chosen is related far more to
political costs and beneftts (Cullis and Jones 1998). As mentioned by Cullis and
Jones (1998), "the fact that government departments invest time and effort
when undertaking cost-benefit analysis does not preclude the possibility that
they are motivated far more by political factors than by welfare economics"
(Cullis and Jones 1998) and highlights the susceptibility to regulatory capture
from powerful industries.
In a similar way, but approaching the problem from the opposite end, Weisbrod
tried to use the way in which goodsare financed asan indicator of the public and
private benefits of a good or service (Weisbrod 1988). The more public the
benefits of a good are, the lessorganisationswill finance themselves through sale
of the good, as there are no direct property rights that can be enjoyed on a non-
excludable basis. Therefore, the more an organisation relies on gifts, grants and
donations, the more public are the effects this organisation has. Weisbrodargues
along these lines to defend the subsidy given to not-for-profit organisations. An
example of this perspective in the AH field would relate to the 'split-financing'
of FMDeradication in Europe.
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The 'quasi-public good' perspective differs from the public-private categorisation
of goods in that it tries to evaluate in economic terms the private-public mix of
benefits stemming from a policy intervention. This implies that context, both
physical and institutional, is taken into account in the evaluation, as well as
assessing the 'blend of publicness' of consequences deriving from it. Therefore,
this taxonomy type may well serve as a tool for decision-making processes in the
animal healthcare sector. However, what this approach does not take into
account are the arrangements related to optimisation of resource allocation at
lower levels within subgroups (i.e. service provision level). This is explored next.
2.3.1.3 Consumption sharing
The third approach to classifying goods and services was developed by Buchanan
in 1968. He portrayed the relationship existing between the degree of
indivisibility and the number of people consuming the good or service (figure 2)
(Buchanan 1968). His categorisation was based on the assumption of a given
population and given property rights. Special attention should be drawn to
situations (2), (3) and (4).
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Figure 2: Consumptionsharing (adapted from Buchanan1968)
In essence, the key of Buchanan's theory is the degree to which consumption
sharing is possibLein a given popuLation. The perspective taken here when
applying Buchanan's theory to AH services will focus on farmers or Livestock
keepers.
Item (1) refers to private goodsor services that are fully divisibLebetween few
individuaLs (or farmers). An exampLe for the AH service wouLd be clinicaL
treatment or diagnostic tests for a given farmer. EvidentLy,tests are done to the
animaLs,but the farmer is considered as an entity by itseLf (might well aLsobe
called farm). Services that are fully divisible between farmers or livestock
keepers 'shouLd' be left to market provision. On the other extreme, item (5)
relates to public goods, completely indivisible over a large group of people. An
example would be trypanosomosiscontrol in a specific district, which would be
fully indivisible between livestock keepers, and each farmer, as well as the rest
of the population of this district, will profit from the services. In that case not
only Livestockkeepersor farmers will profit from not losing their animals because
of the disease (hence reducing productivity Loss),but collaterally the inhabitants
of the district will also profit from not being at risk of sleeping sickness. The
same logic will apply for the controLof 2004-2005AI outbreak in Vietnam among
the farmer population. The government provided controL strategies (mainLy
compulsory sLaughtering)to the whole farmer population given that almost all
the provinces were affected (only 4 were not), and the strategy could not be
individualised given the contagiousness and spread of the disease (Riviere-
Cinnamond2005).
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Item (3) may refer to services such as vaccination against a highly contagious
disease,which provides a degree of protection for all neighbouring farmers. This
category could apply at a later stage in the AI control strategy, when the
emergency situation is under control and farmers can vaccinate their animals.
This however applies to countries where OlE list A diseases are endemic.
Otherwise, in Western countries, vaccination strategies (e.g. for AI) are not
allowed.
When focusing on group (2), extension services at a community level might be
taken as an example. Extension (a relatively indivisible service) under these
conditions may be given to a small number of livestock keepers. Hence, services
are shared between a small number of people. Following Buchanan, service
provision in this category might be left to voluntary arrangements between the
individual membersof the small group concerned, in this case livestock keepers.
Category (4) contains goodsor services that are highly indivisible and are usedby
a small number of people. These are the so-called 'Clubs'. These could be
cooperatives or farmers' associationswhere, for example, dipping facilities could
be usedby all members (i.e. those who have paid a premium or fee). The service
will be provided as long as the number of members is not excessive (i.e. no
congestion). However, it could be argued that the effectiveness of the dipping
product diminished with use, thus incurring some level of rivalry. Clubs are
arrangements in the private sector by which goodsare to a certain degree non-
rival in consumption and voluntarily provided. Typically the good is excludable
(i.e. membership fee) but this is by no meansprivate (i.e. below capacity limits
consumption is non-rival). Buchanan contributed to the understanding of the
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establishment of efficiency conditions for the provision of such goods via clubs
(Buchanan1965).
Viewing impure public goodsin this way enables consideration of the appropriate
provision of a range of goodsbearing both 'public' and 'private' characteristics.
In some instances this approach hascalled into question the appropriate role for
the public sector. Goods that are not perfectly public might perhaps be better
supplied through the market. On the other hand, there are some conditions
under which it might be appropriate for governments to provide private goods.
This is going to be elaborated in the next sections, especially looking at the case
of remote rural areas.
2.4 Publicly-provided private goods
Prior to the drive towards privatisation animal health systems initiated by the
World Bank, component services tended to be mainly funded and provided by
government. As mentioned in sectionU, this has been particularly the case in
sub-SaharanAfrican countries prior to the 1990s.Conversely, in Asian countries
these services continue to be financed and supplied mostly by the government".
The remainder of this section will focus on ways in which governments are
theoretically able to control over-consumption of publicly provided private
goods. The analysis also aims at providing options to limit the negative
consequencesthe privatisation process might have in remote rural areas. This
does not imply, however, that AH service delivery in remote rural areaswas of
high-performance prior to privatisation.
4 In India privatisation has started to a certain degree.
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Following economic theory, publicly provided private goodsor services are those
for which there is a large marginal cost associated with supplying additional
individuals. An example is service delivery in remote rural areaswhere the costs
of reaching an additional farmer might be high. Though the costs of participating
in a market (for example distance deters private involvement as transport costs
are higher the farther places are - e.g. pastoral setting - thus hindering
profitability) provide one of the rationales for public supply of some of these
goods, it is not the only or even the most important rationale. Sometimeswhen
governments provide a private good publicly it simply allows individuals to
consumeas much as they want without charge. Hence, if provided publicly there
is a tendency of over-consumption. In somecasesthis over-consumption might be
limited as in the case of water supply (where satiation can be reached), but in
the case of animal healthcare market the distortion from over-consumption may
be very large.
When there is a marginal cost associated with each individual using a good, it
may be more efficient to provide the good publicly and finance the good through
general taxation. However, providing the good publicly may cause distortion
(Stiglitz 2000). In the human health setting, Evansprovides an example where
the high costs associatedto private markets providing insurance hasbeen usedas
an argument for the public provision of insurance (Evans 1984). The role of
government in the context of pastoral and remote areas is discussednext, first
for the case that the privatisation process has not yet been fully implemented
and, second, for the casethat suchprocesshasalready been undertaken.
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2.4.1 The case of remote rural/pastoral areas
In most developing countries animal healthcare was publicly provided before the
1990s. As a result of the macroeconomic context and the crisis of national public
finances, an abrupt process of privatisation ~f most government services,
including animal healthcare, was initiated. The fact that there was a very short
or even no transition period from public to private service provision in the animal
health sector, caused serious disruptions in many areas. Especially vulnerable
were the remote rural areas where, after government pulled out, no animal
health service was available with the exception of some NGO initiatives.
As outlined in the introduction chapter (section .Ll), it is interesting to compare
the process in the AH field to its counterpart in human healthcare. Structural
similarities exist between the two systems which help pinpointing failures in the
AH. Nevertheless, an extensive comparison of the service delivery branch will be
elaborated in chapter 4. The next sections focus on the role of the government in
rural and remote areas under two different settings.
2.4.1.1 The role o/government in a pre-prtvatisation setting
Continuing the comparison with the human health care sector, rationing devices
were progressively introduced in the human health field through Primary Health
Care (PHC) programmes with the aim of cutting healthcare costs. In the human
healthcare system, PHC refers to the first point of access or attendance of care.
Secondary health care refers in the same context, to services offered in hospital
facilities. Measures to reduce demand, either from suppliers or patients, were
therefore implemented. Such planning was missing during AHS privatisation in
most nations.
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In countries where privatisation of AHShas not been yet fully or even partially
implemented, i.e. caseswhere 'private' animal health services are still being
provided to a certain extent by the government, there are three ways in which
the government could control the (over-) consumption of publicly-provided
private goods (Stiglitz 2000). These are (i) rationing consumption (i.e. user
charges), (ii) uniform provision, and (iii) queuing.
As previously mentioned, inefficiencies arise from over-consumption of publicly-
provided services. In the HHS, governments imposed user charges on services
provided in order to reduce or limit their consumption and hence government
expenditure. Independently from the controversy surrounding the use of charges
(especially with regard to low income earning people, equity issues arise when
referring to user fees), rationing methods could have been used during the
transition process to limit the 'superficial' demand for animal health services
(though this hasbeen questioned by Abel-Smith in the context of Tanzania (Abel-
Smith and Rawal 1992). In the sameway that the introduction of chargeswould
have limited demand, it would also have helped to increase the government's
budget (at a local, regional or national level, depending on the country's
decentralisation status) for animal health services and using the public funds for
targeted public good interventions. It should however be mentioned that partial
cost-recovery methods have already been introduced in some AH delivery
programmes.
Uniform provision refers to supplying the samequantity of the good to everyone.
However, this mechanismdoes not allow for adaptation of different individual's
needs and desires, as the private market does (Stiglitz 2000). This characteristic
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is of most importance in the animal healthcare field as the needs in different
rural or pastoral areas might greatly vary. A government policy of uniform
provision of animal healthcare serviceswould not be advisable.
Finally, the third way through which the government might control over-
consumption of publicly provided services is through queuing. The underlying
rationale is that, rather than charging individuals for accessto publicly provided
services, the government requires that they pay in waiting time. This measure is
based on the idea that money is an undesirable way to ration medical related
services. Queuesare supposedto be an effective device to discriminate between
those who are truly needy and those less in need. Willingness to pay (WTP) is
thus here replaced asa criterion for allocating medical servicesby 'willingness to
wait' (Stiglitz 2000), which in turn can be a basisof priority. However, one might
argue that waiting time incurs alternative social costs to the government that
might be higher than with other rationing devices (suchas time away from work).
In the case of animal health services however it does not seem reasonable to
make herders and livestock travel long distances to reach veterinary assistance
as diseased animals may not be able to walk or will lose too much weight and
condition during the trip, or even further disseminate and spread the disease.
Similar arguments regarding costsassociatedto reaching health serviceswere put
forward by Abel·Smith (1992). He stated, in the Tanzanian and Swaziland
context, that "an additional important cost is time away from other activities,
which can be very important not only for those who lose cash earnings when
away from work, but also for subsistence farmers and, not least, from mothers
taken away from their household activities. A further costs if that of travel for
certain patents" (Abel·Smith and Rawal 1992). Most herders would therefore be
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more interested in selling the diseased animal at a lower price or slaughter it
(without inspection, therefore possibly incurring human healthcare costs), rather
than risking its complete loss. Hence, costs incurred due to the lack of accessor
the waiting time to receive animal health services may impact at the individual
level (loss of the economic value of the animal), at the community level (as
livestock hashigh social value in these areas) and at national level. In relation to
the latter, if herders do not have access to animal health services, or have to
wait for the services to come to them (in the case of community-based workers
or other services), an outbreak of an epidemic disease such as Foot and Mouth
Disease (FMD)or Rinderpest would go undetected and uncontrolled for longer
than necessarythus increasing the risk of substantial spread. If the outbreak is
not contained, the entire nation's exports might be hindered due to the
imposition of an export ban. Therefore, the consequencesof this 'waiting time'
would have high social costs at a national level.
The underlying assumption for public provision of private goodsor services is the
existence of an 'efficient' government. It has been shown that many
governments fail to provide services efficiently as they incur high transaction
costs related to political and individual interests. Quantification of transaction
costs to compare differences in efficiency between market and government.
provision of goods or services might, however, be technically and practically
difficult.
Applying user charges would therefore be the main device to help limiting
government expenditure, hence slowly moving towards a more privatised system
where government would play an added role, concentrating on provision of goods
with high degree of publicness.
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2.4.1.2 The role of government in a post-privatisation setting
In countries where privatisation of AHShas been undertaken, there is a need to
explore ways in which the delivery of services can be improved and their
financing can be secured. As in the previous section, special attention is given to
remote rural areas. Given the physical context encountered in these areas (lack
of infrastructure, water, electricity and often the presence of high insecurity) it
would seem there is a rationale for public provision of animal healthcare.
Following Williamson's economics, what is being advocated here is the action of
the government as an overall coordinator. Additionally, another role for the
government would be facilitating the institutional context.
The first role would involve the remaining government animal health services in
rural areas as well as at other levels such as district and national. These could
play a key role in decreasing the existing transaction costs by coordinating
current ongoing field activities. These activities might range from private or
business-orienteddelivery of animal health service, to NGOinitiatives. Examples
of this coordination role would vary from setting national goals for delivery of
primary animal healthcare (PAHC)(suchas integrating into a common PAHCgoal
the existing programmes, be they private or not-for-profit), to more logistical
activities, suchas facilitating networks for drug supply.
The second activity, which in turn relates to the previous one, is facilitating an
institutional context for Primary Animal Health Care (PAHC)delivery. The PAHC
concept refers to the AH system's service delivery branch. That is: the first
contact point for livestock keepers with AH services. PAHCwould therefore
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include initiatives such as community-based animal health (CAH)systems (which
might be businessoriented, NGOmanaged or government run), veterinary aid
centres, mobile dispensaries, etc. The nature of PAHCwill differ between
countries. Hencefor example in sub-SaharanAfrica PAHCwill mainly include CAH
systems as AH service delivery branch, whereas in India veterinary aid centres
and mobile dispensarieswill be more common. This function is of interest for
developing countries as it might help rural livestock owners accessing regional
markets (i.e. in the same country or in some instances in neighbouring
countries). However, other factors are needed (such as transport and
infrastructure) and that doesnot exclude the existence of illegal export markets.
For stockowners to be able to sell their livestock and derived products in these
zones there is a need for a coordinated and integrated animal healthcare service
at a national level so as to assureminimum quality standards in live animals and
derived products. Of course, one might argue that in some of these localities
official inspection is lacking and, if to some extent it exists, parallel markets
tend to arise due to the lack of enforcement. Delivery of AH services in remote
rural areas therefore represents a challenge in terms of AHSreliability to reach
these standards. An interesting case is that of Kenya and the acceptance of
CAHWs.Although this will be expanded in chapter 5, reluctance exists from some
members of the KenyanVeterinary Board (KVB)to legalise and integrate CAHWs
in the Veterinary Act, in spite of the latest recommendations of the Office
International des Epizooties5 (OlE) in relation to veterinary para-professionals
(OlE2003). If these para-professionalsare not legally accepted (and in practical
terms adequately supervised, which would relate to the organization and
structure of CAHsystems, especially in relation to the supervision of CAHWsby
qualified professionals) there is the possibility that livestock and derived
5 French acronym for the World Animal Health Organisation
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products may be rejected in local or regional markets on public health and/or
animal health grounds.
There is, nevertheless a need to assesseffective ways to increase government
resources for funding animal health services. There is also the need to explore
existing and new possibilities for the private sector to fund and provide these
services.
2.S Conclusions
This chapter demonstrates that the application of economic analysis to AHShas
moved from an outcome-oriented perspective of earlier contributors towards a
more process-oriented point of view. Hence, the animal healthcare market is
viewed in a broader context where political interference, self-interested
behaviour and other transaction costs are considered. This relatively new
perspective (in the AHsector) leads to the identification of factors that were not
taken into account in the first economic analysesof AHS.These factors that may
however have had some influence on the failure of the privatisation process in
somecountries.
The public choice school's perspective gives a new approach to the analysis of
the animal healthcare sector. Central to the public choice school is the view of
the government as part of the AHSmarket and not only as an external agent with
regulatory power. It sheds light on how to avoid errors in ongoing and future
privatisation processes.This perspective contemplates the government as a key
element in harmonising and facilitating the market economy, hence as a means
for reducing existing transaction costs. An important factor to be taken into
account relates to corruption at a governmental level. Additionally, the analysis
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provided in this chapter has put forward the consequencesof regulatory capture
whereby governmentsmay be lobbied by private businesses.
Hence, deriving from the analysiselaborated in this chapter, it can be concluded
that the application of economic theory to guide the processof privatisation of
animal health systemsvaries in relation to several factors and the privatisation
processcannot to be applied in a homogeneousway. Influencing factors such as
the physical, political and institutional contexts need to be taken into account.
There is no standard model applicable to the privatisation process.
Furthermore, the role of government should be viewed at a broader level as
coordinator of activities in the animal healthcare sector (increasing cross-sector
collaboration), the aim being not only to reduce transaction costs, but also, and
especially, to guide current initiatives towards a common goal for AH systems.
Thus, in countries that have not undergone privatisation, cost-containment
measures could be applied in order to smooth the transition process to a
privatised AH market (where applicable). Conversely, in those countries where
privatisation has been undertaken, efforts should focus on governanceof the AH
systems (although this is elaborated in further detail in chapter 4 in the context
of community-based service delivery).
Nonetheless, the discussionchapter 6 will further discussStiglitz's market failure
approach in the context of government and the degree and type of intervention
in the animal health arena.
Having analysed AHS from an economic perspective, there is a need to
understand the ways in which AHsystemsare organised and financed. This refers
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to the main actors, their relations and implications, aswell as the AH structures
driving these systems. Closely related is therefore the alternative ways in which
AH systems are financed. The manner in which systems are organised and
financed influences their performance. This is explored in the next chapter.
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3 Funding mechanisms for animal health systems
3. 1 Introduction
3.1.1 Background
"Since the early 1980s, total meat and milk consumption grew at 5 and 3%per
year respectively through the developing world. In East and South-East Asia,
where income grew at 4-8% per year, population at 2-3% per year and
urbanisation at 4-6%per year, meat consumption increased between 4 and 8%per
year. Between 1983 and 1993, the share of the world's meat consumed in
developing countries rose from 37%to 47%, and the share of the world's milk
[consumption] rose from 34 to 41%" (Delgado, Rosegrant, Steinfeld et al. 2000).
According to the International Food Policy Research Institute's (IFPRI)
projections, by 2020 people in developing countries will produce on average40%
more meat and 60%more milk per capita than in the early 1990s (Delgado,
Rosegrant,Steinfeld et al.1999).
These trends in the animal production sector are, unlike most other movements
(i.e. the "Green Revolution"), demand driven. Forecasts have led the
international scientific arena to label the change as the 'Livestock Revolution'
(Delgado, Rosegrant, Steinfeld et al. 1999). What this new food revolution
implies is a considerable growth in livestock production and processingof derived
products. The implications of such an increased production are several and have
been extensively debated by Delgado, Rosegrant, Steinfeld et al. (1999). These
include various issuessuchas: (i) nutrition, food security and poverty alleviation,
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(ii) environmental sustainability, (iii) world trade and food prices and (iv) public
health.
Suchproduction forecasts also have implications for AH systems. It seemsobvious
that this production increase will lead to higher demand for animal health
services. The governance of AH services therefore needs to be effective and
efficient to assurequality services and minimum international trade standards,
and to minimise public health and environmental risks.
There is, however, a significant deficit in information about how ~nimal
healthcare services are financed and data on how funds are collected and
managed is scarce. Very few analyses have been performed in the animal
healthcare field on funding mechanismsand related available options (Anteneh
1984). Those countries which undertook the process of privatising veterinary
services have seen their previously frail funding allocation further diminished.
Hence, most departments of veterinary services (OVS)are currently pleading the
case for an increase in their budgets (Leonard 2000; Gimeno 2003; Sidibe 2003).
The increased demand for AHSthat is associatedwith the 'Livestock Revolution'
emphasisesthe need to analyseexisting and innovative ways in which funds may
be generated in order to present options that could be feasible and acceptable to
developing countries.
The underlying comparison to the human health field is the focus of this chapter.
As previously mentioned, similarities between the two systems (animal and
human) have been highlighted in earlier papers (Leonard 2000). Furthermore,
Leonard (2000) stated that "the two professions [human and animal medicine]
are close enough that [their] differences help each to look at its own structures
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and operations in new and illuminating ways" (Leonard 2000). The theoretical
frameworks used for analysing human healthcare (HH) markets can then be used
to illustrate the mechanisms underlying the animal healthcare (AH) market. The
chapter therefore draws on those frameworks used in the human healthcare field
to describe the performance of animal health systems.
This section explores not only the agency theory relationships between actors in
the animal healthcare market, but also the options available to decision makers
for raising revenue for AHS. Special focus is given to the implications of choosing
one funding mechanism over another, or more usually the implications of a
particular mix-funding source mechanism. The study draws from the extensive
literature existing in the human healthcare field, and the meagre literature that
relates to the AH field. Regarding the latter, information was gathered through a
literature review on AGRIS, AGRICOLA databases as well as CABI abstracts. In
addition, documentation obtained from FAO, OlE and AU/IBAR was also used. In
addition, a questionnaire was elaborated in order to elucidate taxes associated
to anirnats and antmal products in developing countries. The questionnaire was
elaborated with the help of FAO staff members and was tested in Guinea. It was
performed in Senegal with the help of the hub coordinator based in Dakar. A
local consultant was contracted to gather the information and identify the
appropriate persons to respond to the questionnaire (the questionnaire may be
found in the annex section). The results of the questionnaire are presented in the
core of the text in section 3.4.2 where specific examples of taxation associated
to animal health are described. Finally, several personal communications,
especially regarding the financing of FMDepisode in the UK (2001) were obtained
through FAO contacts.
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Other distinctive features of this research are that it combines public finance
theory (Musgraveand Musgrave1989)and empirical evidence, provides examples
of current structures (and surrounding debates) of AHS, brings together issues
related to animal and human health and examines the relationship between
funding and resourceallocation.
Questions that arise and that are addressed in this chapter are the following:
How are AHS funding mechanisms organised in different countries? Are there
different patterns or 'models' of funding AHS?Howmay revenue be collected and
allocated for animal healthcare services?What is the relationship between the
different SUb-components of some financing structures? What are the
implications of suchfunding mechanismsin terms of equity and efficiency?
3.1.2 Objectives
The objectives of the chapter are threefold:
1. To explore the useof the agencytheory in the animal health care market;
2. To describe the functional components of animal healthcare systems,
highlighting the inter-relationship between the components;
3. To analyse different mechanisms for raising revenue in support of animal
healthcare systems.
3.1.3 Organisation of the chapter
The chapter is divided into five major sections. Section 3.2, which follows this
introduction, describes the components and actors involved in the animal
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healthcare sector and their interactions. Hence, the agency theory is applied to
the animal health actors.
Section 3.3 introduces a framework for assessingthe different components and
suo-components involved in the financing and provision of AHS.The focus is on
describing their influence on the performance of health systems at three
different levels: (i) strategic design, (ii) structural arrangement and (iii)
implementation levels. The section is descriptive and based on Murray and
Frenk's (2000) framework of health systemsfunctions.
Conversely, section 3.4 takes a more practical perspective, describing the
different existing funding and revenue collection mechanisms, and groups them
in four main categories. This analysis, based on Musgraveand Musgrave (1989)
public finance theory, also includes the implications such sources of revenue
collection may have on service provision. The main focus is on evaluating the
consequencesof these collection methods in relation to equity and efficiency.
This section includes the results of the questionnaire performed in Senegal.
Finally, section 3.5 presents the conclusions of the study and provides
recommendations for improving current knowledge regarding AH systems
organisation and revenuecollection mechanisms.
3.2 Analytical approaches to AHS funding theory
Animal healthcare systemsrely on accessto human and consumable resourcesas
well as funds to be sustainable. For these inputs to be secured, financial
resourcesare needed to pay for equipment and buildings, to compensate animal
healthcare staff's time and to pay for drugs and other consumables.The way in
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which such financial resources are generated and managed (i.e. the process of
collecting revenue and pooling funds) are critical issues for policy-makers and
planners. These issues relate to the challenge of designing funding systems, as
the process generally conveys ideas related to social policy, politics and
economics.
Concernsderiving from the SAPin Africa and the subsequentimplementation of a
market oriented approach (i.e. privatisation) outlined in section 1.:.1led to major
changes in the way animal healthcare systemswere organised and financed. In
that context, policy-makers have three options: (i) containing costs, (ii)
increasing funding for animal health services or (iii) both (adapted from
Mossialos,Dixon, Figueraset at. 2002). Cost-containment through privatisation of
services has been driving the policy discussionsin the international arena. As for
other sectors (including human healthcare), many countries do not consider
large-scale public borrowing to be a sound economic policy. Hence, concern
should focus on revenue policies, that is: how to fund animal healthcare systems
on a sustainable basis.
Basedon the definition, in section 2.2.2, of the different components included in
AH systems, the interactions between actors in the sector, the implications and
derived consequencesare the focus of the next section.
3.2.1 Components and main actors of the AHS
Thus, asmentioned in section 2.2.3, AHScan be divided into six main categories:
(i) curative services, (ti) preventive services, (iii) pharmaceutical supply, (iv)
public health, (v) education/extension and (vi) research and development. What
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these different components have in common are the actors involved in the
system.
In order to understand their roles and interactions better, they can be classified
following the "healthcare triangle" framework (Reinhardt 1990;Mossialos,Dixon,
Figueraset al. 2002). Playerscan therefore be grouped into three categories:
(i) Consumers of the service (the first party): Stock owners and herders or
livestock keepers. Public health issues, such as animal diseases that affect
humans, imply that society in general may also be considered a consumer;
(ii) Providers of the service (the second party): Veterinarians and veterinary
para-professionals (animal health assistants (AHAs), community animal
healthcare workers (CAHWs),barefoot vets, traditional healers etc.):
(iii) Third party insurers or purchasers (which might be a public or private body):
Government, intergovernmental, non-governmental donors or private
entrepreneurs.
Stock owners, herders and livestock keepers are the direct consumers of the
services. They can be small-scale (backyard raisers) or large-scale farmers,
sedentary (mixed farm) producers and pastoralists (Leonard 1990). Farmersmay
be organised into producer associations,cooperatives or other forms of collective
organisations whose functions may include the provision (finance and/or
delivery) of animal health services, therefore playing the role of the "third
party" insurer or purchaser (see later). As stated by Umali-Deininger, Feder and
deHaan (1992), the general population might also be considered as a direct
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consumer of the veterinary services as several livestock diseases can affect
humans. These can be of bacterial, viral or fungal origin and might be
transmitted through various ways (direct contact, food-borne, vector-borne,
water-borne etc). Examples of zoonotic diseases include: anthrax, brucellosis,
sleeping sickness, Chagas disease, tuberculosis, salmonellosis, cysticercosis,
trichinellosis etc. The risks to human health caused by these diseases,and their
control and/or eradication, are of public health concern (this has been pointed
out by recent events such as BSE,SARSand AI). This is the reasonwhy society in
general has been incorporated into the first party element as a direct consumer
of veterinary services.
Veterinarians and other auxiliaries deliver health services either through private
channels or through government sponsored programmes. Veterinary para-
professionals assist veterinarians in their duties. However, the extent of
healthcare services provided by the government varies widely in relation to
national regulations. Becauseof the limited number of trained veterinarians in
some countries and/or their unwillingness to serve in rural areas, para-
veterinarians become valuable workers. On the one hand, they supplement and
expand the area covered by veterinarians (Sidibe 2003), and thereby increasing
the number of farmers reached, freeing time for the veterinarians to treat more
serious cases (Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan 1992). Hence, para-
veterinarians contribute to limiting transaction costs arising from transport. This
is of most importance in pastoral areas.
The third party insurer or purchaser refers to public and/or private structures.
On the public side, it is normally the ministry of finance (MoF),which allocates a
certain amount of money to the ministry of agriculture (MoA). This creates
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competition between ministries for the funds that are to be allocated (Mossialos,
Dixon, Figueraset al. 2002; Gongora2003). The MoAis in charge of redistributing
these funds to the different programmesin place. However, a certain part can be
played by the ministry or department of health (MoH/DoH), depending on its
existence and duties, regarding zoonotic diseasesand public health education. In
some instances, public health education programmes fall under ministry of
education (MoE) duties, rendering the allocation and coordination between
different ministries more complex. It is important to highlight that legislative and
executive bodies of the government formulate the domestic policies that shape
the economic and institutional environment in which livestock and animal
healthcare services operate. This means that these bodies create the incentives
or disincentives to private sector activities. Inter-governmental donor assistance
is mainly focused on providing funding for national livestock service programmes
(animal healthcare services are a component of the livestock services). Their
financial assistanceis usually channelled through the government thus asserting
the role of government in the delivery of livestock servtces' (deHaanand Bekure
1991; Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan 1992). On the other hand, regarding
private sector third parties, in the animal health or livestock service field it is
common to find non-governmental organisations (NGOs) funding specific
programmes. They assist governments by providing technical assistance, but it is
more likely to find NGOsfinancing livestock sector development programmes
(hence animal healthcare programmes). However private entrepreneurs have
started to play an important role in AHS in most countries. As previously
mentioned, these can be producer associations, cooperatives or other types of
6 Examples of these inter-governmental organisations include African Development Bank (ADB).
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)and the World Bank.
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collective associations. They can offer a relatively wide range of services from
curative to preventive including sometimes the production and distribution of
veterinary supplies.
Having described the actors in the AH field, the next section analyses their
interactions and the underlying reasonfor them to interact.
3.2.2 The agency theory applied to animal health
Illness is unpredictable whether in humans or animals. It might be possible to
predict prognoses associated with disease conditions and predict losses in
economic terms due to those conditions once an animal (or herd) is affected, but
in general the future health status of animals remains uncertain. Herders cannot
therefore plan the future consumption of animal healthcare servicesasone could
do with other commodities (suchas food consumption). As a consequenceof this
inability to plan for what will happen in the future, an unregulated market would
respond by developing insurance mechanisms whereby a herder or group of
herders could make payments to some risk pooling agency (for example an
insurance company) to guarantee some financial or economic compensation in
the event of their animals falling ill. Herders cannot insure their animals against
illness but they might be able to insure themselves against the financial burden
of their animals falling ill. Livestock insurance (LJ) thus embodies a wider
concept of income maintenance. The concept of livestock insurance embodies
not only animal ill-health but also animal death. Thus, aswill be seen in section
3.4, animal health and insurance tend to be closely related in their financing
mechanisms.
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The analysis of the relationship between the above-mentioned actors starts with
the financing and provision of services, which can be simplified as an exchange or
transfer of resources. Providers (the 'second party') transfer healthcare
resources to patients (in this case the 'first party' or consumers of the service)
and then patients or insurers (the 'third party') transfer financial resources to
the providers (see figure 3).
First party
Consumer
(Stock owner/ .
herder and the'
society)
Second party
Provider
(Veterinarians and
auxiliaries)
Figure 3: Agency theory applied to AHS (adapted from Mossialos, Dixon, Figueras
et al. 2002)
The principal/agent theory has been extensively discussed in the human
healthcare literature (Arrow 1985; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985; Evans 1998).
However, an attempt of comparison between the two health fields has only been
undertaken by Leonard in 2000 (Leonard 2000). Following his reasoning, and
adapting the transaction model from Mossialos, Dixon, Figueras et al. (2002) to
the animal health setting, interactions between different actors in this triangle
can be explained.
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The simplest form of transaction is by direct payment where the consumer pays
the provider directly in return for goods or services. However, healthcare
systemshave often developed another player: the third party or insurer. This can
be a public or private body that has been created to offer protection to a
population against the financial risk of falling ill. In the animal health setting this
refers to the risk of animal illness and arguably the occurrence of zoonosis.This
system allows risks to be shared within a defined population. Nonetheless, as
already introduced in section 2.2.5, risk sharing may give rise to moral hazard
situations. Arnott and Stiglitz (1988, 1991) point out two situations where moral
hazard can arise, these are (i) within a formal insurance market, and (ii) within
non-market institutions.
The latter refers to the reciprocal provision of insurance within family or
between friends (Arnott and Stiglitz 1991). This is particularly relevant in the
pastoral context and will be described in chapter 5 where "tiliantany"
mechanismsare usedwithin community to restock in times of drought or animal
disease epidemics. "Tiliantany" is an 'insurance system' among pastoralists.
Pokot people in Kenya (see section 5.1.3) minimise the risk of complete loss of
livestock through 'loaning' cows to relatives and friends in other parts of the
district in exchangeof steer. The cow provides milk for the personwho receives
it, but calves are property of the original owner. Loaning cows to other people
gives prestige to the pastoralist and more importantly it gives him the right to
claim assistance from his "tiliantany" partners when needed. In such context,
"peer monitoring is an important mechanism for controlling moral hazard"
(Arnott and Stiglitz 1991). Arnott and Stiglitz's example refers to credit markets.
However, given that in rural and pastoral areas livestock are regarded as
financial assets, a similar reasoningmay be applied. Hence, they argue that "in
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lessdeveloped countries, loans [which in the pastoral context may well be in the
form of livestock] are often made to groups of individuals; the members of the
group have then an incentive to monitor each other" (Arnott and Stiglitz 1991).
Adding to the discussion in section 2.2.5, in formal insurance markets "moral
hazard arises when neither the states of nature nor individuals' actions are
observable [or imperfectly observable] to the [third party] insurer" (Arnott and
Stiglitz 1988). Hence, the provision of insurancecan have an effect the behaviour
of the insured (i.e. the farmer or stock owner) modifying the precautions that
would have otherwise been taken. Several examples of livestock insurance and
animal health insurance are presented in section 3.4. Nonetheless, to finance
animal healthcare services, the third party insurer must collect the revenue from
a population set (in a direct or indirect way), which is then used to reimburse the
herder or the veterinarian (or para-professional).
Indeed, as mentioned by Stiglitz, "risks in agriculture are clearly tremendously
important, yet remarkably, the traditional theoretical literature has avoided
explicit treatment of risk sharing in agricultural environments" (Stiglitz 1974).
Livestock being a sub-sector of agriculture falls into Stiglitz's lines. It should be
pointed out in addition that this sub-sector, as previously mentioned, might
entail public health hazards, highlighting the aforementioned important 'risks in
agriculture' .
Here the analysis focuses, not as in Stiglitz's 1974 article on the incentives for
sharecropping, but on the mechanisms to avoid risks (i.e. insurance, whether
formal or non-market). Therefore, central to the insurance matter are the
following questions: Where should funds to sustain animal health services (AHS)
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come from given that their aim is twofold: (i) protecting farmers from possible
economic losses and (ii) protecting society from public health hazards? This
question raises some of the main controversies surrounding animal healthcare
systems funding, which is essentially due to the aforesaid mixed nature and
diverse objectives of veterinary services. A theoretical framework to analyse the
different functional components of AHS and how they are linked is presented in
the next section.
3.3 Functional components of AHS: Implications on
performance
This section introduces a methodological approach to the functioning and
performance of AHS. Following the thesis rationale, the framework applied here
has been adapted from the human health literature. Although several authors in
the HH field have analysed health systems (Mossialos and Le-Grand 1999; Kutzin
2001; Mossialos, Dixon, Figueras et al. 2002), the choice for this section has been
Murray and Frenk's (2000) approach. Reasons for that choice are based on their
definition of 'health action', which has already elaborated in section 2.2.2. Such
definition clearly points out the overlapping areas between human and animal
health from a public health perspective.
One reason for promoting this wider view is that recent events in the developed
world have raised consciousness about the organisation and performance of AH
systems (as for example the FMD episode in the UK in 2001, BSE-CJDv,
salmonellosis, ttsteriosts, SARS, Avian Influenza etc.). These concerns arose
mainly due to consumers' increased awareness of the link between animal health
and food safety. At the same time, and for similar reasons, developing countries
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are also becoming more aware of the risks related to mismanagement of AHS (not
only because of zoonotic diseases and economic losses due to poor animal health,
but also because of the enforcement of international trade standards' recognised
under the World Trade Organisation (WTO)).
The focus of this section is therefore on promoting a broader view of AHS
functional components and on providing an empirical analysis of the systems
while identifying the factors influencing their performance. At the same time,
the economic perspective introduced in chapter 2 will be at the basis of the
analysis.
3.3.1 Financing
Healthcare systems, whether human or animal, can be divided in two different
functional components: financing and provision. Revenues are collected from
primary or secondary sources, accumulated in fund pools and then allocated to
provider activities. Three SUb-components in the financial functional element
may be devised. These are: (i) revenue collection, (ii) fund pooling and (iii)
purchasing (see figure 4) ..They can be organised and combined in different ways
between and even within countries. For example, functions can be integrated by
a single organisational entity and in other cases one entity collects and pools the
funds and other bodies purchase and provide the services (Kutzin 2001).
7 Sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures (SPS)
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Revenue collection
Fund pooling
Purchasing
Figure 4: Health systems functions (adapted from Murray and Frenk 2000)
These three sub-functions are analysed next, as well as the provision and other
possible influencing factors related to the AH sector. Following Murray and
Frenk's definition of health action outlined in section 2.2.2, their rationale for
analysing health system's functional components is used here in the context of
AHS. Thus, especial attention is given to 'strategic design', 'structural
arrangements' and 'implementation processes' as these might have great
influence on the system's performance.
3.3.1.1 Revenue collection
The process of revenue collection refers to who is paying (source), how the
payment is made (mechanism) and who is collecting the money (collection agent)
(see figure 5). In the animal health setting, funding mechanisms include primarily
(i) individual contributions through out-of-pocket payment, (ii) loans, grants and
donations, (iii) private livestock insurance premiums, and depending on the
country, the extent of (iv) national livestock insurance and (v) the contribution
"
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from taxation which might vary widely (each of these mechanisms- except for
loans, grants and donations - is analysedin detail in section 3.4).
Focusingon the strategic design, Murray and Frenk mentioned that the "way in
which revenue collection or resourcemobilisation is structured is likely to affect
the system's performance" (Murray and Frenk 2000). Although specific examples
in the AH field regarding resource mobilisation will be debated in section 3.4
following Musgrave and Musgrave's (1989) public finance theory, under the
umbrella of social policy concerns at a decision-making level, performance of a
systemis related to..
(i) The type of payment, which can be either voluntary (for example enrolling in
a private livestock insurance or cooperative association delivering animal
health services) or compulsory (e.g. taxes or national livestock insurance
contributions);
(ii) The progressivity or regressivity of the payment (for insurance premiums, for
taxes - both general and hypothecated -, for compulsory contributions). A
progressive tax is one in which payment increasesmore than proportionately
with income, and
(iii) The payment mechanism (referring to prepaid services versus payment at
point of use).
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Compulsory
insurance
contributions
and payroll
Figure 5: Funding sources, contribution mechanisms and collection agents
(adapted from Mossialos, Dixon, Figueras et al. 2002)
These three aspects are highly influential on the behaviour of A~S actors as well
as on the consequences at different social levels (e.g. progressivity or
regressivity of payments). The latter is closely related to governments' political
target and standpoint (i.e. the equilibrium between economic growth and
development goals) as the method of tax collection may have considerable equity
effects, especially over vertical equity, which refers to who is bearing the
biggest burden when paying taxes (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989). For instance, a
progressive taxation system would transfer wealth from rich to poor, thus
reflecting government's concern on the ATP principle (Begg, Fischer and
Dornbusch 2000) (ATP principle will also be debated in chapter 4).
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When focusing on AHSactors' behaviour, the choice of payment mechanism at
governmental level may influence national expenditure on AH. For example,
where AH services are free at the point of use, farmers will have an incentive to
over-consume. This relates to the consumer moral hazard issue debated in
sections 2.2.5 and 3.2.2 on market failures and agencytheory, respectively.
Turning to the structural arrangement of revenue collection, governance is likely
to influence performance. Governance is here defined following Williamson's
perspective and is highly intertwined to the transaction-cost economiesdebate in
section 2.2.5. Thus, "transaction-cost economiesconcurs that the transaction is
the basic unit of analysisand regards governanceas the meansby which order is
accomplished in a relation in which potential conflict threatens to undo or upset
opportunities to realize mutual gains" (Williamson 1998). Hence, "governance is
[ ... J an exercise in assessing the efficacy of alternative modes (means) of
organization. The object is to effect good order through the mechanisms of
governance. A governance structure is thus usefully thought as an institutional
framework in whieh the integrity of a transaction or related set of transactions,
is decided" (Williamson 1996).
Although the debate about governance will be further elaborated in section
3.3.3, in the AH setting, governance is associated with the number of
organisations carrying out this function. Given the definition of the structure of
AHSin section 2.2.3, several "alternative modes (means)of organization" may be
found. Therefore, the process of collecting revenues may involve, as seen in
figure 5, several sources and mechanisms that will have different impacts in
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terms of equity and efficiency. Questionsarise also regarding economiesof scale
and concentration.
The choice of measuresto avoid evasion for each specific collection procedure is
a matter, at an implementation management level, that might have an impact
upon AH systems' performance. Hence, Arnott and Stiglitz's (1991)moral hazard
debate in section 3.2.2 (i.e. agency theory applied to animal health) arises also
at implementation level in revenue collection.
3.3.1.2 Fund pooling·
Fund pooling focuses on "the accumulation of revenues for the common
advantage of participants" (Murray and Frenk 2000). Pooling resources thus
highlights that funds are not related to contributors, hence there is risk-sharing.
The rationale for AHSis that it facilitates the financial risk (of animals falling ill)
to be shared acrossthe farmer population or a defined sub-group. This relates to
Buchanan's theory of clubs debated in section 2.3.1.3. The difference with
revenue collection lies in that some mechanismsof revenue collection do not
share financial risksacrosscontributors as for example out-of-pocket payments.
A key element in the strategic design that is likely to affect the performance of
fund pooling is the extent to which separate fund pools exist for different farmer
groups. Additionally, the presence or absence of cross-subsidisation between
low-risk and high-risk contributors (i.e. farmers) might also have an influence.
For example, if revenue collection and fund pooling are integrated, the
allocation from collection to pooling agent is internalised. An example
illustrating this mechanism may well bea national animal health insurance
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(NAHI) scheme (as that of Germany (Donhauser and Pauels 1997) exposed in
section 3.4.3.2), where contributions are collected and retained by the same
funds (in the case of Germany, regional funds). Depending on the degree of
decentralisation in any given country, this mechanism may also apply to the
collection and retention of regional or local taxes.
Regardingstructural arrangements of fund pooling, key elements are: (i) the size
and number of fund pools, (ii) the mechanismsof transfer of funds amongpools,
(iii) the choice of compensation funds for enrolment (i.e. competition) and (iv)
the governance of institutions which maintain these fund pools. For example, if
different agents are carrying out the collection and pooling, a mechanism is
needed to distribute resourcesfrom the collection agent to the pool. If there are
multiple pools, there is a need to adjust the allocation to the risk sharing among
the population in relation to each pool's population risk profile. The reason
behind risk-adjustment in earmarked or hypothecated tax systems is to prevent
cream-skimming. In tax-financed systems, methods such as capitation have been
used in human health systems to risk-adjust and hence ensure a "fairer"
allocation of resourcesto territorial health authorities basedon the needsof the
population. Following Rice, "capitation can be defined as the health service
funds associatedwith a plan member for the service in question and for the time
period in question, subject to any overall budget constraint. A capitation system
puts a 'price' on the head of every member" (Rice and Smith 2002). A similar
method may well apply to the AH setting and would generate even less
surrounding controversy than in the HHfield.
At an implementation level, the way in which the rules guiding entry and exit of
those organisations performing the fund pooling function are set is likely to
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affect performance. For example, should the rules guiding entrance limit the
number of fund pooling organisationsin the market to the extreme of monopoly,
competition will thus be limited and premiums likely to the higher than expected
in market conditions. This would include the procedures that. protect
contributors (farmers) from insolvency or bankruptcy due to loss of animals or
enforcement of compulsory slaughtering (an example is provided in section
3.4.3.2 with Germany's "CompensationFunds").
3.3.1.3 Purchasing
Purchasing refers to· "the transfer of pooled resources to service providers on
behalf of the population for which the funds were pooled" (Kutzin 2001). If the
process of allocating resources is to pursue the objectives of equity and
efficiency, there is a need to evaluate animal healthcare needs. Similar methods
to capitation could be usedin the animal health setting. Purchasingmethodsmay
vary from simple budgeting in highly integrated public systems, to a more
complex scenario that would include the purchasingof different input, output or
outcome units. In the latter example, the government would be collecting the
revenue through general taxation, would allocate the resources to programmes
and would contribute to staff and other costs. However, in many countries (and
especially in developing countries), allocation of resources still depends on
political negotiation or historical precedents (this applies also'to other sectors).
Other ways of purchasing, as for "managed care" type organisations (debated in
section 3.4.4), may include the selection of specific units of inputs, outputs and
outcomes.
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Hence, the strategic designof purchasing lies in the questions of "what, how and
from whom" services should be purchased (Murray and Frenk 2000). To purchase
goods or services it is important to evaluate first the needs of the targeted
farmer population. Once evaluated, the- types of purchasing methods may vary
also in relation to the existing market structure, as outlined in chapter 2.
Purchasing methods could therefore go from direct purchase of interventions
(suchasvaccinations or surgical procedures), to purchasingmore general services
(such as services of veterinarians), or even to directly purchasing inputs like
veterinarians, AHAs,vehicles etc. Key to this process is the choice of provider.
Thus, contractual processesrelating purchasersto providers, selection criteria of
providers and payment methods need to be explicit.
When turning to structural arrangements, basedon the reasonsfor market failure
outlined in section 2.2.5, those likely to influence purchasing performance are
the:
(i) Size and number of purchasers (e.g. farmers' associations in a specific
district);
(ii) Choice and competition between purchasers (e.g. cooperatives, public
veterinary services, NGOsetc.):
(iii)Transactions mechanismsbetween revenue pools and purchasers (e.g. a local
branch of a cooperative in a private system, a regional fund in the case of a
national systemetc.);
(iv) Governancemechanismsof purchasers, as outlined by Williamson's definition
earlier in this chapter.
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At an implementation level, performance and efficiency will depend on the
control and managementof the quantity and quality of the servicespurchased. In
the human health field these techniques are called "managed care" and will be
explored in section 3.4.4 in relation to cooperatives and farmers' associations.
3.3.2 Provision
Provision of services refers to "the combination of inputs into a production
process that takes place in a particular organisational setting and that leads to
the delivery of a series of interventions" (Murray and Frenk 2000). Murray and
Frenk separate the provision of human health services in two branches: personal
and non-personal health services. It is argued here that such classification is
related to the already debated degree of publicness of goods (in chapter 2).
Indeed, the classification refers more precisely to Samuelson's rivalry and
excludability principtes outlined in section 2.3.1.1.
Following the underlying logic of the thesis, farmers or livestock keepers are
considered as the end users of animal health services. Hence, personal animal
health services would refer to services directly consumed by the farmer or
livestock keeper, hence with a high degree of excludability and rivalry, whereas
non-personal animal health services would apply for activities with a higher
degree of publicness, such as public health education in the animal health and
production field or to the environment as, for example, hygiene and sanitation.
It is worth mentioning that these components also apply in the human health
setting according to the broader definition of 'health action' outlined in section
2.2.2. This highlights, as previously mentioned, the intertwined nature of human
and animal health and the difficulty, for the public health sector, of defining
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roles and responsibilities for service provision and financing in relation to issues
that also come under animal health.
Regarding strategic design, the way in which provision of personal AHS is
organised has to do mainly with the market structure. An example in the AH
setting are cooperatives or farmers' associations where there is vertical
integration of different functions. The level of integration between provision and
purchase functions may however vary. In relation to National Livestock Insurance
systems (NU) and/or National Animal Health InsuranceSystems(NAHI), the way
in which governments carry out these two functions lies at the core of the
performance of the system. Although it will be debated later on in section 3.4.3,
it is worth mentioning that National Livestock Insurance schemes embrace a
broader concept than National Animal Health Insurance as livestock insurance
may include not only animal health services, but also insurance in, for example,
the case of compulsory slaughtering etc. Depending on the country studied,
livestock insurance schemes may be separate from animal health schemes.
However, for study purposes, the term NUwill be used for both animal health
and livestock insurance. Some governments integrate the two functions
(purchasingand provision) whereas others tend to use a purchaser-provider split
model. This model exists when the provision of services is contracted by the
purchaser, so the two functions are independent. The objective is thus to
increase competition and lowering prices. The decision whether to useone model
or the other relates to the level of decentralisation of the government and
governance of provider institutions. Hence, the design chosen for the system
might not only have repercussionsin its performance, but also important policy
implications. For example, a system where such integration between purchase
and provision is integrated is India. Veterinarians and AHAsare still part of the
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government structure, as well as the rural veterinary clinics. The choice of
design is highly influenced by the political history and standpoint of the country.
With such integration, little incentive exists for market forces to lower prices
and/or increase quality of servicesprovided.
For non-personalAHS(i.e. high degree of publicness), the conceptual framework
for analysing the design would be the same. However, in most countries it is
often the public sector that is in charge of these services. An interesting
phenomenonin the AHSrelates to zoonotic diseasesand public health education.
For example the WHO manual for community health workers' training and
curricula rarely mentions how to prevent simple zoonotic diseasesthrough, for
example food handling (WHO 1987). In most instances there is no clear
attribution of roles and responsibilities between the ministry of agriculture (MoA)
and the ministry of health (MoH) (and in some cases the ministry of education
(MoE)) for public health education relating to livestock and food safety. The
recurrent outbreaks of E. col! 0157 represent an interesting illustration in this
area. The same type of anomaly can be found between international
organisations dealing with health and agriculture. Often lack of communication
or misunderstanding leavespublic health matters unattended.
This relates to the regulatory capture process outlined in section 2.2.5 and has
been debated in the literature by Propper in the context of the UKNHS(Propper
1995). The regulatory capture phenomenon highlights an important strategic
design problem also affecting structural arrangements and implementation
management (see previous section 2.2.4). Hence, a crucial aspect in strategic
design is the number and size of providers. This refers to the extent to which a
single organisation provides a wide range of non-personalAHS or whether there
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are multiple specialist organisations providing specific services such as hygiene
and sanitation, (veterinary) public health education, environmental services, etc.
As in the case of personal AHS,the degree of integration with purchasing in non-
personal AHS is important, as well as the nature of governance and level of
autonomy.
When focusing on structural arrangements for personal AHS at the level of
provision, the relationship existing between provider organisations will be
decisive for the delivery. The level of separation or networking of these entities
(such as agrovet" and CAHWs, cooperatives etc) will determine access to
facilities. Accessmight be direct (for example direct accessto CAHWs,AHAsor
veterinarians) or through referral (as for example in the CAHsystems, accessto
the veterinarian through AHAsor CAHWs).The way in which accessto services is
organised points out the issue of cross referrals between public and private
sector networks. This is of most importance when talking about privatisation of
AHS (for example businessoriented CAHsystemsand CAHWsduties of referring
suspicion of epidemic diseasesto government staff or veterinarians working in
the public sector as well- as the private sector) as inter-sector communication
might be severely hindered or biased. This leads to non-personal AHS as the
implications of such arrangements in the public sector relate to the staffing in
the two categories. Hence, managerscan be the same for both services or be
different for each service. The public sector would tend to deliver some non-
personal AHSsuch as prevention and (veterinary) public health education and
promotion. But in private service delivery there may be no delivery of non-
personalAHS.
8 Agrovet: veterinary pharmacy located in rural areas. The term is generally used in the East
African context.
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As for the HH sector, in the AH sector the formal and informal means by which
each organisation arranges its tasks, control systems and authority relationship
are important (Scott 1966). Following Murray and Frenk's (2000) rationale in the
HHsector, in the AHcontext it could be suggestedthat whether top management
of provider organisations is in the hands of veterinarians or of professional
administrators is important. The issue of skill mix amongst various categories of
providers (i.e. veterinarians, AHAs,CAHWsetc) at the clinical level is also likely
to be a determinant of performance. This refers back to the discussion in
sections 2.2.5 about transaction costs and moral hazard. Indeed, for example at
community level CAHWsare supposed to reduce costs arising due to social
distance. In addition, the debates in sections 3.2.2 and 5.4.1.1, point out that
"trust" is a key element in selection of these workers as seen by villagers, who
are the end users. Trust is a desired quality as it theoretically restricts the
presenceof providers' moral hazard, hence limits transaction costs.
3.3.3 Governance
As introduced in section 3.3.1.1, Williamson refers to governance as "the
institutional framework within which the integrity of a transaction is decided.
Markets and hierarchies are two of the main alternatives" (Williamson 1979).
Quoting Macneil, Williamson (1979) useshis classification of contracts in order to
explain the nature and occurrence of transaction costs. The tree types of
categories of contract law mentioned are (i) classical, (ii) neoclassical, and (iii)
relational.
First, characteristic of classical contract law is its attempt to "enhancing
discreteness and intensifying 'presentiation', where presentiation has reference
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to efforts 'to make or render present in place or time; to cause to be perceived
or realized at present'?" (Williamson 1979). This refers to a situation where all
contingencies involved in the transaction of a good or service are specifically
described with respect to "likelihood and futurity" (Williamson 1979). The
emphasisis therefore put on "legal rules, formal documents, and self-liquidating
transactions" (Williamson 1979). This is the simplest form of transaction.
However, it needs an established contractual environment, which is not always
present in the animal health sector, especially in rural areas.
Second, neoclassical contract law applies to situations in the long-term which
tend to imply a certain degree of uncertainty. In such cases 'presentiation' may
become prohibitively costly (Williamson 1979). In these situations opportunistic
behaviour is likely to arise from one or more of the parties implied. Onesolution
proposed by Williamson to this situation is to internalise transactions through
commonownership and hierarchy. This is illustrated by several examplesoutlined
in section 3.4, where private insurance schemesfor livestock an/or animal health
have been burgeoningin several countries.
Finally, relational contracting derives from neoclassical contract law being
spread over an increasingly longer period of time. The progressiveincrease in the
"duration and complexity" of contracts has moved from a highly transaction-
specific contract law to one in which the reference point is the relation itself
developing through time (Williamson 1979). Relational contracting is therefore
increasingly important in the relationship between purchaseand provision. These
lines of reasoning may be applied in the AH setting at different .levels. For
example, when focusing on community-based systems, due to the lack of
9 Quote of Macneil in Williamson (1979).
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contractual framework in rural and remote areas between CAHWsand community
members, transactions are based, as previously mentioned, on trust. Monitoring
in these settings incurs high costs, deterring classical contractual agreements.
The privatisation process in most developing countries has generally weakened
the previously frail overall system design. Consequently, governance has also
been affected. As mentioned by Murray and Frenk (2000) in relation to the HHS
and applicable to the AHS,a judicial structure which enforces contracts between
purchasers and providers is of high importance for the effectiveness of the
system. Attributes such as ethical codes of conduct or, as mentioned by Leonard
(2000), the levels of corruption in the government are also likely to influence
performance.
It is therefore essential for the system's design to consider activities such as
performance assessmentand priority setting. Performance assessmentis crucial
in providing strategic directions and assuring a level playing field to assessthe
performance of institutions involved in the revenue collection, purchasing,
provision and resource development. Priority setting refers to selecting the
criteria for prioritisation, and consensusbuilding around these criteria, are major
tasks for governance. These two factors imply both technical and political
aspects. Inter-sector advocacyin relation to the promotion of policies enhancing
animal and public health needs to be addressed in the strategic design. As
mentioned earlier, AHS do not only deal with animal health and economic
production of livestock products but also with a broader concept of protecting
human health through (veterinary) public health policies, activities and
education. Advocating progress on those determinants implies a cross-sector
approach.
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Governance is an important function in AHSperformance that has usually been
linked to the notion of regulation. Yet, a broader perspective on the involvement
of governancein the overall system is taken in this study. Its key function is thus
associated to setting, monitoring and implementing the rules for animal health
systems.Associatedwith this is assuringa level playing field for all actors in the
system, especially in relation to purchasers, providers and clients/farmers.
Further, governance plays an important role in defining strategic directions for
the whole AHS.
Regulation and consumer protection should also be considered in the design of
the system. Regulation in the AHSwould not only include sanitary regulation on
livestock and derived products but should also include certain neglected areas
such as the regulation of organisations in charge of the finance, provision and
resource development functions of the system. Given the nature of animal
healthcare markets and the presence of asymmetries of information between
consumers (herders) and providers (veterinarians, AHAsetc), achieving a level
playing field for the actors to enhance information exchange is also a role for
governance.
3.3.4 Other influencing factors
Other aspects that are likely to influence AHSrelate to the extent of integration
of different sub-functions and non-financial resourcegeneration.
3.3.4.1 Type of integration
It has been painted out that AHSperformance is closely linked to the different
elements that form its structure. However, the relation between these functions
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and sub-functions also influences its efficiency. Figure 6 (below) shows the
diverse types of integration that exist in AHS. The degree in which animal
healthcare services are integrated depends also on the level of decentralisation
of activities in each country. Thus, in African as well as in Latin American
countries vast differences can be found regarding decentralisation levels (Gimeno
2003; Sidibe 2003).
Vertical
segmentation
and
horizontal
integration
(C)
In those African countries where privatisation has been undertaken, more than
one entity is currently responsible for more than one function, thus falling into
the category of vertical and horizontal segmentation (0). It has been recently
painted out by Sidibe that one of the problems of most francophone African
countries after the privatisation process is the lack of articulation between the
central administration and the delivery branches at district or local level. This
phenomenon points out the usefulness of the transaction cost economics
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perspective and the importance of governance (the latter is debated in detail in
section 3.3.3). End users in remote areas often believe that they are being
excluded from services (Sidibe2003). Linked to this negative perception by stock
owners is the lack of organisation and coordination by the central administration
of field surveillance programmes, therefore hindering the system's performance.
However, it should be noted that someNorth African countries and someof those
in Southern Africa have maintained the "classical" structure of veterinary
services (Sidibe2003) (i.e. they have preserved the structures existing during the
colonial period). Throughout this era, African countries tended to be vertically
and hodzontally integrated (A) (as for other fields). This type of integration also
applies, to someextent, in India (Ahuja, George,McConnelet at. 2000)where, at
a state level, there is vertical and horizontal integration. However central
government also contributes with a percentage of the AHSfunding.
Belize's newly developed Belize Agricultural Health Authority (BAHA) (Gongora
2003) would fall under the category of vertical segmentation and horizontal
integration (C). Fundscome from the revenuesallocated from the "Consolidated
Revolving Fund" (from the ministry of finance (MoF», from fees imposed by the
Authority and from donations (Belize 2000). All these funds are pooled to the
Authority. Purchase and provision of services is separated as there is high
involvement of the private sector for animal health services delivery (Gongora
2003).
An example that highlights vertical integration and horizontal segmentation (8)
is Australia's national animal health structure (NAHS).Here, collection methods,
fund pooling and purchasing are split between research and development and
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animal health services. (This example will be further analysed in sections 3.4.2
and 3.4.3).
The extent of vertical integration especially affects functions such as revenue
collection and purchasing, or purchasing and provision of services (Murray and
Frenk 2000).
When analysing financing and revenue collection mechanisms at a governmental
level, the degree of responsibility sharing (i.e. for public health and food safety)
between ministrtes . (e.g. MoA and MoH) creates an added difficulty for
transparency and accountability in terms of funding mechanisms, as well as for
service delivery. This sharing of responsibility delineates different AHS
organisational patterns between developing and developed countries. Thus, in
developed countries there is a tendency to move public health and food safety
matters to the MoH (e.g. Japan (Ozawa, Chang, Yoshida et al. 2003), Italy (DIE
1994)) or to a separate authority (AFSSA10 in France (Nairaud and Prunaux 2003)
in 1998, FSA11 in the UK in 2000 (UK·Government 2003), EFSA12as part of the EU
in 2002 (European-Union2003), the Canadian CFIA13 in 1996 (Evans, Doering,
Clarke et al. 2003)), whereas in developing countries these still lie under the MoA
(or MoL). The split is mainly due to a higher degree of consumer awareness and
consciousness of food related hazards in developed countries. By contrast,
10 AFSSA(Agence Francaise de Securite Sanitaire des Aliments) is the French Food Safety Authority
and falls under the umbrella of the MoH, MoA and Ministry of Consumer Affairs. Detached bodies or
agencies such as AFSSAdo not have the mandate for sanitary policy (except for veterinary drugs).
They play the role of control, alert and information dissemination and transparency (Nairaud, D.
and O. Prunaux (2003). "La renovation du dispositif francais d'analyse des risques sanitaires." Revue
Scientifique et Technique 22(2): 433-447.
11 FSA:Food Standards Agency.
12 EFSA:European Food Safety Authority.
13 CFIA: Canadian Food Inspection Agency.
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developing countries tend to focus on increasing animal production; therefore
AHSare principal activities and they remain under the MoA(or MoL).
3.3.4.2 non-ttronao! resources
Apart from the institutions that finance or provide services, crucial to the
functioning of AHS(aswell as for the HHS)are the organisations providing inputs
to these services. Especially important are (i) human resources, (ii) physical
resources (i.e. facilities and equipment) and (iii) knowledge (Murray and Frenk
2000). Examples will include universities and other educational institutions,
research centres, and companies producing specific technologies such as
pharmaceutical products, devices and equipment. Eachsub-group's organisation
is likely to influence the AHS performance as for example the degree of
concentration of pharmaceutical companies and the level of competition.
Another example could be the degree of autonomy of research institutions to set
their goals and priorities. In terms of training institutions such as veterinary
schools and animal health workers' training, the main issue would refer to
whether they fall into the domain of the MoA or the MoEand the collaboration
with the MoH. This will determine the match between supply and demand for
animal health personnel.
Having analysed the key components of the organisation of AHS, the following
section will focus on the different ways in which these servicesmight be financed
and the implications for their provision.
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3.4 Practical approaches to fund;ng AHS
As mentioned in the previous section, there are several ways in which services
can be funded. These include taxation (TF), national livestock or animal health
insurance contributions (NU), private livestock (or animal health) insurance (PU)
and user charges or out-of-pocket payments (UC). Loans, grants and donations
are also a way of funding animal health services. Suchsourcesmay contribute to
funding mechanisms like taxation, national livestock or animal health insurance
and private livestock or animal health insurance. Additionally, credit may also
have consequenceson livestock keepers' ability to pay for AH services. However,
credit does not contribute to centrally funded AHS, but (as it affects ability-to-
pay) its analysis will mostly lie under the umbrella of service provision and
related "payment arrangements". This is why credit is not analysedin the thesis.
The way in which AHS can be financed through the above mechanisms (or a
combination of them) is analysedbelow.
3.4.1 The financing equation
Until recent years, national governments in developing countries have been in
charge of animal health financing, taking care of all AHSexpenses. However, as
elaborated in section 1:1, during the past decadessomegovernments have faced
financial difficulties. Animal health services have been, at least partly,
privatised. Herders now have to pay for the services of veterinarians or
auxiliaries. Some farmers are grouped in cooperatives or integrated farms that
help in obtaining a more cost-effective price per unit of veterinary service
delivered. In other countries (as is the case in someAsian countries) it is possible
to find national animal health insurance (NAHI) supplemented by a national
livestock insurance system (NU) (FAO 1992). India, for example, has a mix
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between regional and central government funded AHS(Ahuja, George, McConnel
et al. 2000). The ways in which revenues are collected vary widely between
countries. In view of the upcoming challenges related to the "Livestock
Revolution", most countries are pleading for an increase in animal healthcare
services budgets (Gimeno 2003; Gongora 2003; Sidibe 2003). It is therefore
surprising to see that, to date, there have been very few attempts to explore
revenue collection mechanismsfor the animal healthcare sector (see (Anteneh
1984).
By contrast, in the HHside, the debate regarding funding mechanismsstarted in
the early 1960s (Abel-Smith 1963; Abel-Smith 1966) and is still continuing.
Sourcesof financing have been thoroughly explored and their consequences,both
positive and negative, evaluated. The financing debate in the HH field has
therefore been much more elaborated and, consequently, is more sophisticated
than that found in the AH field. For example, Abel-Smith (1992) hasexplored the
options for funding health services in developing countries where it is generally
difficult to raise more revenue through taxation. These are fee for services,
community financing and compulsory health insurance (Stinson 1982; Akin,
Birdsall and Ferranti 1987;Abel-Smith and Rawal1992).
Still in the HH context, Evans (1998) formulated an equation for financing of
healthcare systems (see figure 7). This equation was devised to render (human)
health systemsmore transparent and accountable. It assumesthat the total of all
revenues has to be equal to all expenditure (Evans1998). This in turn should be
equal to the incomes plus the profits of those working in the system.
Consequently the equation assumes no deficits. The equation states that:
"revenue - the sumof taxation (TF), compulsory or social insurance contributions
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(SI), out-of-pocket payments and user charges (UC), and voluntary or private
insurance premiums (PI) - is equal to expenditure - the result of price (P) times
the quantity (Q) of goods and services. These in turn, must be equal to the
income of those who provide health care services - the quantity and mix of inputs
(W) times the price of those inputs (Z)" (Mossialos, Dixon, Figueras et at. 2002).
Even though the two systems (for animal and human health) are different, the
concept of this equation still applies in the animal health setting. Some of the
main inputs in the first part of the equation would definitely differ (as for
example the weight of taxation and the counterpart in' AH of "social insurance"
contributions). But it does not mean that they do not exist. It is just more usual
in post-privatisation developing countries to find systems commonly based on
user charges or out-of-pocket payments (UC).
No system is based on a single source of revenue. Hence in the AH setting the
mixed sources of revenue will come from taxation (TF), national livestock
insurance (NU) contributions, user charges (UC) and private livestock insurance
(PU). Examples will be provided in the following sections (3.4.2 to 3.4.5). In
developing countries, though, non-governmental organisation (NGOs),
intergovernmental organisations and international banks contribute significantly
to this first part of the equation compared to the situation in the developed
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world (Mossialos,Dixon, Figueras et al. 2002). This applies to both human and
animal healthcare delivery.
3.4.2 Taxation
Taxation is one of the existing mechanisms to collect revenues for AHS (and
evidently for HHS).What is explored in this chapter is the way in which AHSare
or can be financed through taxation. Hence, it relates to an element that is part
of a national taxation structure. Developed countries generally tend to have
more reliable taxation systemsthan developing countries. In the latter case, lack
of structures and enforcement tend to hinder the implementation and collection
of taxes.
According to Musgraveand Musgrave (1989) and Cullis and Jones (1998), there
are two basic principles to report the way in which taxes can be levied. These
are the "benefit" principle and the "ability to pay" principle. The benefit
principle argues that people who receive more than their share of public
spending should pay more than their share of tax revenues. Benefit taxation is
hindered by difficulties of measuring benefits, especially for goods with high
externalities (Stiglitz 2000). The ability to pay principle is basedon the concept
of taking proportionally more from the rich than from the lesswell off. Someof
the elements of taxation take into account benefit considerations. Yet, tax
structure is generally planned to satisfy the "ability to pay" principle, the
interpretation of which is not exempt from debate (MusgraveandMusgrave1989;
Cullis and Jones 1998).
Two different flow measurescan be chosen as tax base (Musgraveand Musgrave
1989). These are (i) income (see Box 1 below) and consumption (expenditure),
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and a single stock measure, (ii) wealth. Following Cullis and Jones (1998), a
"personal expenditure tax" would be the equivalent to income-based taxes. They
argue that such tax method is attractive because it takes into account
individuals' consumption instead of their contribution (i.e. income). Hence, it
would relate to "actual rather than possible consumption". It has been argued
that this method of taxation would be more equitable than income tax. However,
due to the administrative difficulties, it is not generally used. Yet, there is
limited experience and evidence in relation to "personal expenditure taxation"
(Cullis and Jones 1998). Wealth is the "discounted present value of the
individual's net income stream", which is the stock value of flow. Hence, "if
Income is part of the ability to pay, then wealth is also part of it". In practical
terms the difference lies in that "some things are more easily measured as a
stock than asa flow" (Cullis and Jones 1998).
Direct taxation generally encompassestaxes on income, personal expenditure
and wealth, whereas indirect taxation refers to taxes on sales of goods or
services (Musgraveand Musgrave1989). The implications of this distinction were
put.forward by Atkinson (Atkinson 1977).
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Marketed- explicit Non-marketed- implicit
. (a) Wages, salaries, rent, (b) Fringe benefits, e.g .
Visible interests, profits (that may. company car, subsidised
arise as a capital gain) meals, private health
insurance paid by the
~ employer
(c) "Extra" work activities, (d) Use of part of (e.g.)
Camouflage jobs "on the side" farmer's own output for
domestic consumption
Income can be categorised following the 'visible' and 'explicit' criteria (see table
below). The elements in cell (a) are those "most easily documented and are
typically subject to the tax system" (Cullis and Jones 1998). If tax rates vary in
relation to the source of income, an incentive exists to find a form in which it will
not be taxed. Hence, the system is encouraging "fringe benefits" (b) in
remuneration packages as well as promoting the "cash economy".
Situation in cell (d) is common in most developing countries with widespread
subsistence farming. By definition subsistence farming generated income ('imputed'
income) nearly equals total income. Yet, taxation process becomes easier with
economic specialisation and trade (national and international), the existence of
market prices and the recording of transactions. This is why it will be easier to find
more visible and explicit taxation systems in developed than in developing countries
(Cullis and Jones 1998).
Box 1: Income taxonomy (adapted from Cullis and Jones 1998)
There is, though, a wide gap between tax theory and practice (Musgrave 1959;
Musgrave and Musgrave 1989; Cullis and Jones 1998). However, Adam Smith's
principles for taxation still serve as guidance for any evaluation' of such systems.
These principles are (i) equity, (ii) certainty, (iii) convenience and (iv) economy
or efficiency. Equity conveys the idea that individuals should contribute in
proportion to their abilities, hence referring to the "fairness" in contribution as
associated to individuals' eamings (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989). Certainty
refers to visibility and compliance cost considerations (Cullis and Jones 1998).
Convenience points out "the manner and timing for the tax payment should be
convenient to the taxpayer" (i.e. acceptability) (Cullis and Jones 1998). Economy
or efficiency refers to minimising excess burden or welfare costs. This also
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includes the administrative, collection and psychic compliance costs of a taxation
method (Musgraveand Musgrave1989; Cullis and Jones 1998). Yet, putting these
principles into an analytical and practical context is difficult. An added problem
is that these principles may conflict with each other (Cullis and Jones 1998).
Although available data and examples are scarce in the AHScontext, the next
section introduces the debate surrounding the different ways in which taxes can
be levied.
3.4.2.1 Direct and indirect taxes
Direct taxes may be levied on firms, householdsor individuals. Examplesin the
economic literature include personal income tax, corporate profit taxes and
property taxes (Musgraveand Musgrave1989). Personal income taxes tend to be
labelled generally as progressiveand redistribute income from rich to poor. This
refers to a progressivetax systemwhere tax rates are higher for those who have
higher incomes. In developed countries, direct taxes are administratively simple
to collect as formal records of earned income and of companies' profits are kept
(Cullis and Jones 1998): Given that income is easily identifiable, it can be
directly deducted from source, therefore increasing compliance (Musgraveand
Musgrave 1989). If there is a high informal economy, it is important to apply
institutional measures to reduce tax evasion (Mossialos,Dixon, Figueras et al.
2002) (although it might be argued that it is not an easy task). Such taxes are
generally collected and pooled to the national treasury. Governments may.
allocate funds from this pool (which generally also includes indirect taxes) to AH
programmes as happened in the UK during the FMD2001 outbreak". However,
14 Personal communication: Keith Sumption, FMDOfficer (Europe Region), Animal Production and
Health Department, UN·FAO.2004: Rome
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there are several institutional characteristics that might create horizontal
inequity such as geographical variation of income tax rates, exemptions of
taxation for certain incomes and tax deductible expenditure. Horizontal equity
relates to the notion of 'equal treatment for equal needs' whereas vertical
equity focuses on redistribution (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989).
In the AH field, indirect taxes are more common. These are levied on
expenditure on goods and services as for example sales tax, value-added tax,
excise tax and import and export tax (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989; Begg, Fischer
and Dornbusch 2000; Stiglitz 2000). An advantage of this taxation method is
highly visible and easily identifiable. Yet, they tend to be regressive as they are
not related to overall income (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989). When taxes are
regressive, people with lower income spend proportionately more of their saving
on highly taxed goods such as tobacco than people with higher income. Even so,
they are useful when there is a large informal economy and widespread evasion
of direct taxes (Mossialos, Dixon, Figueras et at. 2002).
In developed countries, an interesting example of funding mechanism for one of
the components of AHS is Australia's scheme for research support. This system
relies mainly on indirect taxation (which is earmarked for R&D). Levies and
charges are therefore used to fund activities such as research and development,
marketing and promotion, residue testing, and animal health programmes
(Government-of-Australia 2003). Collection of taxes is supported and enabled by
government legislation (Holden 1999).
The Levies Revenue Service (LRS) of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forestry - Australia (AFFA) collects and administers most levies. These are usually
137
collected at the first point of sale of the primary producer or point of further
processing. In caseswhere there are specific difficulties in collecting levies at
the first point of sale, a levy on inputs may be considered. Examplesof levies for
the livestock and dairy sectors include the following15 (Government-of-Australia
2003):
(i) Livestock levies: buffalo export, buffalo slaughter, cattle and livestock export
charge, annual cattle and livestock transaction levy, monthly cattle and livestock
transaction levy, chickens-laying charge, chickens-meat levy, deer export, deer
slaughter, etc.
(ii) Dairy levies: dairy ("All Milk Levy"), dairy adjustment levy, etc.
All levies and charges are paid into the Consolidated RevenueFund (CRF).The
Federal Government assists primary industries by matching certain R&D
expenditure up to the limit of the levy receipts, but subject to a further limit in
any financial year of 0.5 percent of the grossvalue of production. Thus, direct
taxes also contribute to the CRF,and hence to R&Dactivities, through Federal
Government. This matching of expenditure provides additional revenue for
primary industry R&D.
The LRSthen allocates the funds of the CRFinto the appropriate Researchand
Development Corporations (ROC),which are in charge of R&D activities. These
Researchand Development Corporations include Animal Health Australia (to be
discussedin section 3.4.3), Australian Pork Limited, Meat and Livestock Australia
and others. As an example, ROCinvested around 364million Australian Dollars in
15 Specific description and details on each of the taxes may be found at:
http://www.affa.gov.au/content/levies.cfm
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R&D during the period 2000-2001. Investment in R&D by industry and
Government, not only results in industry-based productivity increases, but also
delivers essential public good outcomes. These include regional development,
improvements in food safety, environmental benefits, medical advancesand new
consumerproducts (Government-of-Australia 2003).
In developing countries, Anteneh (1984) pointed out some indirect taxation
mechanisms used, although not generally earmarked, for AHS funding. He
explored the different types of taxes, chargesand levies that were applied in 14
West African countries. The taxes recorded were (i) import/export taxes on live
animals, meat and edible offals; (ii) trade licences; (iii) livestock head tax": (iv)
meat inspection fee; (v) slaughter fee; (vi) market fee; (vii) holding ground fee;
(viii) transit fee; (ix) sanitary tax/veterinary certificate. The data obtained dated
back to 1975, a period well before the privatisation process. It was shown that
taxes such as trade and slaughter fees were the most constant acrosscountries.
The reason lies in that these taxes are generally easier to administer and
encounter less political rejection as they are not directly confronted to livestock
owners (asopposedto direct taxes). This may though be arguable for someof the
indirect taxes. However, such taxes are more likely to be included in the national
or regional treasury than being earmarked for livestock services (debate over
earmarked versusgeneral taxes will follow in section 3.4.2.3). Hence, the actual
livestock budget may seem to be smaller than the potential one. Of course this
depends on the weight of livestock related activities in the country studied.
These taxes were painted out by Anteneh as a possible source of revenue that
could be collected to increase the livestock budget in countries where the sector
plays an important role in the economy (Anteneh 1984).
16 Although this tax was later abolished in several of the countries studied.
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Following these lines data obtained from Senegal also indicates that indirect
taxes tend to be the preferred method of taxation (annex 1). Following the
questionnaire's results, these include taxes at the abattoir paid directly by the
farmer when slaughtering the animal, movement control, sanitary tax,
commercial licence tax and taxes paid by the abattoir itself on a yearly basis
(through "timbres fiscaux"). Hence, the taxes currently implemented in Senegal
are still similar to those painted out by Anteneh. Nevertheless, some of these
taxes may be national or local.
3.4.2.2 National and local taxes
Following Musgrave'stheory of public finance, national taxes are useful because
they allow trade-offs to be made between AHSand other public policies. Through
this revenue collection mechanism the state obtains a yearly amount of money
that the MoF then allocates to other ministries in relation to the needs of the
period and negotiating power of eachministry.
For example, in Bangladeshthe bulk of animal health protection and treatment
falls under the responsibility of the government through the Directorate of
Livestock Services (DLS). AHS are executed through a network of 9 regional
diagnostic laboratories, 17 district diagnostic laboratories, one Veterinary
Vaccine Production Laboratory (VVPL) and 464 Upazila Veterinary Hospitals
(UVH). However, no data is available on how the national animal health services
in Bangladesh are funded (types of taxes or existence of a separate fund).
Presumably funds come from taxation (local and/or general) therefore there is
no separate fund-pool. It is worth pointing out that, in spite of an allocation of
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TK 50.0 million intended for free distribution of medicines and de-worming drugs
to poor farmers, diseasediagnosisand treatment of ruminants carried out by the
DLSstaff are not cost-free (Jahanand Rahman2003).
An advantage of collective taxes (i.e. national taxes) is that it enhances
economies in administration. Devolving revenue collection to regions produces
fewer economies of scale and thus higher costs. In the developing world,
countries such as Chad and Mauritania tend to channel their whole AHSbudget
through the central treasury (Anteneh 1984). Examples obtained from the
questionnaire performed in Senegal include commercial licence tax (which
amounts 15000FCFAper year), sanitary tax and those taxes paid by the abattoir.
The latter include the stabulation tax for ruminants, holding tax, stabulation tax
and "ressuyage" tax.
Local taxes, however, might be an attractive alternative to national taxation for
four reasons. First, local taxes are seen as more transparent (i.e. visibility)
because the relationship between the amount of money levied through local
taxes and the amount spent on animal health services may seem to be more
direct. This has been highlighted previously in Anteneh's example. In countries
such as Mali, Niger, Senegaland The Gambia, in addition to central government
budgets, finance is channelled through regional (district) administrations, which
raise funds through different local taxes and levies including those on livestock
(Anteneh 1984). As seen in the Senegal questionnaire, taxes that remain local
refer mainly to movement control/restriction taxes and amount 100 FCFAper
head. Second, local taxes tend to improve accountability as local politicians are
closer to the electorate and decisionson how to spend the money are (supposed
to be) more apparent. This is especially relevant in countries where livestock
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plays an important role in the local (and national) economy. Third, theoretically,
they enhance responsivenessto local preferences so that people's needs guide
the decisions taken. Fourth, local taxes have the advantage of giving importance
locally to issuesthat are not necessarily a priority in the national budget (i.e. in
the political negotiation of budget allocation by the MoF). Hence, at a local level
and in relation to the characteristics of the region, animal health expenditure
might be given higher priority than at a national level (this would apply
differently in developed and developing countries. Developed countries would
give priority to food safety whereas in developing countries, where animals and
derived products tend to playa major role in the local economy, AHSwould be
consideredmore important).
However, depending on the importance given to animal health and/or food
safety, local taxation might create political inertia. Issuesof horizontal inequity
might also arise not only if local taxes differ between regions but also if the tax
applied in all regions is the same. Local taxation can be as progressive or
regressive as national taxation, however the scope will be more limited and it
has the potential to redistribute income only within a region (as opposed to the
whole population).
3.4.2.3 General and hypothecated taxation
General taxation has two main advantages. First, taxes are obtained from a
broad base and diverse sources. Second, it allows trade-ofts between animal
health care and other areas of public spendingwhich might reflect the priorities
of the population. However as previously mentioned (in section 3.2.1), the
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allocation of the budget for animal health services in the general taxation system
is subject to annual negotiations.
Hypothecated taxation refers to taxes that are earmarked (in the context of this
study, for animal health). They might be direct or indirect (Musgrave and
Musgrave 1989). This revenue collection process may be considered to have
several advantagesover general taxation for three reasons. First, it renders the
processmore transparent and possibly less susceptible to political pressures (as
taxes are earmarked). Second, it reduces resistance to taxation because its
purpose is more visible. A third possible advantage is that "people feel more
connected to the tax system, which in turn, may increase the pressure on
providers to improve quality" (Mossialos,Dixon, Figueraset al. 2002). However,
disadvantagesof this systemalso arise.
In practice not all hypothecated taxes are practically earmarked. As mentioned
by Anteneh (Anteneh 1984), the livestock tax revenue may be mergedwith other
taxes. Following the results of the questionnaire in Senegal those taxes
earmarked for animal health are those paid for by the farmer at the abattoir. In
the specific caseof Senegalwhere the questionnaire was performed, these taxes
are "taxe de stabulation, abattage, ressuyage, stockage" and "timbre fiscal"
(see annex 1). Therefore the above-mentioned "connection" between the
population and the tax system is undermined. Furthermore, this method might
increase rigidity in the budgetary systemas expenditure dependson the revenues
collected (limited budget) and not on political decisions. Finally, some interest
groups and professional lobbies might take advantage of the hypothecation
systems to exert pressuresover the funds. In fact, some compulsory insurance
contributions are a payroll or earmarked tax collected by the government.
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3.4.3 National insurance for livestockand animal health services
(NI)
In the human health field, social health insurance (SHI) contributions are
earmarked for health. This exists in countries such as France, but not in others
like the UK. Their main characteristics are that taxes are mandatory, collected
by a separate fund closely linked to the government (otherwise it would be an
earmarked payroll tax. Contributions are usually related to income and not to
risk (Normand and Busse 2002). In the human health care field, Abel-Smith
developed a comprehensivehistorical review of the origins of insurance schemes
in Europeancountries (Abel-Smith 1992).
In the livestock and animal healthcare field, earmarked contributions also exist
and somesimilarities can be drawn from SHIschemes.However, attention should
be drawn to the different focus that national insurance schemesin the livestock
sector may take. These schemesmay include compensation funds for lossesdue
to particular diseasesand/or animal health servicesneeded to prevent or contain
such diseases. Therefore, for simplicity in study purposes, national insurance
schemes in the livestock sector will be conveniently divided into National
Livestock Insurance (NU) and National Animal Health Insurance (NAHI). The
concept of NU is wider than that of NAHI.The latter is restricted exclusively to
animal health. Fundingmechanismswill vary in relation to the organisation and
type of scheme.
3.4.3.1 National livestock insurance (NU) contributions
Livestock insurance in intensive production systems is widely used in European
countries (VanAsseldonk,Meuwissen,Huirne et at. 2003). In these systems, two
types of compensation funds exist: compensation for direct losses and
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compensation for consequential losses. Public intervention varies between
countries and in relation to the elements for which compensation is paid.
3.4.3.1.1 Direct losses
Compensation of direct losses in Europe is partly based on European Union (EU)
dtrecttves" for list-A diseases. Direct losses include the value of the animal
destroyed, welfare control measures and organisational aspects (e.g. monitoring
of farms in restriction zones). Compensation includes 50%of the value of animals
subject to compulsory and pre-emptive slaughter, 70% of the value of those
slaughtered for welfare reasons and 50% of the costs of organisation (i.e.
administrative). The rest of the costs may be (i) refunded from national budgets,
(ii) co-financed through pubtic-pnvate financing schemes where farmers pay a
compulsory levy or (iii) suffered by the producer.
(i) Countries where governments fund compensation for direct losses from their
national budgets include Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the UK. The main
welfare control measure for the UK FMD outbreak in 2001 was to slaughter
animals thought to be suffering as a result of movement controls. Producers were
compensated for their value. However, this policy will not be continued. In
future outbreaks such compensation will not be patd":
(ii) Those countries that opted for public-private partnerships are Austria,
Belgium, The Netherlands, Greece and, as previously mentioned, Germany. In
this case, the arrangement generally includes a compulsory or voluntary levy,
paid by farmers to a separate fund. In Belgium, for example, types of levies are
17 Council directive 90/424/EEC http://www.warmwell.com/90424eec.html
18 M. Upton, Professor Emeritus, University of Reading, personal communication 2003.
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differentiated in relation to the animal speciesand farm size. Additionally, levies
for pig production vary depending uponwhether the production system is open or
closed. These levies are collected in a fund managed by the Ministry of
Agriculture. Servicesdelivered through these funds include some animal health
and quality improvement measures. However, the collection method varies
between countries. Hence, Greece, which has a NU programme under the Greek
Agricultural InsuranceOrganisation (ELGA),defines the compulsory fee as 0.5%of
the value of the stock production sold;
(iii) Farmers in Spain and Italy do not receive any compensation from their
respective governments other than for destroyed animals. There is no voluntary
or compulsory levy.
3.4.3.1.2 Consequential losses
In Europe, options do also exist to compensate for consequential losses. These
lossesrefer to businessinterruption, lossesrelated to the established restriction
zones, additional repopulation costs, losses from emergency vaccination and
price effects. The options are mainly: (i) private insurance schemes, (ii) free
public disaster assistance, (iii) public-private partnerships.
(i) Private insurance schemes in Europe exist for certain types of livestock
(mainly cattle and sheep). Examplesof countries having such schemes include
the UK, The Netherlands and Germany. In Italy private insurance schemesare
exclusively for dairy production and sheepbut participation is very limited.
(ii) Free public disaster assistanceexists in Finland and France. Although funds
are public, private insurers administer the scheme. Private insurers receive a
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commission but do not incur any loss. There is therefore no risk transfer to such
insurers;
(iii) Finally, pubtic-pnvate partnerships for the compensation of consequential
lossesexist in Denmark, Finland (to someextent) and Spain (through a structure
co-financed by the government named Agroseguro). Under this type of
partnership, the government may act as an insurer or re-insurer. Under these
schemes the risk of losing financial resources is transferred to the private
insurers, asopposedto the retailing mechanismunder free public assistance.
Through this overview of compensation mechanisms in Europe, it can be seen
that government or public intervention still remains high, as the extent of
negative externalities stemming from the occurrence of OlE list-A diseases is
likely to be high. Private livestock insurance involvement seemshowever to be
increasing in Europe for consequential losses(VanAsseldonk,Meuwissen,Huirne
et at. 2003).
In a developed country setting, private sector intervention is interesting as it
transfers risk (i.e. cost of disaster) away from public funds. However, in
developing countries, the weak legal framework and institutional context, aswell
as the lack of private providers of livestock insurance, make public intervention
the only alternative available.
Liyestock insurance for farmers exists in Asian countries. Nevertheless, specific
and comprehensive data on how such services are financed and organised is
lacking. In India, as part of the national insurance scheme (General Insurance
Company - GIC), livestock insurance is automatically granted to poor dairy
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farmers when buying an animal from a specific source. By introducing a master
policy, all animals financed by bank loans were automatically covered by the
insurance. A low cost insurance cover at a premium rate of 2.25%was introduced
for animals subsidisedby special development programmes (i.e. Integrated Rural
Development Programme (IRDP), Small Farmer Developing Agency (SFDA),
Marginal Farmer and Agricultural Labourer (MFAL) and Drought-Prone Area
Programme(DPAP)projects). The schemereimburses the owner in caseof animal
death (FAO 1992). GIC in India will compensate only under the following
conditions: accident, diseasescontracted under the period of the policy, surgical
operations, and riot and strike. The policy may be extended to a Permanent
Total Disablement (PDT) on payment of an extra premium and will therefore
cover the event of dairy cows not conceiving and not producing milk, or stud
bulls incapacitated for breeding purposes(Mathemaand Joshi 2000).
It is worth highlighting the entangled nature of livestock insurance and animal
health services. In India, the latter services fall under the responsibility of state
governments (although central government also plays an important role and some
privatisation has already been undertaken), and is managedseparately from the
national livestock insurance. In 1991, the Department of Animal Husbandryand
Dairying (DAHD) was created in the MoA (central government). The DAHD
primarily concentrates its activities on supplementing and complementing the
efforts of state governments in enhancingproductivity levels of livestock. Hence,
one of the components relates to the provision of animal healthcare services.
Fundsfor the provision of these services come from two sources: (i) the central
government and (ii) each state's regional fund. However no data is available on
the fund collection mechanismsfor either of the two fund-pools. Given that the
Indian public sector tends to be highly centralised and hierarchical, here it has
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been extrapolated that the origin is likely to be general taxation (for both,
central and regional levels) although some user-charges have been introduced in
India in 1996 for (the previously free) AHS, which might contribute to the
regional pools. Regional funds are the ones bearing the biggest part of the animal
health budget,' For example, in Gujarat during the period 1996-1997, the state
government share provided to AH was 61%, whereas the central government
share was 39% (Ahuja, George, McConnel et al. 2000). Nonetheless, GIC has
"employed a number of veterinary officers who have been provided with kits for
treating animals during their rounds. Their services can be utilised by various
agencies, whenever necessary, in the overall national interest" (FAO 1992). It is
however stressed that "veterinary services should be provided free or at a cheap
and affordable cost and government line agencies have to fully cooperate [with
GIC]" (FAO 1992). Hence, livestock insurance and health care are supposed to be
complementary, thereby highlighting the intertwined nature of AHS and livestock
insurance .
. Similar livestock insurance schemes exist in other Asian countries such as Nepal,
Thailand, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines (Mathema and Joshi
2000). These schemes started during the 1970-80s and were initially focused on
dairy production, but they expanded later on to include other livestock. Strong
links with banks (generally national and a few commercial) have been created.
For example, when farmers ask for a loan or credit from the bank, the adoption
of an insurance policy is obligatory. Insurance premiums vary between 3 to 5%of
the value of the animal. Premiums are generally kept in a para-statal fund. The
funds collected serve to reimburse the farmer when the insurance policy refunds
in the stipulated cases. Yet it is commonly stated in the insurance policy
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documents that no compensation for compulsory or emergency slaughtering (i.e.
direct losses)is reimbursed by the national insurance company.
NU embraces a wider concept of insurance of income maintenance and mayor
may not include animal health. Livestock insurance and animal health insurance
are, as seenin these examples, highly entangled. However, schemesmay exist at
a national level focusing more specifically on the animal health service
component.
3.4.3.2 National animal health insurance (NAHI) contributions
The origins of NAHIcontributions go back to the beginning of the 20th century in
Germany when the Bismarkian model of SHI started. The "Bismark" model has
often been considered the standard model of social insurance in the human
health field. Compulsoryhealth insurance started in Germany in 1883 (Zollner,
Kohler and Zacher 1982)and "the ideology of social health insurance developed:
people paid according to what they earned and the basic health needs of the
earner and the family were met - whatever the risk and the family size" (Abel-
Smith 1992). As an example, in the former Federal Republic of Germany "75%of
the population were insured compulsorily, about 13%voluntarily [...] and 10%
privately" (McPake, Kumaranayake and Normand 2002). However, two other
types of models of human health systemshave been devised: (i) the "Semasko"
model characteristic of the former Soviet Union, representing the most "pure"
public model (at least in theory as there were substantial 'under-the-counter'
payments) in that it is publicly funded and provided, and (ii) the British model,
which is largely publicly financed, and provided through the National Health
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Services (NHS). Nevertheless the British model includes some forms of user-
chargesand a small private insurancesector outside the NHS.
Abel-Smith pointed out in the HH field that the "organisational pattern of
insurance funds differs according to their historical evolution and political
culture" (Abel-Smith 1992). Indeed, he described the following possibilities:
(iii) "One insurance fund covering all the insured, though powers may be
delegated to local areas". This simplifies administration when there are
employment changes;
(iv) "A series of local funds to bring control nearer to the consumer. Cross-
subsidiesmay be needed between richer and poorer areas";
(v) A system of insurance "largely based on industry" as in Germany, South
Korea and Japan. "Under the law, all the funds have to provide certain
defined benefits: someother benefits may be optional";
. (vi) "To have competition between funds for members, with a central body
collecting the contributions and distributing them among the choseninsurers
according to the risk of their members", as it has been the case in the
Netherlands.
In the AH field, Germany passeda national law on contagious livestock diseases
enabling the establishment of "Compensation Funds" (TSK)in 1909 (Donhauser
and Pauels 1997). These collected funds to support official measures against
contagious diseases.TSKswere then established in the German federal states.
The philosophy of the TSKsrelied on the combination of the livestock owners'
will of risk-sharing with the state support for agriculture. It was introduced as a
compulsory scheme and the intention was to accumulate funds to compensate
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farmers for losses incurred from the application of official measures. Those
measures were (i) the control and fight of contagious livestock diseases and (ii)
the application of prophylactic or preventive measures (prevent the outbreak and
spread of diseases), which constituted the biggest bulk of the financing.
Nowadays, TSKs exist in all federal states as para-statal self-governing
institutions and their mandate is determined in the statutes. It is an independent
management body that takes decisions according to best practice (Donhauser and
Pauels 1997).
Financing of (or contributions made to) TSKs come from three different sources.
First, membership is compulsory for all livestock holders and the annual fee is
related to the number of cattle, horses, pigs, sheep and poultry owned. Second,
TSK receives state grants to finance legally ordered activities such as
vaccinations and routine tests. And third, another source of income is revenue
coming from financial investments and assets held (Donhauser and Pauels 1997).
Compensations received by livestock owners from TSK relate to the following
situations (Donhauser and Pauels 1997):
(i) Losses due to notifiable diseases,
(ii) Losses due to compulsory measures for disease prevention and control,
(iii)TSKs contribute partly to the costs incurred by proper disposal of rendering
carcasses in rendering plants, and
(iv) TSKs compensate mass vaccination and laboratory testing expenses.
The eradication of the major contagious diseases (such as FMD, bovine
tuberculosis, cattle and sheep brucellosis and cattle leucosis) in the 1950s in
Germany has been largely attributed to the TSK.
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TSKsoperate under the guidance of the federal MoAor MoH (in relation to each
federal state). At the top of its structure is the supervisory board composedof
representatives of livestock holders, private veterinarians, public veterinary
officers and the supervising ministry. It is the supervisory board which sets the
guidelines and relevant decisions applied by the management on day to day
operations (Donhauserand Pauels1997).
The newly created Animal Health Australia embodies a similar structure to that
outlined above for .Germany. Animal Health Australia was founded in February
2000 as a result of a consultation between government and industry groups
regarding strategic planning for policy and funding mechanisms for a national
livestock system programme. The Australian National Animal Health System
(NAHS)is organised as a not-for-profit company which currently includes 24
members spread across four membership categories: (i) the Commonwealth, (ii)
State and Territory governments, (iii) key primary industry groups and (iv) other
key interested organisations.
Funding is provided via annual subscriptions paid by the members to the
Company and "is applied in pursuit of an integrated national animal health
system" (Animal-HeaLth-Australia2003). Subscriptions to AnimaLHeaLthAustraLia
are determined on a three-year rolling average of the GrossValue of Production
(GVP)as established by figures published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Each livestock sector or species is represented by an organization that is
effectively the "peak body" for livestock producers utilizing that species of
animal. The CommonweaLth(FederaL)government is aLsoa member, as are the
seven States and Territories. The Commonwealth pays one-third of the total
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subscription funding due (based on break even expenditure budgets prepared in
advance and approved by members of the Company in general meeting), the
States and Territories pay one-third (split between them all on the basis of GVP
as noted above), and the "peak bodies" pay one-third, also split between them
as per their relative GVP figures19•
The structure is supported and enabled by legislation. The Company also has the
capability to manage national animal health related programmes for all, or a
subset of its members. Programmes that have a collective benefit for members
are funded from members' subscriptions. The Company currently has three major
subscription-funded programmes addressing (Animal-Health-Australia 2003):
(i) Animal health services, "which aims to improve the national capability,
stan~ards and performance of Australia's animal health system",
(ii) Animal disease surveillance, "which provides a nationally integrated,
innovative surveillance system to underpin trade", and
(iii) Emergency animal disease preparedness, "which enhances management
approaches to deal with animal disease emergencies".
Animal Health Australia also includes disease specific programmes. Those
diseases of interest to a limited number of members are therefore funded
directly by the primary beneficiaries. In 2003, the Company managed 'special'
programmes and projects such as Tuberculosis Freedom Assurance Programme
(TFAP), National Transmissible Spongiform Bovine Encephalopathy Surveillance
Programme and the National Arbovirus Monitoring Programme.
19 Willoughby, Animal Health Australia's Finance Officer, personal communication 2003
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Similar examples of disease targeted specific programmes can be found in the
UK, but also in developing countries, as for example, in Cote d'ivoire. After the
outbreak of Aujezsky's disease in 1981, the British government offered help by
partially compensating the eradication of the disease. The British pig industry's
first answer was to refuse this offer. However, after weighing the costs and
benefits, in 1983an agreement was reached between the British government and
the pig producers to control the disease. A Pig DiseaseEradication Fund (PDEF)
was created to coordinate the financing and control of the disease.A levy of 0.3
GBPper head was raised on all pigs destined for slaughter or export. This levy
covered the compensation costs incurred through the compulsory slaughter of
animals. There was a fund in charge of the collection of the money: the Meat and
Livestock Commission acting under the Pig Industry Levy Act of 1983 and
transferred to the PDEFLtd for compensatory payments to producers with
affected herds. This tax collection raised an amount of 27 million GBP.All other
costs associated with the schemewere borne by the government that includes
administrative, veterinary and laboratory resources (Holden 1999). In Cote
d'ivoire, specific funds for diseaseeradication or containment exist. In the case
of compulsory control and eradication of CBPP, Rinderpest and PPR, funding
. sources from 1994 to 2002 came from: (i) the government through the "Budget
Special d'investissement et d'Equipement" (BSIE), (ii) livestock keepers' direct
contributions and (iii) external funding (EuropeanDevelopment Funds). Livestock
keepers contribute through payment of charges for services, which are collected
by the external services of the ministry in charge of animal production and
subsequently pooled to the "Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement" (CAA, state
bank). Management of these funds is centralised at the livestock and animal
health project level, which falls under the direction of the ministry in charge of
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animal production. Management of these projects is also supported by the
decentralised governmental structures (Vame2003).
3.4.3.3 Advantages of NI schemes for the Uvestock sector
These examples show the diverse and mixed nature of funding mechanismsfor
livestock insurance.
The pattern observed from the above examples is similar to that found in the
human health counterpart, as stated by Abel-Smith (1992). The main
particularity of a 'national health system', which is the existence of a separated
collector agent, is therefore also found in the livestock setting. The collector
agent in the AH field can therefore be a single NI fund (such as in Belize) or
several funds devolved to the regions (e.g. Germany, Australia, India). The
predominant attraction of NI (whether central or regional) is the 'independence'
of the insurer from government and the perceived greater responsivenessto the
consumer (i.e. farmer). However, the 'independent' NU fund is at arms' length
from the government, therefore it may still be subject to a certain degree of
manipulation, although less than that of the general taxation fund. It is however
easy to see that due to problems of governance, accountability and regulation of
funds, these might fall again under the control of the MoAor MoF.
NI, as a way of collecting revenues, has similar advantagesto those outlined for
hypothecated taxation (see section 3.4.2.3). It is more transparent and usually
more acceptable. Theoretically, NI funds are supposed to be better protected
(than if they were managed by the ministry) from political interference since
budgetary and spendingdecisionsare devolved to independent bodies. However,
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independent agenciesmight also be vulnerable to political influence or pressure,
a processknown as "regulatory capture" (Stigler and Fiedland 1962) (mentioned
earlier in section 2.2.4).
Additionally, the risk pool created through NI is much larger than that obtained
through private insurance, especially in developtng countries. However,
depending on the nature of the contributions to the NI fund/s, difficulties may
arise when trying to obtain a census of farmers as they might produce in the
informal market. An illustration is the recent AI outbreak in Vietnam (Riviere-
Cinnamond2005), where identifying and recording the actual number and breeds
of animals farmers possess(FAO 1992) or in determining the gross value of
production (GVP)was not always possible. This might limit accessto certain parts
of the farmer/producer population, especially for poor farmers and small
producers and this highlights someof the equity problems arising from NI.
Other key points in the functioning of NI are associated with the specific
organisational arrangements of the insurer's fund(s) (i.e. single or multiple
funds). These arrangements might have an important impact on the system's
efficiency. Hence, a single fund may reduce administrative costs, ease regulation
and obtain bigger risk pooling. Multiple funds mayor may not compete with each
other. If they compete, there might be an incentive for improving efficiency.
Yet, insured farmers will not be able to choose. This may lead to some lack of
responsiveness and certain degree of inefficiency. Defining the extent of
coverage for non-competing funds in relation to the region or to a specific
diseasemight also be essential. For example, regional funds exist in Germany.
They are geographically distinct and cover the entire farmer population of the
territory. This allows for larger pools, spreading administrative costs and
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functions over a larger base. However, they can also have the disadvantagesof
local taxation regarding regional inequity of wealth, income and risk status.
Schemestargeted at specific diseasesare not generally compulsory. Commonly,
it is a collective decision of the farmers/producers affected by the disease to
organise such schemes themselves (e.g. Animal Health Australia's special
programmes outlined in section 3.4.3.2). The underlying rationale is usually
based on the economic implication related to the presence of the disease for
both, producers and government. Such. specific funds are generally non-
competing and targeted to a defined population. Under such funds, services are
tailored to meet the needs of farmers/producers. Contribution rates might
though be higher than average, especially for highly intensive farming. In rural
areas this may raise some equity considerations. Another possible disadvantage
of disease targeted schemes is that coverage might serve overlapping
geographical areas, therefore duplicating administrative costs and limiting the
total size of the pool.
Someof the characteristics outlined for disease-targeted schemesrelate to those
found,in private livestock insurance.
3.4.4 Private insurance for livestock and animal health services
(PLI)
According to Stiglitz the main difference between private and social insurance is
that with private insurance "there is a close relationship between the payment of
the individual, the risk he faces and what he receives" (Stiglitz 2000). Indeed, as
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stated by Musgraveand Musgrave, "social insurance programs provide insurance
and redistribute income" (MusgraveandMusgrave1989).
When turning into the human health sector, Abel-Smith debated why national
coverage through private health insurance would be costly and not equitable
(Abel-Smith 1992). As mentioned earlier, human and animal health systems do
not convey the same ethical values. This is why it might seem logical to find
more often private insurance in the animal health sector. Nevertheless, following
the 'health action' concept (see 2.2.2), there are overlapping areas between
both sectors.
Insurance principles and their implications have been analysed in the context of
human health by several authors (e.g. Abel-Smith 1992; Abel-Smith and Rawal
1994; Green 1999; Mossialos and Thomson 2002). In the specific context of
private insurance, Mossialosand Thomson (2002) present a useful categorisation,
which may be applied in the context of AH. Indeed, before entering in the
categorisation of private schemes, it is important to bear in mind the debate in
section 2.2.5 regarding market failures and the presence of incomplete market
(Stiglitz 2000).
The concept of private insurance for the livestock sector includes all those
initiatives that are individually or collectively organised without government
involvement or intervention. Private insurance exists in the livestock sector and
may be structured and financed through (i) farmers' associations, cooperatives
(Umali-Deininger, Feder and deHaan 1992), (ii) community-based initiatives, (iii)
mutual livestock insurance groups or (iv) insurance companies (Donhauserand
Pauels1997;VanAsseldonk,Meuwissen,Huirne et at. 2003).
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Theseschemescan playa valuable role in the financing, provision and delivery of
a wide range of toll good services varying from preventive to curative, drug
distribution or even ordinary animal diseases not covered by the national
livestock/animal health insurance (if existing) and other hazards. Toll good
services have been defined in section 2.3.1. Briefly, these are those for which
after paying an initial fee, consumption of the good or service is unlimited, up to
capacity maximums. Such types of PLI are largely related to high value
productions like dairy, pig or poultry, the organisation of which relates to
Buchanan's 'theory of clubs' outlined in section 2.3.1.3.
However, data regarding such schemes is difficult to obtain. Here, examples
were obtained through a through literature review in AGRISand AGRICOLA
databases, as well as examples obtained from the grey literature and through
FAOand AU staff members. In developed countries, and especially in Europeas
mentioned in the previous section, PLI is increasingly being managed through
insurance companies (Van Asseldonk,Meuwissen, Huirne et at. 2003). Examples
of PLI mainly focusing on AHSinclude Israel's HACHAKLAIT(Efron 1997), which
started as early as 1919, New Zealand's "Veterinary clubs" (FAO 1997; Smith
2001) created in 1930 from associations of private livestock owners, service
cooperatives in Ethiopia (deHaanand Bekure 1991), which started in 1975, and
Kenya's cooperative societies (deHaan and Bekure 1991; Chema, Oruko and
Heffernan 2001; Smith 2001), which have been evolving since 1988. Similar
structures exist in other countries such as in the state of Gujarat in India. There
the Amul Cooperative and the Kheda and Mahesanadistrict cooperative unions
are among the most active and are operating relatively well-managed insurance
delivery systems(Ahuja, George,McConnelet at. 2000). In Latin America, similar
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schemesmay also be found such as the AGSO(Asociacion de Ganaderosde la
Sierra y Oriente), which started in 1995(Kleemann1999).
Thus, according to Mossialosand Thomson (2002), insurance in the human health
sector may be classified in three categories: (i) substitutive, (ii) supplementary
(or choice-increasing), and (iii) complementary. Given the similarities existing
between the human and animal health sectors, outlined in section 2.2.1, such
categorisation may also be applied to the sector of private livestock insurance.
The boundaries of each of these categories of PLIare not always clearly defined;
therefore overlap is expected when revising PLI schemes in different countries.
Nonetheless,suchclassification is useful for the purposesof the thesis.
3.4.4.1 Substitutive insurance
Substitutive private livestock insurance may exist as an alternative to the
national animal health and/or livestock scheme applied in a country. For
example in the Netherlands, pig producers are increasingly encouragedto opt for
such private schemes (Meuwissen2000) to shift risk away from government
budgets. This development is driven by two main factors: the changing role of
government (e.g. lessprice control but more regulation on the useof medicines)
and the increasing industrialisation of agriculture (Meuwissen2000). Farmers or
producers with higher benefits may opt out from the public sector scheme
leaving that sector to bear the smaller producers' risk.
3.4.4.2 Supplementary (or choice-increasing) insurance
PLI will be supplementary when it allows quicker access to services, which are
generally of higher quality than those provided by the public structure. An
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example of suchschemewould include Israel's HACHAKLAITservice provider. The
scheme operates nation-wide and may also cover diseases that are under the
NAHSmandate. This may therefore generate differential accessto animal health
services and livestock insurance between those who adhere to the private
schemeand those who do not. Certainly, not all production types carry the same
risks, thus high-risk production may be forced to revolve to private schemes.
Depending on who these higher risk farmers or producers are, inequalities may
arise, potentially making the PLIschemeregressive.
3.4.4.3 Complementary insurance
Finally, complementary PLI refers to those schemeswhich deliver services not
provided or covered by a national structure. In the livestock sector, an example
included in this category could be artificial insemination. Given the 'private
good' characteristics of these services, provision is generally left to the private
providers which may be organised as an association offering AI service packages
for a stated premium (e.g. Israel Cattle Breeders' ASSOciation).Such schemes
may be highly profitable for users, but will generally leave the lower profit
producers unable to pay"for their services.
The organisational structure and functioning of these different types of PLI has
some similarities with the managed care structures found in the human
healthcare setting. The classical example of this structure is the Health
Maintenance Organisation (HMO)seen most commonly in the USAbut also found
in Europe.
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In human healthcare, HMOsare the most well known alternative to fee-for-
service (FFS)for medical care. However different the origins of HMOsand PUs
might be, their structure and organisation remain similar. HMOswere created as
a meansof counteracting moral hazard (consumerand provider) associatedwith
FFSpayments, whereas PUs were created to enable farmers to finance highly
valued veterinary servicesnot or poorly provided by the state. This might be one
of the reasonswhy most of these structures exist in high production sectors.
HMOsand PUs are based upon a similar concept: a fixed periodic per-capita
prepayment which- is paid by consumers/farmers directly to a provider of
comprehensive (animal) healthcare services (in some cases including also
livestock insurance). The latter concept refers to a structure combining the roles
of provider of both medical (veterinary) services and insurance, hence removing
at least a part of the hidden information problem. Under this structure,
veterinarians or physicians are paid a salary or might be contracted by the
insurer/cooperative on the basis of a negotiated fixed salary, thus coping with
provider's moral hazard. Drugsare usually bought directly from pharmaceutical
companies enabling the fnsurer/cooperative to obtain reduced prices. They can
be fully charged to the consumeror partially subsidisedby the insurer depending
on the type of HMOor PU. Clinical services delivered by the veterinarian or
physician are free at the point of use or might involve a certain fee charge to
overcome consumer's moral hazard. Hospitals and/or laboratories might be an
integral part of the HMO or PU but can also be contracted by the
insurer/cooperative at a fixed negotiated rate. In the case of HMOs,the state
usually gives incentives in the form of tax reductions to employers and
employees to enrol in the scheme. PUs do not always involve government
support. However it is common to see some government involvement during the
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start up phaseof the insurance schemeuntil the cooperative hasattained a cost-
recovery level (i.e. financial sustainability).
Insurancecoverage varies greatly between PUs. It can be national as in the case
of HACHAKLAITand the "Veterinary clubs", or restricted to intensive dairy or
poultry units as in Kenya. However, it is common to see these structures arise
first in dairy industries and expand later to other types of farming. This was the
case in both Israel and NewZealand's PUs.
Premium setting and benefit package definitions differ between insurance
groups. HACHAKLAITcalculates the fee according to the speciesserved. Payment
is regressive according to the size of the herd. The benefit package includes all
veterinary and diagnostic costs. However drugs are charged at 100%but can be
purchased by the individual farmer either from the insurance company itself or
from the market (but drugs are lessexpensivewhen bought from HACHAKLAITas
they contract with pharmaceutical companies for drug supply). Benefit packages
in Kenya include clinical treatments, herd health interventions (which include
advice for persistent health problems suchasmastitis, fertility and recurrent tick
borne diseases), artificial insemination and vaccinations. In New Zealand
packages are restricted to clinical services, whilst operating costs are met
through charging for each farm visit. Similarly in Ecuador, the AGSO(Asociacion
de Ganaderosde la Sierra y Oriente) delivers, through its "Integrated Programme
of Farm Management", a package of services including technical assistance,
which covers animal health (vaccinations, diagnostics, parasite control,
epidemiological surveillance, control and management of farm records, rearing
of calves, etc.) and quality control (especially for milk).
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The AGSOrepresents nearly 5,000 cattle holders, most of them dairy farmers.
The objective of AGSOfocuseson "defending the interests of its membersand to
offer services which permit an increase in productivity and a better life for the
members and their families" (Kleemann 1999). Up to the beginning of the 1990s
services of technical assistancein livestock related subjects where offered free
of charge by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG) to farmers in
Ecuador. The MAGthen recognisedthe shortcomings the public sector in terms of
limited financial and human resourcesin providing efficient, client-oriented good
quality services. It subsequently reached several agreementswith AGSOallowing
the latter to deliver specific services that were formerly provided by the ministry
(such as artificial insemination, veterinary diagnostics and extension services.
The conditions of service delivery are fixed in a service contract. To provide
services, professionalsand/or technicians of AGSOmake two visits per month and
farm. Samplesare analysed in the laboratory of AGSO(or handed to others). The
farmer has to pay a fee for the services, which is basedon the number of animals
on the farm. Clients of this service packageare mainly medium-size commercial
dairy farms' (i.e. 50 ha) (Kleemann1999).
PLI as a means for funding animal healthcare may have several advantages in
practice. First, it enables the demands of certain farmers to be self-financed,
leaving the government to target the (limited) public resources on delivery of
animal healthcare services to other premises with more externality features.
Second, it mobilises additional resources for infrastructure that might benefit
both privately insured and not privately insured farmers. Third, it encourages
innovation and efficiency, which might catalyse the reform of the public sector
becauseof its flexibility and the profit motive (Mossialos,Dixon, Figueraset al.
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2002). Finally, the fourth reason regards the increase of choice of services
delivered to farmers.
However, PU's potential may not be attained as performance depends on its
designand regulation and on the way it interfaces with the public sector. PU also
has potential problems in practice. These are, as previously mentioned, moral
hazard (mainly consumer moral hazard), adverse selection and/or cream
skimming (see sections 2.2.5 and 3.2.2). The latter two arise mainly from the
definition of the premium packageand associatedpremiums. Suchconsequences
might hinder the objective of equity in access,an issuealso arising when dealing
with user chargesor out-of-pocket payments.
3.4.5 User charges ,or out-of-pocket payments (UC)
Asmentioned by Robinson,UCcan conceptually be viewed as "different positions
on a continuum ranging from full third party payment (zero cost-sharing) to full
user charges (costs met completely by the out-of-pocket payment)" (Robinson
2002). Following Rubin and Mendelson's (1995) analytical framework for
classifying these UC, two types of cost-sharing can be devised: direct and
indirect cost-sharing. In the AHsetting direct cost-sharingwill refer mainly to:
(i) Co-payments:which is a flat fee or charge per service. For example, in most
community animal health systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, diagnostic and
treatment services as well as drugs are charged. In India's Gujarat state, AH
servicesprovided at government veterinary dispensarieswere free of charge until
1996. However,a nominal fee per visit to the centre was then introduced (Ahuja
1999)), and;
166
(ii) Co-insurance:which refers to a percentage of the total charge. For example
in Bangladeshanimal health services are heavily subsidised by the government,
e.g. for vaccines the government pays40%of the cost (Jahanand Rahman2003),
hence farmers pay a percentage of the vaccine price.
Other more sophisticated methods in which direct cost-sharing can be
materialised (found in the HH setting) are the so called "deductibles" (a payment
covering the first x amount of money before insurance coverage begins)
(Robinson2002).
Indirect cost-sharingwould, as in the HH field, refer to the policies that result in
out-of-pocket expenditure even if charges are not directly imposed. This refers
to policies on the criteria of inclusion and/or exclusion (such as insurance
companies which specify which are the services that will and will not be
reimbursed, or government policies deciding what services should be privatised),
and pharmaceutical regulatory mechanisms (also linked to government policies
on, for example, free drugs).
This section focuseson cost-sharing as there is widespread lack of disaggregated
data on the UC, both in developed and developing countries. Furthermore, in
most transition and developing countries, informal payments tend to represent
an important source of direct cost-sharing (for example, when services are
supposed to be free of charge but a payment is made by the client to the
practitioner for the service rendered). Their informal nature meansthat they fail
to meet the standards of transparency met by formal systemsand the magnitude
is largely unrecorded, as debated in section 3.4.2. Previous sections have
introduced the criteria used to assesssuch systems (seeAdam Smith's principles
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outlined in section 3.4.2). Cost-sharingschemesin the animal healthcare sector
may also be analysed following the criteria of efficiency, equity, feasibility and
acceptability (or compliance).
In the AH field, Anteneh's study in 1984 (Anteneh 1984) listed several sourcesof
cost-sharing schemesin someSaheliancountries. He listed charges related to (i)
vaccination, (ii) clinical treatments and (iii) veterinary drugs. As seen from the
responsesto the questionnaire in Senegal,such types of user chargesstill exist in
that country for diagnosis and laboratory tests, vaccines and drugs. It is worth
referring to Musgraveand Musgrave (1989) to point out the difference between
charges and taxes. One main disadvantage of charges is that their costs of
administration might be too high, even if the charge is desirable. This has been
corroborated by Abel-Smith and Rawal (1992) (see below). However, although
taxes might be earmarked and used in lieu of charges, the basic dilemma lies in
whether the allocation of the revenue would fit the benefit principle (as
illustrated by Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) with the example of earmarked
taxes for highwaysand the HighwayTrust Fund in the US).Thuschargesin the AH
sector are used for goods and services where "consumption is wholly rival"
(Musgrave and Musgrave 1989). In turns, this relates to previous debates in
sections 2.3.1 on taxonomy of goodsand 2.4.1 on provision of goods in remote
rural areas.
In this context, efficiency has several connotations (see also section 4.3.2 for
further debate on efficiency). Although there is widespread lack of data
regarding user-charges (both in developed and developing countries) such
charges can be used by the government with two aims. First, they might be
devised as a way to limit or discourage superfluous or "unnecessary" use of
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government animal health services, as mentioned in section 2.4.1. Beyond this,
disaggregating changes (reductions) in utilisation is important to examine
whether these have involved appropriate (effective) or inappropriate
(ineffective) services, if these can be distinguished. This, in turn, addressesthe
effects of cost-sharing on the regional (or national) animal health situation or
status. Second, chargesmay also be utilised to increase government's revenue.
In most developing countries the rationale behind their application relates to this
objective. This is generally not related to the economic concept of efficiency but
rather with government's policy of cost-containment. Cost-sharing could
therefore be judged in relation to its successin meeting this objective. However,
the desirability of the objective is lesswell recognised than that of efficiency in
allocating resources.
The equity criterion is often missing in the AH field and will be further
elaborated in section 4.3.1. In the HH field, Chalkley and Robinsonhighlighted
the importance of the payment profile faced by the health service user (Chalkley
and Robinson1997). Of particular interest is the importance of marginal prices
and their expected impact on behaviour. Indeed, in a case study of UC in
Tanzania in the HH field, Abel-Smith and Rawal (1992) found that such payment
method incurs inequity and thus is only recommended for the better off strata of
the population. Hence, UCtend to exclude the poorest becauseof their limited
ATP (Abel-Smith and Rawal 1992) (which will be further discussed in section
4.3.1). However, the authors argue that UCimposed on the better off strata of
the population might be administratively difficult to implement. This is mainly
because, as mentioned earlier (see 3.4.2), in developing countries it might be
more difficult to measure wealth as there tend to be an important informal
economy.
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In the AH field it is also relevant to look at consumers' (stock owners) behaviour
when faced with cost-sharing. Such behaviour might greatly differ from low to
high potential areas (in a similar way to Abel-Smith and Rawal (1992) findings). In
the rural setting, several studies have demonstrated livestock keepers' WTP for
AH services (Ahuja, George, McConnel et al. 2000). However, this willingness is
not always matched with the ability to pay (ATP). Although the two concepts are
highly intertwined, the human health economics literature tends to highlight the
different implication of both in the context of consumers' behaviour. Given the
similarities pointed out in previous sections (e.g. 2.2.1) between AH and HH, ATP
and WTP will be dealt with as in the health economics literature.
It is therefore likely that farmers will tend not to demand AH services even if the
services needed are a necessity. This will not only entrench consequences that
might have a higher economic impact at a regional (and/or national) level than
the income generated from UC, but is also likely to heavily undermine poor
farming households' livelihoods. Conversely, in high potential areas, production
systems tend to focus on improving productivity levels. Equity consequences in
such settings would tend to be less important than ATP if significantly higher.
Hence, equity in financing as well as equity in utilisation should be taken into
consideration. This refers to the financial burden UC may cause when evaluating
their share in relation to income among different socio-economic groups. Thus,
the relative elasticity of demand between diverse socio-economic groups will
differ. Those in the upper income levels will tend to have higher elasticity. Those
farmers in the lower levels will tend to be more price-inelastic given that their
subsistence heavily depends on livestock. Nonetheless price elasticity of demand
will depend on the good or service traded. Thus, "unnecessary or frivolous"
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(Abel-Smith and Rawal 1992) services (also debated following Stiglitz in section
2.4.1) will tend to be price-elastic, whereas those evaluated by the farmer as
essential will be price-inelastic.
Although equity and efficiency are the most commonly used criteria in the HH
field to assessperformance of health systems,other criteria should be taken into
account. The feas;bWty of administering cost-sharing schemes should be
considered as in some instances the costs of running such arrangements might
hinder its main purpose. Finally, pubUc acceptabWty of cost-sharing might be a
hotly debated and political issue in many countries. Public viewpoints can
represent an important constraint on implementing cost-sharingarrangements.
3.5 Conclusions
International research institutions forecast a significant increase in animal
production in the next two decades. Suchgrowth will have several consequences,
one of them being the increase in public health threats from animal origin. As a
consequence,an increase in demand for animal health servicesis expected.
AHShave proved to be slow in responding to recent challenges acrossdeveloped
and developing nations. Several factors may affect efficiency and effectiveness
of AH services. However, it has often been argued that the scarcity of funding
heavily undermines the system's ability to improve and copewith new situations.
A framework has been devised to analyse AHS functional components
concentrating on the structure and organisation of existing revenue collection
mechanisms across different nations. Special attention has been given to the
financing, provision and governancemechanismsof AHS.
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Four mechanismsto raise revenue for AHS (and their implications in provision)
exist: (i) taxation, (ii) national livestock insurance contributions, (iii) private
livestock insurance, and (tv) user charges or out-of-pocket payments. These
funding approaches are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, most AHSrely
on a mix of them. The way in which these mechanisms are combined has
different consequencesin terms of equity and efficiency. However, issuessuchas
feasibility and public acceptability need also to be considered when
implementing AHsystems.
When focusing on pro-poor policies for the livestock sector the equity criterion
will playa central role. Several authors have lately debated the role of the state
in agricultural and consequently on livestock production systemsarguing that SAP
may have left vulnerable groupsworse off than in the previous situation. State
intervention may therefore be justified in areas where there is market failure
(which is the caseof most remote areasasstated in section 2.2.5 and 2.4.1), and
under social or environmental grounds (Dorward, Kydd and Poulton 1998; Upton
and Riviere-Cinnamond2004).
Most African countries rely on a centralised tax based systems. Hence, it is the
ministry of finance making annual budget allocations to the livestock sub-sector.
Decentralisation is taking place in most of these countries. This processprovides
a strategic time for re-organising the funding mechanismsfor animal heath and
livestock services. In districts where livestock constitutes an important income-
generating source, devolving the management of resources collected to local
authorities and earmarking those taxes associatedwith livestock to animal health
services may be a suitable alternative. This process would enable local
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authorities to obtain a more stable and predictable budget for animal health
services, which could then be adapted to local needs. Such alternative would
make budget allocation a more transparent processvis-a-vis local population.
Another funding system is that found in some Asian countries (such as Nepal,
India, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Indonesia,Malaysiaand the Philippines) which seemto
have a relatively consolidated culture of using National Livestock Insurance (NU)
schemes (which started in the 1970-80s).These tend to target especially dairy
production systemsas, being the most lucrative production type, requires heavy
investments in high quality productive animals (which are the most expensive).
However, in the case or transboundary animal diseases (TAOs) such as AI,
regional or even international sources of financing may be needed. The
characteristics of TAOsdraw similarities to the environmental economics sector.
In the latter, several regional and international funding options have already
been brought forward (e.g. Pearce 1997). Following Pearce's rationale, this area
will be debated in the discussionchapter 6.
From the examples described in this chapter, it appearsclearly that there is still
no enough market access to allow for private goods to be traded. Taking into
account the particularity of this situation and the implications associated to
animal diseases, it can be argued that regaining a certain level of control over
the financing function of animal health services might be needed for developing
countries to tackle disease spread. It has also been painted out that in
developing nations scarce are the examples of insurance schemesadapted to the
. animal health sector and particularities. Funding thus needs to be attached to
taxes levied on animals and derived products. Where all taxes or part of them
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are allocated to a specific "animal health fund" which would aim at addressing
surveillance and monitoring activities or that they are mixed to the rest of the
national taxes in the treasury will depend on the public finance structure of the
country. However, it has been seen that there are several implications in terms
of effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, ideally it would be more effective and
efficient having an animal health fund fed with earmarked taxes or levies and
which will be located in the department of veterinary services.
For pro-poor animal health services the equity criterion in the implementation is
crucial and therefore the choice of funding mechanisms should be tailored to
take into account the most vulnerable segment of the livestock keepers'
population. The latter tend to be concentrated in rural and remote areaswhere
service delivery mechanisms are often unrelated to the national structures.
These delivery mechanisms are examined in the next chapter following a
comparative analysis between human and animal health community-based
systems.
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4 Service delivery through community-based
systems
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Background
Delivering services in rural and marginalised areas in developing countries has
been and remains of great concern in the development arena. Although such
services exist in many sectors, there is an especially rich literature concerning
community-based health workers (CHW).
Humanand animal health systems' similarities have already been discussedin the
previous chapters. The parallels between these two sectors in their delivery
channels and structures have been pointed out by Leonard (2000), Redmond
(2003) and others (Catley 1999; Riviere-Cinnamond and Eregae 2003). This
chapter will therefore focus on the extensive experience in the human health
sector regarding policy analysisof community-based health initiatives.
As mentioned in chapter 1, the implications of the two systems differ in that
human health is regarded at a 'human right' thus, conveying ethical
connotations, whereas in the animal health sector trends tend to be driven by
economic pressuresfaced by those producing animal products although there are
public health risks associated with AH. Thus, although the two systemsare not
comparable in terms of driving forces, they have gone through similar situations,
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especially in the financial context. Interestingly, their governancegreatly differs.
Most developing countries were constrained by SAPto cut spending (see section
U). As mentioned earlier, in the HH side, a worldwide initiative involving
international organisations (e.g. WHO) and ministries of health (MoH) was
launched in 1978 (Alma Ata) in order to ensure that primary health care (PHC)
was available in rural areas. It is in this context that the concept of "community-
basedhealth worker" evolved.
Meanwhile, the samebudgetary constraints affected the animal health (AH) sub-
sector. However, no attempt of coordination from authorities was undertaken,
leaving animal health services (AHS)unarticulated, especially in rural and remote
areas. Additionally, privatisation guidelines for the livestock sector were
released in 1991-1992 by the World Bank (deHaan and Bekure 1991; Umali-
Deininger, Feder and deHaan 1992) with the aim to increase AHSefficiency and
effectiveness whilst reducing public expenditure. However, as mentioned in
previous chapters, a decade later the results have not proved to be as expected
(Dorward, Kyddand Poulton 1998).
At the same time; NGO-led community-based animal health activities started
growing in marginalised rural areas. Nonetheless, few linkages existed with the
already ill-equipped national animal health system (NAHS).The debate regarding
community-based schemesin animal health started as a consequenceof the rapid
increase of these initiatives, whereas in the human health sector policy analysis
at ministerial and institutional levels were performed at a much earlier stage.
It is therefore not surprising that similar concerns to those raised in the human
health field are currently being debated in animal health. Issuessuch as quality
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of care, accessibility, sustainability, equity, efficiency etc. are at present hotly .
debated in the animal healthcare arena at national and international levels (e.g.
FAO, OlE and AUIIBAR). Discussion over the aforementioned topics arises from
two main reasons. First, significant effort is currently focused on the
institutionalisation of CAH systems in developing countries. The aim is to obtain a
wider and more coherent AHS coverage at country level to enable regional
and/or bilateral trade agreements. Second, CAHWsare seen as important players
in poverty reduction development goals for the livestock-dependent poor.
Since the beginning of the debate in the late 1980s, regional differences
regarding the evolution and implementation of these systems have been seen.
CAH initiatives in West African countries have generally been more accepted than
in East Africa (Sones and Catley 2003). Scarce literature exists in Latin American
countries regarding CAH systems, although references point out such services
have been running for several decades (Mariner, Eulert and Ruiz 2004). In Asian
countries, CAH systems do exist but, unlike those in East Africa, government
involvement in CAHWs' training and organisation seems to be higher than in other
countries (GTZ 1992; IFAD2004).
Although research has been undertaken on several technical aspects of CAH
systems as a consequence of the privatisation process, little attention has been
given to policy analysis. Few authors have examined CAH systems from a policy
perspective (see for example Catley and Leyland, 2000). As a consequence, CAH
services tend to be weakly linked to national structures, making it difficult for
rural areas to be an integral part of a national and consistent AHS body.
The purpose of this chapter is not to give a historical perspective on CAH
systems, nor to examine the technical limitations hampering CAH programmes'
performance (although the qualities desired in CAHWsand their selection process
will be analysed in chapter 5). The chapter's perspective focuses on the possible
reasons why CAH systems have often been excluded from the wider animal health
policy debate and why interest is currently increasing in this area. It is argued
that financial constraints and privatisation process are not the only reasons for
the apparent faltering support CAH initiatives have been given.
4.1.2 Methodology
In order to be able to make such comparative analysis between animal and
human community-based delivery systems, a thorough literature review was
undertaken in both fields. In the AH field the literature referring to CAH systems
was mainly found in the grey literature and international organisations websites
(OlE, FAO, AU/IBAR). In addition, web-based search platforms were used (see
table below for further detail on the databases searched as well as the keywords
used). Finally, data was obtained through the contacts made in FAO and
AU/IBAR. The main criterion for CAH programmes inclusion was their intention of
up scaling CAH initiatives (i.e. the number of trained workers in the reviewed
programme and/or because it is stated in the aims of the programme) towards a
primary animal health care (PAHC) system (i.e. their integration in a wider
national animal health policy context). The CAH articles selected may be found
in annex 2. In the HH field, published literature was more easily available. Thus,
databases such as BIDS,MEDLlNE, Ingenta, PUBMEDwere used.
Databases were limited to articles in English, French and Spanish languages.
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Database Years Key words used for the
search
Ingenta (including Medline) 1997·2002 • Community (animal)
BIDS 1997·2002 health worker
Web of Science All years • Village (animal) health
SIGLE All years worker
Agris 1975·2003 • (Animal) health services
Agricola 1984·2003 • Veterinary services
CABAbstracts 1984·2003 • Primary health care
PubMedlMedline 1976·2003 • Livestock health• Economics animal health
• Finance (animal) health
services
International Bibliography of Social 1981·2003 (Available tools in eachSciences· database were used to
expand, limit or combine the
above key words)
Table 3: Literature review strategy
4.1.3 Objectives
The objectives of the review are threefold:
1. To undertake a comparative literature review to pinpoint the similarities and
differences between human and animal health community-based health service
delivery systems;
2. To elaborate the criteria against which CAH initiatives should be evaluated within
a national animal health system (NAHS);
3. To place community animal health (CAH) programmes within the context of
animal health policy.
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4.1.4 Organisation of the chapter
The chapter is divided into five sections. Following the introductory section
(4.1), section 4.2 gives an overview of the concept and origin of PAHC in
comparison to the human health counterpart (PHC)as well as a definition of a
community animal health worker.
Section 4.3 sets the criteria needed in the evaluation of community-based animal
health programmes. These criteria are equity, efficiency, access to services,
quality of services, financial and human resources.
Section 4.4 focuses on the factors influencing community-based service delivery
at national level. Areassuch as institutionalisation of CAHWs,monitoring systems
and governanceof PAHCare discussed.
Section 4.5 brings the conclusions of the chapter as well as policy
recommendations related to the guidance and support needed when aiming at
scaling up national animal health servicesdelivery through CAHsystems.
4.2 The concept of Pdmary Animal Health Care (PAHC)
4.2.1 Origins of PHCand PAHC
As mentioned in section ~, one of the main differences between community-
based human and animal health systems is their origin. Community-based
initiatives in the HH field started in 1978 with the launching of a highly
ministerial and institutional initiative. Although the approachwas supposedto be
participatory (i.e. 'bottom-up'), community-based initiatives formed an integral
part of the MoH of those countries agreeing upon the PHCconcept and were
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consequently implemented under MoH guidance (i.e. 'top-down'). Thus, PHC
literature is rich in examples of nation-wide initiatives on CHWs' organisation,
training and financing. Less abundant are examples of punctual, small-scale NGO-
led CHW projects. The latter projects have tried to include more participatory
methods in their training approaches and methodologies in order to increase
community participation and system's sustainability (Skeet 1984; Bastien 1990;
Zakus and Lysack 1998).
Conversely, the PAHCapproach derives from the dismantling of NAHS. During the
SAP period, the gap in service delivery in rural and remote areas with regard to
AH started widening. Several NGO-led activities began in rural and pastoral areas
as a consequence of the demand of AH services from livestock keepers (see for
example the case in Afghanistan (Leyland 1994)). Methods were explored in order
to assess the AH problems in these areas. As a response, Rural Rapid Appraisal
(RRA) methodologies were designed to "use farmers' knowledge and skills when
planning development projects" (Catley and Mohammed 1996). The RRAconcept
derives from a 1970 initiative originated by Chambers in 1983 as it was
,
acknowledged among development practitioners "the failure of formal data
collection methods (particularly questionnaire surveys) to generate cost-effective
and reliable data which could be used when planning projects" (Catley and
Mohammed 1996). RRAevolved into Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), the main
difference being farmers' involvement in analysing problems and formulating
solutions (Catley and Mohammed 1996). These techniques started being widely
used espectally in the agricultural sector during the 1970s.
In essence, the main difference between community-based initiatives in the two
sectors relates to their strategic planning and governance (see figure 8 below).
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These factors have been discussedin section 3.3. Thus, community-based health
systems tended to be implemented in a relatively hierarchal manner. In that
respect, Nitcher pointed out in 1986that "while the Primary Health Careconcept
may have been developed in the name of people, it is beginning to appear to
many field staff as top down and better serving political interests of speech
makers rather than either health center staff or the community" (Nichter 1986).
Considerable debate has concentrated on the lack of use of participatory
methods in the implementation of suchsystemsin HH (Nichter 1984). Conversely,
CAHinitiatives tended to proliferate from grass-root projects, seeminglywithout
coordination. The aim here is to highlight how initial conditions in the policy
context may influence the development of suchtype of initiatives.
It is important though to point out the apparently converging evolution of these
two systemssince their respective starting periods. On the one hand, researchon
PHCinitiatives tends to question the sustainability and initially assumedcost-
effectiveness of the approach given that a high number of large-scale or national
CHW schemes receive government support (e.g. salary of CHWs) (Zakus and
Lysack 1998). Furthermore, techniques have been sought on how to increase
community participation and integration of CHWsinto the PHC initiative. As
mentioned by Walt, "in pursuanceof the goal of Health For All by the year 2000,
through Primary Health Care [...], small scale CHW programmes have been
converted into large scale programmes. This has often been done hastily,
resulting in some lossof flexibility and commitment at the local level [...]" (Walt
1988). In this regard, her recommendations focus on learning from other sectors'
experience of community-based workers, especially emphasising agricultural
extension workers (Walt 1988).
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On the other hand, CAH systems' debate focuses on the institutionalisation of the
programmes and workers (Catley and Leyland 2002; Catley, Lynen and Nalitolela
2002; Sones and Catley 2003), seeking to integrate these initiatives into a wider
policy context. Main driving forces arise from concerns related to the use of
CAHWs in the context of epidemic disease outbreak containment and derived
economic and trade implications (OlE 2003). This in turn raises questions first,
about the definition of CAHWs and performance of CAH systems and second,
about their liability. To whom should they ultimately be accountable?
4.2.2 What is a CAHW?
Following McCorkle (2003), CAHWs "go by almost innumerable names in the
literature. 'Barefoot vets' was one of the first [...], modelled on China's barefoot
doctors. Others include: paravets, basic veterinary workers, village vets, (village)
animal health workers, herder auxiliaries/agents, community animal first aid
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workers, community veterinary agents, or (community) animal health
volunteers/attendants/assistants, settlement livestock carers, village keymen or
village scholars [...] veterinary scouts or 'vetscouts'" (McCorkle 2003). This
variety of names reflects not only the diversity of tasks these workers perform,
but also the type and length of training received. Yet, as for the human
counterpart, it is important to highlight that "the earliest programmes were
indigenousattempts to meet local needs" (Walt 1988).
As previously mentioned, no equivalent to the PHC "Health For All" approach
exists in the AH sector. However, both sectors' definitions of the characteristics
of a community-based worker are strikingly similar. Although the "community
selection" criterion was omitted in the earliest definitions of a CHW (thus
emphasisingthe different evolutions of PHCand PAHCasseen in figure 8), in the
late 80s, CHWswere "described as people who were selected by the community,
.: resident in the community and were from the community" (emphasismade by
the original author (Walt 1988)). It was however stated that a CHWwas "a person
from the community who is trained to function in the community in close
relationship with the health care system" (Ofosu 1983). Walt pointed out that
this definition continued to change and emphasiswas given on the professional
status of these workers (Walt 1988). Hence, in 1987 Berman et at. (Berman,
Gwatkin and Burger 1987) stated that "they may be volunteers or receive a
salary. They are generally not, however, civil servants or professional employees
of the Ministry of Health" (analogousstatements were propounded other authors
(Scholl 1985; Robinsonand Larsen1990)).
Similarly, in the early 2000s,CAHWsare seen as personswho "live and probably
grew up in the community concerned. The CAHWis known and respected in the
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community, is recognisedas a knowledgeable livestock keeper, and was selected
for training by the community" (Catley, Blakeway and Leyland 2002). Moreover,
they do "not receive a salary from the state, but for a limited time is given
money through the non-governmental organisation's programme. The aim of the
CAHWis to make a living by selling his or her livestock services, and for the
programme to becomeself-sustaining" (Martin-Curran andMacLehose2002).
However, both in human and animal health settings, community workers may be
seen, 'as labelled in the HH field, as "change agents" at community level,
enabling people to organise themselves and increasing knowledge at local level
(Nichter 1986; Rifkin, Muller and Bichmann1988; Stewart 2002)..Berman painted
out that "[ ...J CHWsare more than just a health services technology. They are
the reflection of a political struggle to change the emphasis of rural health
systems" (Berman, Gwatkin and Burger 1987). Following the same lines, Skeet
emphasised that in the context of PHC,development goals need to be put first
and thus, that "the main orientation of health workers is directed to community
development that includes health care, rather than to health care alone" (Skeet
1984). Additionally, Bender highlighted that "if priorities have been established.
by the community, it might very well be that activities directly associatedwith
'health' are not as high a priority as, says, agriculture, water development, and
income-earning activities" (Benderand Pitkin 1987).
The above definitions highlight the different evolutions of the two sectors. Yet, a
central issue to both types of community-based systems relates to the criteria
againstwhich the initiatives should be evaluated.
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4.3 A framework for analysing CAH systems
Walt (1988) states in her review of CHWprogrammes that an alternative way of
defining community workers is by examining the tasks and functions they perform
in the community and evaluating how effective they are. As in the HH literature,
the activities that CAHWsperform in the selected literature review remain
relatively similar. Clinical work and drug selling appear constantly as main tasks
undertaken by community workers in the AH field, probably becausethe worker's
earnings generally heavily rely in such activities. Prevention and extension
services are not performed as often as it would have been expected or desired.
Again, this relates to the characteristics of goodsand servicesoutlined in section
2.3 regarding the degree of publicness.
As outlined in section 3.4.2, the principles used to evaluate a tax system refer
back to AdamSmith. Whenapplying those principles to the health context, these
criteria used for health systemevaluation are generally (i) equity, (ii) efficiency,
(iii) access to services, (iv) quality of services, (v) financial and (vi) human
resources (Kutzin 1997; Kutzin 2001).
Following the similarities between systemsalready outlined in previous chapters,
these criteria will be used in the context of CAHsystemsas they are seenas the
delivery branch of a national animal health service. However, it should be noted
that such criteria are here compartmentalised, but that in practice, strict limits
and separations are difficult to establish. Thus, for example, issues regarding
equity may affect efficiency as well as access to services. Criteria
individualisation is usedhere for analysisSimplification.
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4.3.1 Equity
The equity criterion in health system's evaluation may be interpreted in several
ways (equity in access will be elaborated later in section 4.3.3). In health
economics, as mentioned by McPakeet al. (2002), "equity might imply equality
of: (1) expenditure per capita, (2) inputs per capita, (3) inputs for equal need,
(4) accessfor equal need, (5) utilisation for equal need, (6) marginal met need,
(7) health". It can also be argued that some of these definitions of equity might
be equivalent to those used for the allocative efficiency criterion when need is
defined as "capacity to benefit" (McPake, Kumaranayakeand Normand 2002).
Similarly Kutzin points out the several dimensions of equity such as "equity in
finance", "equity in receipt of care" and "equity in health status" (Kutzin 1997).
Mooneycharacterise equity in terms of "vertical" equity (i.e. equal payment for
equal needs, thus relating to the progressivity of the system) and "horizontal"
equity (i.e. equal services for equal needs) (Mooney 1992). Further debate on
equality has been brought forward by Muurinen and Le Grand, especially
regarding equality of access in (human) health (Muurinen and Le-Grand 1985).
The definition chosenfor the analysisof a health system (or sub-component)will
depend on the health policy objectives of the system.
Equity, thus, relates to the concept of 'fairness' in a given system (Musgraveand
Musgrave 1989; Stiglitz 2000). If the animal health policy objectives of CAH
systems are to make AH services readily available and affordable for poor
livestock keepers in rural and remote areas, equity may be analysed following
the vertical and horizontal definitions.
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4.3.1.1 Vertical equity
Vertical equity in the CAH context therefore refers to the progressivity or
regressivity of the system (Musgraveand Musgrave 1989). That means whether
those livestock keepers less well off pay less for the same services than those
'richer'. Several studies have already pointed out that most poor livestock
keepers are willing to pay for animal health services (Ahuja, George,McConnelet
al. 2000; Chipeta, Hoydahl and Krog 2003; Ahuja 2004). In the hypothetical
situation of a perfect market, WTPmay well represent consumers' own benefits
for any given distribution of income. In the economic literature, WTPand ATP
are closely linked. As Musgrave and Musgrave highlighted, "ideally, [the ATP]
measurewould reflect the entire welfare which a person can derive from all the
options available to him or her, including consumption (present and future),
holding wealth, and the enjoyment of leisure. Unfortunately, such a
comprehensivemeasureis not practicable" (MusgraveandMusgrave1989).
In health economics though, these two concepts are often dealt with separately
(McPake, Kumaranayake and Normand 2002), mostly due to the existence of
market failures (especially due to the information asymmetry arising in the
healthcare sector). Indeed, McPake,Kumaranayakeand Normand (2002)highlight
that "there are objections to usingestimates of willingness to pay asmeasuresof
benefits [of a given service or good], not least because willingness to pay is
closely related to ability to pay". Given that, as seen in chapter 2, the animal
healthcare market presents similar market failures (section 2.2.5) as the human
health counterpart, the samedoubts will arise regarding how representative the
WTP is as a user's own measure of benefits in the animal healthcare context.
When focusing on vertical equity the debate is thus concerned with the ATP
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principle. Indeed, Abel-Smith and Rawal (1992) pointed out similar concerns in
the HH field in the aforementioned example in Tanzania (see section 3.4.5).
However, the ATP concept dates back to thinkers such as Rousseau and Stuart
Mill and redistribution-oriented writers in the twentieth century (Musgrave and
Musgrave 1989).
Turning to the AH field, CAH systems are generally based on a fee-for-service
(FFS) payment (see the initiatives reviewed in annex 2). It is assumed that this
type of payment method incurs vertical inequity as payment is not related to
income. This in turn is related to the elasticity of demand for goods or services
debated in section 3.4.5. Thus poorer households tend to spend a bigger share of
their incomes in buying services than those more well off. Several of the studies
reviewed in annex 2 point out that richer livestock keepers tend to receive more
services from CAHWs than the others. This is the case for example in Peru (CARE-
Peru 2001), India (Orissa) and Kenya (Chipeta, Hoydahl and Krog 2003). Although
prices of services provided by CAHWs are much lower than those that a
veterinarian would charge, poorer households are often reluctant to seek CAHWs
services because of their low ATP. In these examples thus, charges for service
provided effectively limits demand in poorer households. However, the nature of
the services and goods of which demand is reduced is not described in these
studies.
Several mechanisms have been implemented (informally) to overcome this hurdle
such as payment in kind (Hanks, Oakeley, Opoku et al. 1999), delaying payments
or even adapting fees charged to the income of livestock keepers". The latter
has also been illustrated in the human healthcare field (Berman 1984). These
20 M. Upton, Professor Emeritus, University of Reading, personal communication, 2003.
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mechanisms may be seen as 'exemptions' from the system to overcome the
vertical inequity arising from a FFSdelivery system. Such exemptions however
have important implications when focusing on the economic viability and
sustainability of the CAHsystem (seesection 4.3.5).
4.3.1.2 Horizontal equity
Inequity may also arise when the principle of "equal treatment for equal need" is
not satisfied. Following Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) thus, "the horizontal
equity rule merely applies the basic principle of equality under the law".
Horizontal equity therefore refers not only to having equal medical treatment for
equal need, but also relates to utilisation (e.g. equal CAHW's time spent for
equal need) or access (e.g. equal waiting time for equal need). The latter is
dealt with in section 4.3.3.
CAHWschemeshave generally been implemented by several NGOsin the field.
Government collaboration or coordination is not always present, although its
presence is more often associated with CAH schemes in Asian countries. For
example, in Cambodia (IFAD2004) VAHWsare trained for a period of 6 months,
whereas in Peru (CARE-Peru2001) training lasts for 26 days (equivalent to 290
hours). The fact that several agencies train these workers leads to different
training curricula and length. CAHWs' knowledge might greatly vary between
countries, but here concerns focus on variations within a country or evenwithin a
district. Consequently, horizontal inequity may arise for example, when two
livestock keepers in two different regions of the same country have the same
animal health problem (for example an outbreak of AI). Due to the different
trainings of CAHWs,treatment for the same condition in the two regions may
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greatly vary. Hence, in one region the AI outbreak could rapidly be under
control, whereas in the other region the virus would continue spreading. This
example highlights alsoWilliamson's governanceconcerns raised in section 3.3.3.
Consequencesassociatedwith suchgovernancesituation might incur high costs at
national level at both public health and national economy levels.
Horizontal equity is thus a criterion that needs to be analysed when evaluating
the scaling up of community-based animal health activities. A standardised
curriculum at a national or district level (depending on the degree of
decentralisation of the country) for CAHWswould thus be desirable in equity
terms. Suggestinga standardised curriculum will however encounter difficulties
at two levels: (i) professional level, as there will be pressurecoming from other
AH professionals, and (ii) implementation level, as the reality is that those NGOs
working in a given country implement different CAH models (thus applying
different curricula).
The latter will be debated in section 4.4.3. With regard to the former, although
some aspects will be debated under the issue of institutionalisation (section
4.4.1), similarities arise with the HH counterpart. Even if some members of the
veterinary profession have been reluctant to changes towards CAH, the original
idea has often come from progressive members of such profession who have
promoted the idea of CAHWsand have persuadedpolicy makersand politicians to
support CAH systems (e.g. Catley and Leyland for East Africa). Nonetheless,
involvement of other professionals in the AH field should not be overlooked if
systems have to become sustainable. Thus attention should be drawn to the
involvement of other AH professionals such as animal health assistants (AHA)or
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technicians (AHT)especially taking into account that CAHWsmay aspire to these
professional categories.
However, the trade-off between equity and efficiency is not always easy to
delineate. Hence, as mentioned by McPake,Kumaranayakeand Normand (2002),
considering perfect market efficiency will certainly contrast with the equity
criterion if the theory of the 'second best' is not taken into account. The theory
of the 'second best' states that "once an irremovable distortion is located in one
sector of the economy, the implication is that meeting marginal conditions in the
other sectors is no longer desirable" (Cullis and Jones 1998). In the context of
CAHsystems, application of the equity criterion will lead to reduce efficiency as
it would imply, for example, redistribution of public funds.
4.3.2 Efficiency
In the HH context, there has been a wide debate concerning efficiency of the
PHCapproach and the related workers. There are two schools of thought, one
which was labelled as 'comprehensive primary health care' concentrating on the
processes of health development, and another labelled as 'selective primary
health care' focusing on the identification and transfer of "specific, effective
and economical technologies designedto reduce disease" (Rifkin and Walt 1986).
In 1986, Rifkin and Walt debated these two approachesto PHCin relation to their
underlying assumptions and expected objectives regarding efficiency in health
improvement.
Walsh and Warren (1980) first introduced the concept of selective PHC.They
proposed a concrete methodology on how to tackle the most prevalent diseases
in developing countries within a limited budget (Walsh and Warren 1980). The
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concept was thus appealing as it propounded cost-effectiveness arguments.
However, this approach to PHCwas criticized by several authors (Berman 1982;
Gish 1982) mainly because this potnt of view of health ignores arguments of
development economists regarding "the role of health care and its relationship to
increased production" (Rifkin andWalt 1986).
Conversely, comprehensive PHCseesPHCas a tool for community development
that does not work in isolation from other sectors. As mentioned by Mahler, an
"action undertaken outside the health sector can have health effects much
greater than those obtained within it" (Mahler 1981). Rifkin and Walt thus
conclude that "health is not merely a disease problem but a development
problem" (Rifkin and Walt 1986). The critical difference between these two
viewpoints lies thus in the control of inputs and outcomes of health
improvements and on what timeframe it is realistic to achieve the expected
results.
Similarly, in the AHSdelivery sector, Primary Animal Health Care (PAHC)might
be understood as a mere tool for diseasecontrol or eradication, thus exclusively
focusing on animal health inputs and outcomes. However, following the HH
counterpart concept of comprehensive PHC, PAHC approach might also be
understood as a way to promote rural development. Under this broader poverty
reduction objective, PAHCwould give special attention to increasing animal
productivity while reducing the related public health risk and ultimately enabling
economic growth in rural areas through marketing of livestock and livestock
products. However, as exposedin section 2.2.5, market failure exists at several
levels in the AH sector and failures are especially acute in rural settings. Along
Stiglitz's lines, the reasonsfor market failure in the animal health care market
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have already been argued in chapter 2. However, even taking into account these
constraints, maximising efficiency still remains one of the main objectives in AH
markets. To that aim, community-based workers are seen as a means to reduce
someof these failures. In addition, they may be considered asa transaction costs
minimiser tool. Given the adaptation of Williamson's transaction theory outlined
in section 2.2.5, CAHWsmay help in reducing the information failure in those
areas, thus improving individuals' rationality when choosing. They are also seen
as asset specific with respect to users. However, the opportunistic self-seeking
behaviour may well still remain. Contracts in these areas need thus to be based
on 'trust'. The latter will be debated in the casestudy chapter (section 5.4.1.1).
Following the above debate, CAHsystemsmay be analysed through two different
prisms in terms of efficiency. These refer to understanding CAHsystemsand the
related workers either as an "animal health technology", thus the efficiency
debate would relate to their 'technical efficiency', or as a rural development
tool, hence focusing on their 'allocative efficiency'.
4.3.2.1 Allocative efficiency
In a perfect market situation, resourcesare supposedto be optimally allocated
through market forces. An allocation is thus Pareto-efficient "for a given set of
consumer tastes, resources, and technology, if it is impossible to move to
another better allocation which could make some people better off and nobody
worse off" (Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch2000). In practice though, the resource
allocation process generally involves choices related to the equity-efficiency
trade offs. An important policy issue at the allocative level is thus how priorities
are set for the allocation of the scarce animal health resources. Therefore,
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allocative efficiency in the context of AHSaims at evaluating if an activity is
worth being pursued.
In human health the purpose of using CHWsas part of the PHCapproach was
adopted at a highly institutional level under the assumption that it would be an
efficient way to allocate resources to improve rural population's health status.
PHC's (and hence CHWs)main target was to provide "'essential' health care to
individuals through their first level of contact with a national health service
[which commonly is] a rural health worker" (Stone 1986). It was thus assumed
that PHCwas an efficient meansto deliver health outcomes to rural areas in the
context of a national health structure. Yet, as mentioned earlier, CAHsystems
started in a context where no such PHC equivalent existed, thus no overall
objective was stated. It is thus easy to find in the AH literature that perceived
objectives of CAHsystems differ across studies. CAHobjectives may vary from
improving human nutritional status through increased animal production (Dolberg
2003), to more focused objectives such as reducing animal disease incidence or
mortality (Leyland 1994; CARE-Peru2001; Huttner, Leidl, Pfeiffer et al. 2001;
Catley 2002). Martin-Curran and McLehose, in their systematic review of cost-
effectiveness of CAHsystems, have already pointed out the variety of objectives
driving CAHsystems(Martin-CurranandMacLehose2002).
As stated in the introduction chapter, the ethical implications in CAHsystems
evaluations would seem to be lower than in HH. However, methodological
difficulties in designing scientific evaluations satisfying both quantitative and
qualitative standards are important. While assessing variations in animal
mortality or animal disease incidence might be a way to evaluate effectiveness
of CAHsystems, designing evaluations that demonstrate the impact CAHsystems
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have on (human) nutritional status, health or welfare might prove to be difficult.
This reasoning follows the lines of Pearce in environmental economics. Indeed,
he points out the complexity of evaluating interventions in this area given the
often intangible nature of externalities arising from such an intervention (Pearce
1996). However, it is assumed that increasing animal health and productivity
have positive externalities such as improving human nutritional status and
welfare. This falls into the broader definition of AHSthat has been elaborated in
section 2.2.2 and in the previously debated concept of PAHCas a development
tool.
The AH literature reviewed in annex 2 points out that impact assessmenthas
generally focused on livestock health status (i.e. technical efficiency), and not
on the broader objectives stated for the CAHsystems (i.e. allocative efficiency)
as the latter may havebroader development policy implications.
4.3.2.2 Technical effiejency
Following Begg, "the production function summarises the technically efficient
ways of combining inputs to produce outputs". Thus, "a production function is
technically inefficient if, to produce a given output, it usesmore of some inputs
and no lessof other inputs than someother method that makesthe sameoutput"
(Begg,Fischerand Dornbusch2000).
As previously mentioned, CAHWs may be considered as an animal health
technology tool. In such case, it is important to highlight that CAHWsare
complex 'goods' as they are dependent on several inputs, which may be tangible
(e.g. drug supply) or intangible (e.g. skills, training etc.) or associated with
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externalities. Given that "the production function is the list of all techniques
that are technically efficient" (Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch 2000), the
production function for such type of technologies is more complex than with
other simpler or more easily quantifiable tools.
Several techniques, similar to those used in the human health field, might be
used to analyse costs associatedwith animal health interventions. These are, for
example, cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA),cost-benefit analysis (CBA)and cost-
utility analysis (CUA)(Gold, Siegel, Russellet at. 1996). In human health, someof
these techniques are highly controversial given that at some stage an economic
value needs to be associated to a human health condition (e.g. for DALYs-
disability-adjusted life years). This problem does not apply directly in the
evaluation of animal health interventions. However, a particular feature of
animal health and effectiveness evaluations relates to the negative
transboundary externalities arising from production systems in rural areas (e.g.
Avian Influenza, SARS,FMDetc). Measurement of the impact or effectiveness of
CAHWsintervention in rural areas in preventing or controlling the spread of such
diseases is complex. Indeed, similarities may be drawn from the area of
environmental economics. For example, the transboundary nature of AI and the
complexity in measuring costs and benefits of animal health interventions has
common points with intervention measurement in transboundary air pollution
(for examples in this areas refer to e.g. ApSimonandWarren 1996; Pearce1996).
The events of zoonotic diseasespread shed light on the importance of economic
evaluations of animal health interventions, including CAH systems. Such
evaluations may include parameters such as human healthcare costs,
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international trade barriers or bans, husbandry costs, loss of livelihood for small
producers etc. Inevitably, the choice of the variables included in the analysis will
heavily influence the results. Such analysis may also serve as guidance for
government's financial resource allocation process. Thus, technical and
allocative efficiency are not always easy to separate.
However, effectiveness or impact assessment evaluations of CAH systems may
focus on narrower objectives such as effects on (animal) mortality reduction,
infectious and parasitic disease incidence reduction (Catley 2002) or even visits
of CAHWs or amount of services requested. When viewing CAHWs as an 'animal
health technology' it is important to bear in mind the context in which they
develop their activities. The animal health care market in rural and remote areas
is heavily undermined due to the presence of several market failures as shown in
sections 2.2.5 and 2.4.1. Of especial interest to CAH systems are the lack of
infrastructure and information. Distance to animal health centres and/or animal
health professionals hinders access. CAHWs may thus be seen as a tool to reduce
those transaction costs derived from distance to animal health services (i.e.
transport costs) as well as reducing to some degree information asymmetry.
Thus, as reported by Catley in reference to the East African context, "there is
evidence to show that CAHWs not only treat large numbers of livestock but they
can also act as effective reporters of disease outbreaks" (Catley 1999). Similar
conclusions may be found in other region such as Latin America (CARE-Peru 2001)
and Asia (Leksmono and Young 2002; IFAD 2004).
Nonetheless, it needs to be highlighted that several of the reviewed articles in
annex 2 lacked of methodological rigour. Indeed, the methodology used during
the research is not accurately described, especially in the case of internal IFAD
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evaluations. Neither the sample size nor the selection criteria of the samples is
well documented in IFAD articles. It is therefore assumed that there might be a
bias in the conclusions obtained. Similarly some bias may exist in those CAH
systems evaluations made by other development agencies such as CAREor GTZ.
However, articles by Catley and Leyland are methodologically sound and
scientifically based. It should be mentioned though that both authors are highly
involved in the animal health policy arena in the Hom of Africa, which might
incur in some bias in the analysis. In addition, a literature review bias may exist
as few are the articles stating uncertain or negative outcomes of CAH evaluations
(see Hanks, Oakeley, Opoku et al. 1999). Several criticisms over existing
evaluations of efficiency in improving animal health status have been pointed out
by Blanc, Gori, Kamil et al. (2003). As previously mentioned, effectiveness of
CAH systems may also consider broader impacts such as on the nutritional status
of villagers. However, seldom are the studies exploring this area as numerous are
the technical constraints involved in such evaluations.
4.3.3 Access to services
One of the t1riving forces of the PHCapproach was particularly to increase clinic-
based services. As mentioned by Berman, Gwatkin and Burger (1987) "CHWs are
expected to reduce both accessibility and acceptability barriers to increasing
service utilisation". Though an important feature for human health services,
accessibility might be a greater challenge in the case of AH in pastoral or nomad
communities. Yet, service accessibility may have several dimensions (some which
have already been dealt with in section 4.3.1.1) that are generally associated
with transaction costs. These are: (i) physical distance to animal health centres,
including uneven access of workers to transport and (ii) social distance. The term
social distance here includes differences in access due to gender, wealth,
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ethnicity and educational variations between herders and workers as defined by
(Woods2000).
4.3.3.1 Physical distance
Following Leonard's argument, an added disadvantage in the case of service
delivery in animal health is that mobility of sick animals is generally more
difficult than in the human health counterpart (Leonard2000). He thus potnts out
that distance is a deterrent factor in accessingAHS.As for HH (see for example
Abel-Smith and Rawal (1992) case study in Tanzania), CAHWsare seen as a way
to make AH service readily available for smallholders in rural and remote areas.
In the absence of these workers the livestock keeper has to walk with the sick
animals a long distance to reach animal healthcare. Given the health situation of
these animals, livestock keepers might be more inclined to sell the sick animal
rather than losing their value because of the journey to reach the AH centre.
Such behaviour may have economic implications at national level (e.g. FMD
spread) or public health implications (e.g. spread of zoonotic diseasesuch as AI
in Vietnam) asdiseasesare not diagnosedand contained rapidly.
However, regional differences exist as some Asian countries (e.g. India,
Bangladesh)have developed village veterinary centres (Ahuja, George,McConnel
et al. 2000). These centres would be the structural equivalent to primary health
care centres in HHand are located in rural areas. Pastoralism, as understood in
. the African context, is less practiced in Asia. Additionally, infrastructure is
generally less developed in Africa. Thus, for example, in pastoral areas in
Ethiopia (Catley 2002) and in Ghana (Hanks, Oakeley, Opoku et al. 1999)CAHWs
represent an important asset in reducing physical distance to AHSand hence
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decreasing inequalities in access to AH services. In Latin America, although
smallholders tend to be sedentary, geographical distance to animal health
centres has been highlighted as an important constraint, hence putting forward
the usefulness of CAHWs (CARE-Peru 2001; Mariner, Eulert and Ruiz 2004).
Though CAHWs may be present in rural and pastoral areas, transport is a key
element in enabling them to reach farther locations. Besides the improvements
in infrastructure and transportation, transaction costs associated with distance
led Woods (2000) to state that a clear distance gradient in the use of AHS exists
in Zimbabwe. Woods undertook a paired sample survey study "designated to
investigate the influence of VLT [Veterinary Livestock Technicians] and farmer
gender on the utilization and efficacy of the veterinary services" and "interviews
were conducted with farmers situated at three distance zones from the AHC
[animal health centre]" (Woods 2000). In this particular study, methods and
analytical tools are explicitly described. However, doubts exits regarding other of
the reviewed studies. In particular, criticisms would apply to the methods used in
the case of IFAD reports. Nonetheless, examples where such distance gradient is
mentioned are the studies in Sudan (North and South Kordofan) (IFAD 2004a),
Cambodia (IFAD 2004b) and Thailand (Maskey, Chung, Chuchailam et al. 1992).
4.3.3.2 Social distance
Physical distance and transport are not the only factors limiting access to AHS in
rural and pastoral communities. Social distance, understood as differences in
access to services due to gender, wealth (debated in section 4.3.1.1 "vertical
equity"), ethnicity and educational variations between herders and workers may
play an important inhibiting role (Woods 2000).
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Different patterns exist in the utilisation of CAHWs'services between men and
women. Chipeta, Hoydahl and Krog (2003) stated that "within traditional power
structures of male dominance it is highly unlikely that community-based services
alone can secure equal attention to men and women". In Kenya, Riviere-
Cinnamondand Eregae (2003) found through in-depth semi-structured interviews
that communication between male CAHWand female community villagers was
generally lacking. Women in these settings tend to ask relatives or other women
when AH problems arise. Similarly, in Peru, a CARE-ledCAHinitiative in Puno
(CARE-Peru2001) basedon a group-questionnaire survey showed that women are
not generally allowed into training courses even though they are the ones
spending longer period of times with the animals, thus recognisingearlier animal
ill-health status. Analogousexamples may be found in other geographical areas.
Although other studies have not put forward these constraints (e.g. Ghana
(Hanks, Oakeley, Opoku et al. 1999», such behaviour points out socio-cultural
barriers that may hinder accessto AHSand knowledge at community level.
On the other hand, differences in ethnicity and educational level of workers may
act as an inhibitor in accessing services and knowledge both in the human
(Sauerborn, Nougtara and Diesfeld 1989) and animal health fields (CARE-Peru
2001; Riviere-Cinnamondand Eregae2003). In India (Orissa)for example a study
by Pradhan, Ahuja and Venkatramaiah (2003) pointed out the difficulty in
training women as Community Link Workers (CLW) because of their lack of
education. It was mentioned that "the role of a CLW is very untraditional for
women" and that "they must be trained additionally and they must be provided
.with confidence-building measures" (Pradhan,Ahuja and Venkatramaiah 2003).
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Physical and social factors reducing access to animal health services at
community level have been analysed. However, once services are available their
quality in the context of CAHsystemsmay be questioned.
4.3.4 Quality of services
Demonstrating that CHWsare capable of carrying out basic health care activities
hasgenerated a wide debate in the HH literature under the PHCcontext (Habicht
1979; Berman, Gwatkin and Burger 1987). Similar concerns arise in the AH field
with regard to CAHWs' quality of services delivered to livestock keepers.
However, the concept of "quality of services" greatly varies between studies.
Indeed, quality tends to be associated in the animal health field to the adequate
use of drugs (i.e. dosage,expiry date, dilution etc). Nonetheless,criteria suchas
animal health knowledge and dexterity in performing basic clinical interventions
are also often included in the concept of "quality". In turn, concept of quality is
highly intertwined first, with the activities community-basedworkers are allowed
to perform, and secondto training and refresher coursesundertaken.
4.3.4.1 QuaUty of medicines
Drug selling represents one of the main activities of CAHWs,especially when
workers' income derives from it. Questions have been raised in relation to the
quality of the drugs and their administration (i.e. dosages) because of the
possible economic and public health implications (Dasebu,Escrivaoand Oakeley
2003) (i.e. antibiotic resistance, residues). Of special concern regarding public
health implications is respecting the withdrawal time period. However, this is
more generally associated with settings where production is focused on wider
commercialisation. Nonetheless, given the debate on institutionalisation of
CAHWswhich will be elaborated in section 4.4.1, and the possibility of products
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originated in rural areas entering a wider food chain (although this is subject to
debate), the existence of residuesmay be a market exclusion criterion for poor
producers.
At the same time, drug selling is one of the activities that CAHWsperform that is
more readily subject to Arrow's agency relationship debated in section 3.2.2.
Given that CAHWs'income heavily relies on drug selling, community workers may
be inclined to increase their income by inducing drug selling, thus incurring
provider's moral hazard (Dasebu, Escrivao and Oakeley 2003; Ly 2003).
Furthermore, livestock keepers' choice of provider and drug usage tend to be
.driven by costs and do not generally value intangible services (Ly 2003). It is
common to observe smallholders buying from pharmacies, peddlers or black
markets and administering drugswithout knowledge of dosagesand/or quality of
the drug. This may contribute to increase antimicrobial resistance, giving rise to
public health concerns (which indeed, given the associated spillovers, are
difficult to quantify). However, in the context of the Horn of Africa, Catley has
demonstrated that community members recognise that drugs sold by CAHWsare
of better quality than those livestock keepers may obtained in the black market
(Catley 2002).
4.3.4.2 Quality of activities performed
Studies such as those in Kenya (Riviere-Cinnamond and Eregae 2003) have
pointed out that policy makers and practitioners in the animal health field tend
to doubt the quality of services provided by CAHWs.They believe that short and
variable training periods and lack of refresher courses do not allow CAHWsto
perform quality work. However, Rubyogo, Muriithi, Agumbah et at. (2002)
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evaluated CAHWs' performance in Mwingi District (Kenya) when undertaking
several tasks. The study was basedon a questionnaire used to collect information
from a population of 99 CAHWsa working in the area. 40 CAHWswere randomly
selected. Quality of serviceswas assessedaccording to a marking scheme, which
took into consideration the CAHW training curriculum, field experience and
languagecapacity. The assessmentinvolved not only the questionnaire but also
visual inspection of drugs and equipment. In addition, data was collected within
the livestock keeper community through the use of participatory methods. 85
livestock keepers were randomly selected from a population of 250 in the area.
The questionnaire covered similar subjects to those of the CAHWs.In addition,
secondary-data obtained regarding CAHWs' financial business analysis was
obtained through reports of their monthly activity. All questionnaires were pre-
tested. The study outcomesshowed that CAHWs'quality of servicesprovided was
based on a total score of 115mark and the passmark was 57.5. Resultsshowed
that the 90%of the CAHWspassed the test "despite a very short period of
training (14 days initially followed by three-day refresher courses)" (Rubyogo,
Muriithi, Agumbah et al. 2002). Similarly, based on "a random survey of
stakeholders in the provision of veterinary medicines" based on a mixture of
qualitative and quantitative data, Dasebu, Escrivaoand Oakeley (2003) conclude
in relation to CAHWsand drug administration in Ghana and Mozambique that
incorrect administration of unregulated drug misuse was reduced due to the
presence of CAHWs.Nonetheless, it should be noted that the sample number
surveyed in both countries was not stated.
The quality of services provided has also been associated to workers'
qualification. A study in pastoral areas in Kenyashowsthat community members
often mention that they would like to be able to ask the worker for a certificate
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in order to know if the CAHWhasbeen officially trained (Riviere-Cinnamondand
Eregae 2003). Similar experiences have been pointed out in Peru (CARE-Peru
2001), Sudan(Kordofan) (IFAD2004a),Ghana (Hanks,Oakeley, Opokuet al. 1999)
and Nepal (Stoufer, Ojha and Parajuli 2002). Official certification of CAHWs,
though, is usually closely linked to the recruitment and selection process,which
will be elaborated in section 5.4.1.
4.3.5 Financial resources
As mentioned in section 4.2.2, CAHWsare expected to earn their living, at least
partially, and replenish their drug kits by charging for services provided and
drugs sold to livestock keepers. HH literature has also been analysing this
• subject, but given governments' political commitment to the PHC approach,
economic support to the systems has often been more readily available. CAH
systems may however be assessed under two highly intertwined criteria:
economic viability and financial sustainability.
4.3.5.1 Economic viability
In the context of community-based systems, economic viability is concernedwith
the immediate availability of funds to pay for the services provided. Economic
viability thus relates to the previously debated vertical equity and WTP/ATP
principles (seesection 4.3.1).
In that regard, asmentioned earlier, it is important to highlight that the majority
of CAHsystems are based on FFSpayments. Given that CAHWsmost generally
derive their income from selling drugs, cash availability to make the system
sustainable is a key element. Furthermore, as in HH, community workers'
reputation strongly relies on the availability and quality of the drugs they sell.
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Following these lines, Cross, Huff, Quick et al. (1986) mentioned in the HH
context that "pharmaceuticals [...] are essential for preventive and therapeutic
health services. In addition to their direct health impact, the effectiveness of
pharmaceuticals against most commondiseasesserves to establish the credibility
of health workers that they need to promote long-term health improvements
[...]". Given the importance of drugs, several schemeshave been tested in the
PHCcontext to enhance economic viability in drug selling. The most notable
example relates to "Revolving Drug Fund" (RDF)schemes.Thus, in the HH field,
RDFswere implemented at a later stage of the PHCinitiative given that one of
the fundamental .principles of PHCwas that health services should be free in
rural areas. However, it was noticed that governments in developing countries
could not afford to pay for the drugs used under community-based health
schemes. Indeed, Hanson and McPake (1993) analyse the outcomes of the
Bamako Initiative which was launched in 1987 in order to "increase access to
drugs through community participation in revolving drug funds". The initiative
evolved as a consequence to criticisms over "equity and access, problems of
integration management and logistics the relative importance given to drugs an
sustainability and dependency" Hanson and McPake (1993). Especial emphasis
regarding RDFswas put on the weak levels of managerial skills at community
level as well as poor supervision. Monitoring of community-based systems is
however analysedin section 4.4.2.
Conversely, as PAHC is driven by economic and not ethical objectives (see
section 4.2), CAHsystems did not receive financial support from governments.
RDFswere thus envisaged as an appealing businessoriented approach to CAH
service delivery in rural areas. As seen from the reviewed CAHsystems, most of
the selected articles include RDFsas a main feature for drug selling and kit
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replenishment (e.g. Thailand (GTZ 1992), Malawi (Huttner, Leidl, Pfeiffer et al.
2001), Somalia (Catley 1999) etc.). However, limitations hindering the
functioning of these schemeshave been pointed out and are similar in the two
health sectors. Adapting from Cross, Huff, Quick et al. (1986), frequent
constraints include:
(i) Inaccurate estimation of cost of capitalization and lack of accurate
managementand financial planning,
(ii) Failure to collect payment and/or delays in cash flow (undermining the
replenishment of drug stocks),
(iii)Drug prices below replacement costs (i.e. low margin),
(iv) Lack of capital funds when there is rapid programmeexpansion,
(v) Lossesrelated to theft and deterioration,
(vi) Price increases (e.g. due to inflation etc.).
Common to both sectors is that "the monies actually recovered are insufficient
to replenish the original drug stocks and the fund is soon depleted or
'decapitalized'" (Cross, Huff, Quick et al. 1986). In the PHC literature it is
commonly stated that "one of the most important [factors for the failure of
RDFs]appears to be a resistance to thinking of the fund in business terms"
(Cross, Huff, Quick et al. 1986). Similarly, in the AH field it is generally
mentioned that "many villagers are still reluctant to pay for the services
provided to them by the CBAHW(equivalent to CAHW),becausethey understand
them as employeesof the government" (IFAD2004b) and thus expect services to
be free. Similar findings were also obtained in pastoral areas in Kenya (Riviere-
Cinnamondand Eregae2003), Zambia (Chilonda and Van Huylenbroek 2001) and
Ghana(Hanks,Oakeley, Opokuet al. 1999).
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However, alternative mechanisms such as membership organisations have been
implemented in other regions, which recall Buchanan's theory of clubs previously
debated in section 2.3.1.3. Peru (CARE-Peru 2001), Cambodia (IFAD 2004b) and
Kenya (WASDA2000; WASDA2002) are examples of countries where membership
organisations exist as part of CAH systems. They receive different names as the
type of organisation varies between settings. Local politics and political
standpoint of the implementing agencies may also affect the labelling of these
membership organisations. This follows the lines of Abel-Smith's debate over the
manner after which heath systems are named in different countries (Abel-Smith
1992). Thus in Cambodia these are "VAHWs Associations pharmacies" and in
Wajir (Kenya) "Pastoral Associations". However, details on the functioning,
membership fee and services provided or included through these types of
organisations are generally lacking. For instance in Peru the "Asociacion de
Sanitarios Ganaderos" (CARE-Peru 2001) was created mainly as a negotiation
platform to obtain discounted rates in the acquisition of drugs.
Nonetheless, FFScontinues to be the most widely used payment method in CAH
systems. Indeed, as discussed in section 4.3.1.1, price discrimination mechanisms
may exist in CAH systems as CAHWs may adapt prices to livestock keepers' ATP.
Thus, FFSis likely to affect the equity of the system, which is highly intertwined
to Arrow's agency motivations stated in section 3.2.2 and price elasticity of
demand associated to user charges debated in section 3.4.5. Yet, as mentioned
earlier in this section, livestock keepers' behaviour vis-a-vis payment of services
that used to be free (i.e. no payment, delayed payment or payment in kind) may
heavily undermine CAH systems cost-recovery and sustainability objectives.
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4.3.5.2 Financial sustainabWty
Whereas economic viability refers to immediate fund availability (i.e. cash),
financial sustainability focuses on the flow of funds in the long run. Service
provision may be economically viable but its financial sustainability depends
upon the availability of funds (for the provision of services) in the future.
Funding mechanisms and options for animal healthcare systems have already
been debated in chapter 3. However, these should be matched with population's
. needs.
In 1983, Segall debated governments' resource allocation methods for PHC.He
highlighted the intertwined nature of planning and politics in the promotion of
national PHC policies. Interestingly, he pointed out that budgetary systems
should identify expenditures by geographical areasand level of care. Especially it
was emphasised that "resources should be allocated geographically to reduce
health inequalities through the provision of appropriate mix of different levels of
care" (Segall1983).
A similar reasoning may be applied in the PAHCcontext. In countries where
livestock sector's share of agricultural GOPis important (e.g. at province level in
Vietnam an example would be Ha Tay province (Riviere-Cinnamond 2005»,
funding mechanisms will help enhance government's capacity to generate
sustainable and more predictable budgets to be allocated for AH. Thus, nations
will be less dependent on foreign aid in case of, for example, epidemic disease
spread in their livestock population, which as in the caseof Vietnam, may incur a
non-negligible public health threat component. Here, aswith PHC,depending on
the political choice of balance between poverty reduction goals and economic
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growth objectives, governments might be interested in allocating resources to
the most deprived areas in their countries. Here the terms "resources" is mainly
concerned with public funds. However, these might be materialised into animal
healthcare professionals, facilities, transport etc as stated in section 3.3.2. The
debate on the degree of publicness of goods in the animal health sector has
already been debated in section 2.3. Yet, characteristic of the AH field in
comparison to HH is the greater involvement of non-governmental organisations
in AHSdelivery in rural and remote areas through CAHsystems.
The literature review in annex 2 points out that NGO- government collaboration
in the implementation of CAHinitiatives is more common in Asian countries (e.g.
Nepal, Thailand etc.). In this region, financial support from the government is
generally offered during the initial phasesfor training purposesaswell as for the
first drug kit. In other areas, drug kits and training are organised by the NGO
itself. Financial sustainability remains, however, one of the focal points in
exclusively NGO-ledCAHprogrammesas usually when NGOswithdraw the system
tends not to be sustainable anymore. Financial sustainability in these cases is
closely related to access to credit schemes in order to maintain the
aforementioned RDFsor simply to replenish the drug kit. Links to rural finance
institutions (RFI) are thus increasingly seen as a key element for sustainability.
Credit, especially micro-credit, is commonly considered during programme
implementation (e.g. Peru (CARE-Peru2001), Cambodia (IFAD 2004b), Sudan
(Kordofan) (IFAD2004a)etc.).
4.3.6 Human resources
Three main aspects need to be analysedwhen focusing on human resources for
CAHsystems. These are (i) the worker's remuneration and supervisionwhich are
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linked to Arrow's agency theory (see section 3.2.2), (ii) the qualities against
which CAHWsare selected and (iii) the actual selection process.
The issue of remuneration has been discussed in section 4.2.2 and will be further
elaborated in section 4.4.2.1. Supervision and monitoring of the community
worker will be dealt with in section 4.4.2. As for the two other criteria (i.e.
'ideal' qualities and selection process), these would be extensively debated in
chapter 5 in the context of Kenyan arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL).
This section has brought forward the main criteria used to analyse community-
based animal health systems. The next section thus discusses the areas that need
to be taken into account when aiming at scaling up such systems to the national
level.
4.4 . Service delivery at a national level: Scaling up CAH
systems
Previous sections have introduced the concept of PAHC as well as the criteria
against which CAH systems should be evaluated. In to order to expand the reach
of CAH systems at a national level in rural areas certain institutional and
structural aspects need to be addressed.
4.4.1 Institutionalisation of CAHWs
Although the debate of institutionalising CAHWs started in the late 1990s, in
some countries (e.g. Kenya, Ethiopia) policy makers and other professionals of
the AH sector have been more reluctant to acknowledge the potential usefulness
of CAH systems than others (as for example West African (VSF 1998)) or Latin
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American countries". Indeed, reluctance from the professional community has
also been recorded during the initial phaseof the PHCinitiative. In 1987Berman
pointed out that "the existing medical systemoften felt threatened by CHWsand
tries to subvert local efforts" (Berman, Gwatkin and Burger 1987). He therefore
added that "where CHWswill become a significant component of the rural health
system, they should not threaten any of the existing professionals - for example,
the clinical practices (public and private) of nurses, midwives, or physicians.
Thus the institutional context of large-scale programs may sometimes work to
limit the efficacy of these workers" (Berman,Gwatkin and Burger 1987).
Following these lines, the OlE recommended in early 2003 that, "in order to
strengthen animal health and veterinary public health services through improved
involvement of [...] para-professionals, including CAHW [...], Veterinary
Administrations [should] build official linkages with service providers,
particularly individual veterinarians and veterinary associations, but also with
individual para-professionals, non-governmental organisations and farmers'
groups" (OlE 2003). Furthermore, it was stressed that "linkages between
Veterinary Administrations and private veterinarians and para-professionalstake
the form of contracts for the provision of specific services such as disease
monitoring and surveillance, animal vaccinatton, food inspection, and disease
control" (OlE 2003). Indeed, OlE concerns related to the debate over funding
mechanismsand functional componentsof AHSelaborated in chapter 3. It would
therefore appear that the economic forces driving the burgeoningof CAHsystems
led the international organisation dealing with animal health (i.e. OlE) to
consider the wider implications of lack of coordination between finance,
provision and governanceas debated in section 3.3.
21 Dr Rushton, personal communication, 2003.
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Nonetheless, there are regional differences in the integration of CAHWsat the
national level as outlined for NAHSstructures in section 3.3.4.1. West African
countries have moved faster in the integration of these workers into the NAHS
either with linkages to public or private veterinarians (VSF1998), which points
out Williamson's transaction costs economics debate as well as governance (see
sections 2.2.5 and 3.3.3). Asopposedto WestAfrica, in Asia suchworkers tend to
collaborate more closely with governmental structures (GTZ1992; Leksmonoand
Young2002) than with private practices. In Latin America though, the veterinary
profession has not been so reluctant to collaborating with the "sanitarios
ganaderos" or "promotores sanitarios" (CAHWin Spanish) as in the Horn of
Africa, but have rather acknowledged their usefutness". These regional
differences are generally closely related to the historical and political
background of the country and/or region (e.g. in West African countries
Veterinary Associations - "Ordre Veterinaire" - are generally highly influential,
mostly due to the French colonial period legacy). Indeed, as debated in section
3.4.2 under Adam Smith's criteria for funding mechanisms, acceptability or
compliance is an important criterion when choosing one funding mechanism
against another (MusgraveandMusgrave1989).
However, recent conferences (Sonesand Catley 2003) have shown that even
those countries most reluctant (e.g. East African) to CAH systems (and their
associated para-professionals)seem to increasingly accept a "structure whereby
the CAHW is linked either directly or indirectly, through an AHA, to the
veterinarian" (Riviere-Cinnamondand Eregae2003). Although in the AH research
community participatory approacheshave long been emphasisedas precondition
22 Dr Rushton, personal communication (2003).
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for the sustainability of community-based initiatives, efforts to link these
programmes to a national system have taken much longer than in the HH
counterpart.
At a practical level, community-based structures are far from easy to implement
and monitor. Manyof the aspectsaffecting CAHsystems' sustainability have been
analysed in previous sections. The participatory techniques used in the system's
implementation are also a key element and have been dealt with elsewhere
(Leyland 1994; Catley and Mohammed 1996; Catley 1999; Catley and Leyland
2001; Catley, Leyland and Kaberia 2002). Nevertheless, the different ways in
which CAH systems can be structured might affect the balance between
accountability of the worker and sustainability of the system.
4.4.2 Monitoring models and CAHWs' behaviour
In the HHfield, Arrow's agency theory (1985) outlined in section 3.2.2, has been
.
extensively applied. Severalauthors (e.g. Chabot and Bremmers (1988), Robinson
and Larsen (1990) etc.) have highlighted difficulties associated with the.
implementation of community-based initiatives. Especial emphasis has been
given to incentives and motivation needed to make the systemmore sustainable
as an integral part of a national health structure (Skeet 1984; Robinson and
Larsen1990).
When focusing on AH, few studies have explored the agency relations existing
between the actors at different levels of the animal healthcare structure
(Leonard 2000; Ly 2000; Riviere-Cinnamondand Eregae2003; Riviere-Cinnamond
2004). The literature concernedwith Arrow's agencyat community level in AH is
scarce. Yet, in the rural setting, if CAWHs(whether involved in private, public or
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non-governmental initiatives) are to become an integral part of a national animal
health structure (NAHS), linkages, roles and responsibilities need to be
examined. Figure 9 shows the different types of linkages a CAHW may have in the
context of PAHC. These linkages will influence the worker's accountability (i.e.
degree of liability to PAHC and the community) as well as the sustainability of
the CAH system (such as previously mentioned regarding FFSpayments).
Figure 9: CAHWsmonitoring models
In the field of organisational behaviour research, author such as Steers and
• Porter (1983) or Cook and' Hunsaker (2001) have pointed out factors likely to
influence workers' motivation and performance in the context of a monitoring
system. These include the (i) individual capabilities and skills, (ii) the need for
growth, (iii) the rewards and feedback, and (iv) the work environment. Robinson
and Larsen (1990) applied this reasoning to community-based health systems,
highlighting possible impacts on sustainability and accountability. Each of the
'monitoring models' shown in figure 9 may thus affect the behaviour of those
involved in it, to the extent of influencing the tasks undertaken by CAHWs.
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d,
Robinson and Larsen devised a framework whereby those elements affecting
CHWs'performance and motivation were analysed (see figure 10). It was stressed
that the work environment of a CHW is the community Robinson and Larsen
(1990). This emphasisesthat the worker is not in daily contact neither with the
national health system nor with the PHCinitiative. As a result, they conclude
that "it is reasonable to propose that the community, that is, the people to
whom the CHWprovides services, may have a significant impact on CHWs' job
performance" (Robinsonand Larsen1990).
Along these lines, but focusing on peer monitoring and non-market insurance,
Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) demonstrate that when non-market insurers can
observe each other's behaviour and effort, mutual assistance is desirable.
Extrapolating to the community-based context, what Robinsonand Larsen (1990)
, point out is that if members of the community closely observe the work or
behaviour of CAHWs(i.e. what they refer to as working context), moral hazard
may be less likely to arise than in other forms formal health structures. Indeed,
suchobservation is closely linked to the qualities desired in CAHWs.Thesewill be
explored in chapter 5, nonetheless it is worth pointing out that the results
obtained follow Williamson's (1979, 1996) reasoning regarding the role of 'trust'
in contractual relationships (this will be further developed in section 5.4.1.1 and
hasbeen mentioned in section 2.2.5).
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Figure 10: Conceptual framework for CHW performance and motivation (adapted
from Robinson and Larsen 1990)
In both AH and HH sectors the worker will tend to be more committed to the
community. Commitment hasalso been pointed out in the casestudy (seesection
5.4.1.1) as a desirable criterion in the selection process of CAHWs.However,
although commitment is essential to the sustainability of a CAH system, the
worker's perceived rewards, especially earnings, will be highly influential in
determining to whom the CAHWis ultimately accountable.
4.4.2.1 Perceived rewards
As mentioned by Propper (1995), although in the context of agency and
incentives in the NHS,"the division of the rewards and the constraints on useof
assets in these [principal-agent] relationships, and the form of performance
monitoring adopted by the government as principal in these agency relationships,
currently appears to give relatively limited incentives for either improvements in
productive or allocative efficiency". Turning into the rural community based
setting, similarities may arise when focusing on perceived rewards to community
workers. Thus, extrinsic and intrinsic factors need to be analysed.
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Following Robinsonand Larsen (1990), extrinsic rewards refer to aspects such as
status in the society or salary/earnings. In community-based programmes, the
latter hasbeen largely discussed.Benderand Pitkin highlighted that "the issueof
payment for the VHW [village health worker] is important from the perspectives
of motivation and accountability" (Bender and Pitkin 1987). "Who pays the VHW
(the state or the community) will determine to whom he is accountable. Payment
by the state may signify greater commitment to PHCby the government, but it
also could mean a lesser commitment to the community by the VHW". Yet,
"financial support from the community itself is advantageous because it
promotes community participation and gives a feeling of responsibility over
meeting their own health needs" (Bender and Pitkin 1987). CHWswere however
seen from the beginning as an integral part of a national policy on PHC, thus
accountable to that structure.
Bearing in mind the different origins and objectives of PHCand PAHC,in both
fields the issue of payment versus volunteerism of community workers has been
widely debated (HH (Walt 1988) and AH (Catley, Leyland and Kaberia 2002;
Hadrill, Catley and Iles 2002)). CAHWsare supposedto make their living from the
services given to the community at the same time, as they are (supposedto be)
accountable (directly or indirectly) to the government structure, given their role
as focal point for disease surveillance in rural areas. Some of these tasks are
inherently contradictory, especially when confronting preventive and extension
services to the CAHWs'main source of livelihood (e.g. services given and drugs
sold), giving rise to provider's moral hazard situations (linking to the debate in
section 2.2.5), therefore threatening the systems' sustainability.
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Walt found that in HH volunteers seemed to be acknowledged as the best
alternative to PHC.Nonetheless,voluntarism generally derives from two factors:
a secure economic situation and time availability (Walt 1988). These are
conditions that are not generally met in developing countries. Especially rural
and pastoral populations are heavily burdened with subsistence tasks.
Additionally, it is often mentioned that volunteering is perceived "as an avenue
to paid work" (Walt 1988). Walt therefore pointed out that "the reality is that
most national programmespay their CHWseither a salary or an honorarium, that
almost no examples exist of sustained community financing of CHW[...], and that
NGOstend to find ways of rewarding their CHWs" (Walt 1988). Following these
lines, Scholl did also raise doubts regarding "whether non-financial rewards are
sufficient to maintain the [CHW] devotion to the job" (Scholl 1985). Similarly,
CAHWs are generally motivated by the desire of obtaining employment.
Assumptionssuch as "high attrition rates amongst volunteers aswell as amongst
CHWs whose remuneration fails in some way [...] suggests that a national
programme that relies on volunteers or on the community supporting their CHWs
is likely to fail" (Walt 1988) do also apply to the CAHcontext. However, other
reasonsexisted in the HH field to consider volunteerism as an alternative. Thus,
"in some countries, both developed and developing, volunteers are perceived by
policy-makers as a stop-gap, or an alternative to government expenditure" (Walt
1988). Such reasoning links to the previously debated choice of relationship
between the functional components of health systems debated in section 3.3.
Indeed, perceiving community workers as an alternative to reduce government
expenditure would also have negative efficiency connotations in the AH field at
the purchase-provision level (see the debate elaborated in sections 3.3.1.3 and
3.3.2).
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Volunteers, though, were not assumedas the ideal option for CAH.The reason
probably lies in the participatory origin of PAHCand its economic focus. Thus,
while in the late 80s (i.e. after a decade of PHC start) the HH research
community started evaluating the effectiveness of voluntarism in CHWsystems
(Scholl 1985), CAH research was already focusing on alternative ways to
encourageCAHWsto remain active.
Intrinsic rewards, on the other hand, focus on the worker's personal achievement
goals. These are more difficult to evaluate. According to Cook and Hunsaker
(2001), "intrinsic rewards postulate that motivation is moderated by perceived
fairness or discrepanciesbetween contributions and rewards". Social and cultural
reasons,for example, have been pointed out assourcesof motivation for workers
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under this category (Nichter 1986). However, intrinsic rewards are closely related
to and highly influenced by feedback mechanisms.
4.4.2.2 Feedback
As seen in figure 10, the second factor influencing community workers'
motivation and performance may be divided into human and instrumental
feedback.
Regarding human feedback, in HH it has often been acknowledged that a "[ ... J
high level job performance among CHWscan best be achieved by having a
managementsystemwhich includes regular contact between the CHWand a local
supervisor, a method of evaluating CHW performance and a programme of
continuing education" (Robinsonand Larsen 1990). In the AH field, difficulties in
the monitoring aspect may be greater than in HH as population in the areas
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where CAHWs work tend to be nomad. In that context, Catley pointed out that
"regarding the need for public sector recognition and supervision of community-
based animal health systems to ensure quality of service, even in those countries
with well-established government veterinary services there is limited capacity to
monitor CAHWs in pastoral areas" (Catley 1999). In Ghana, for example,
frequency of supervision of CAHWs by veterinary staff (and facilitated practical
refresher training on an informal basis) varied from weekly to once every 6
months (Hanks, Oakeley, Opoku et al. 1999). Variations in supervision in this case
were reported to be due to "a combination of low motivation on the part of one
or both parties, and transport constraints" (Hanks, Oakeley, Opoku et al. 1999).
Similar disparities in supervision patterns (as well as for the associated reasons
for such variability) have also been reported in other regions (CARE-Peru 2001).
When focusing on the second element (i.e. instrumental feedback), drug supply
plays a crucial role. As mentioned in section 4.3.5, drug selling represents the
major source of income for CAHWs. Several studies have pointed out that one of
the main factors causing CAHWs to withdraw is the lack of drugs or their high
prices (IFAD 2004a). This may be due to the lack of payment by service users, or
because there is no availability of quality drugs in the regions. As previously
mentioned, it has often been acknowledged that the latter poses an important
hurdle for CAHWs as it undermines their capacities vis-a-vis villagers. Therefore,
statements such as "paravets were not trusted anymore because their service
was insufficient due to their recourse to drugs from the black market which are
of low quality" (lFAD 2004a) are often found in the literature (and highlights also
the 'trust' issue already mentioned and that will be debates in section 5.4.1.1).
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However, when considering the sustainability and cohesiveness of an AHS
delivery system at national level, the political context in which CAHstructures
function needsto be taken into account.
4.4.3 Governance of PAHC
Central to the implementation of a national AHSdelivery system is the concept
of governance. This concept has already been brought forward in the previous
chapter in section 3.3.3 following Williamson's debate.
Nonetheless, Williamson's (1981) classification of governance structures may be
used as a framework for analysis. He classifies governance structures into four
categories that may exist in a given "firm" or "organisation" (Williamson 1981).
The categories are:
(i) Internal spot market: "human assets that are non specific and for which
metering is easy are essentially meeting market tests continuously for their
jobs. Neither firms nor workers have an efficiency interest in maintaining the
association",
(ii) Primitive team: "although the human assetsare here non specific, the work
cannot be metered easily [...J. Although the membership of such teams can
be altered without loss of productivity, compensation cannot be easily
determined on an individual basis",
(iii) Obligational market: "there is quite a lot of firm-specific learning here, but
tasks are easy to meter [...J Both firms and workers have an interest in
maintaining the continuity of suchemployment relations" and,
(iv) Relational team: "the human assets are here very specific to the firm and
very difficult to meter [...J. The firm here will engage in considerable social
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conditioning, to help assurethat employers understand and are dedicated to
the purposesof the firm, and employees will be provided with considerable
employment security, which gives them assuranceagainst exploitation" (e.g.
Japanesecorporations).
Yet, when focusing on CAHservice delivery in rural areas as an "organisation",
their governance structure would seem to be that of the primitive team. The
work performed by CAHWsis not always easily metered, especially when dealing
with public health hazardsand related preventive measures (e.g. boiling milk to
prevent brucellosis, food hygiene practices etc). As mentioned by Williamson,
teams may be altered without much loss of productivity given that trainings are
short and that an important part of the work performed would depend on the
personal characteristics of the worker (as exposed by community members, see
section 5.4.1).
In addition, CAH systems' governance specificities associated with political
constraints to equity in AHSdelivery in rural areas and to partnerships between
public and private sectors, need to be addressed. A large number of animal
health service initiatives can be found in African countries post-privatisation,
either private (i.e. businessoriented) or not-for-profit. According to Williamson
(1996), given the absence of a clearly defined governance mechanism, the
presence of overlapping activities leads to an increase in 'friction' costs. In
addition, the fact that logistics of service delivery are not coordinated between
many of these initiatives increases transaction costs. There is also a problem of
lack of willingness to harmonise work, not only among for-profit organisations,
but especially, and (perhaps) strikingly, among not-for-profit initiatives. Someof
the ongoing projects are competing for the same market; hence they have no
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incentive to coordinate their logistics, nor their ultimate goals. In Asian
countries, the setting is different as most services continue to be delivered, at
least in theory, by the public sector. However, government veterinarians have
recently been allowed private practice after fulfilling their public duties. This
creates an incentive for them to send their 'public' time clients into their
'private' working hours. Hence, inefficiencies (thus costs) arise as practitioners
'draw' work they would be paid for under public funds into 'private' domain.
When focusing on the role of NGOsin service delivery, it was pointed out in HH
that in order "to improve the chances of sustainability, the development of
coalitions between NGOsand government services is a highly desirable way to
promote sustainable development" (Bainbridge 1999). However, in the AH
counterpart, it is mentioned that "[ ...J experience to date indicates that
inappropriate government policy has been a major constraint to the
effectiveness, coordination and sustainability of the CAHW approach. Policy
reform with respect to CAHW roles and pubtic-prtvate sector division of
veterinary activities is taking place but progresshas been slow" (Catley, Delaney
and McCauley 1998). Indeed, Catley, Delaney and McCauley (1998) found that,
for Somaliland, southern Sudanand Afar regions, "many of the most dramatic
examples of CAHWeffectiveness have emerged from areas where in reality,
there is no government". This example illustrates how in certain areas NGOsare
able to coordinate their efforts and objectives in terms of CAHprojects so as to
create a comprehensiveand cohesivesystem in the region. Nevertheless, as seen
from the literature review, in other settings such as Asia and Latin America,
collaboration between government authorities and NGOshas been much more
common.
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Indeed, not only the aforementioned type of collaboration is desirable, but
broader pubttc-pnvate cooperation is needed. Linkages between stakeholders
such as farmer associations, cooperatives and pharmaceutical industry should be
strengthened. Researchin East Africa related to the economic viability of four
different models of CAHsystemsconcluded that the most viable in remote areas
was that where Animal Health Assistants (AHAs)or Animal Health Technicians
(AHTs) owned a pharmacy or clinic and had a network of CAHWs,AHAs/AHTs
being regulated by government veterinary staff (Catley 2004). Although doubts
have been raised in relation to the economic viability of farmer or pastoral
associations, it is argued that these platforms increase farmers' voices in the
policy making process(Peacock2004).
Indeed, an important aspect associated to governance links to the relation
•existing between national animal health systems and the SPSagreement. The
issue has been mentioned by policy makers during the field work in Kenya (see
section 5.4.2.2) and will be further developed in the discussionchapter (section
6.2.4).
This chapter has outlined a framework in which to evaluate CAHsystemsaswell
as debated several of the institutional and governance problems likely to arise
when trying to scale up such schemes. Next section thus brings the main
conclusions.
4.5 Conclusions
Recent events of epidemic disease spread such as AI amongst the livestock
population (especially in rural areas) have revealed to be extremely harmful for
developing nations' economies. Trade barriers and export bans heavily
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undermine the already weak economy of most of these countries. Additionally,
collateral effects on smallholders' loss of livelihood have worrying impacts on
poverty levels. CAHsystemsmay therefore play a central role in public health
risk prevention aswell as helping improving productivity levels, hence ultimately
reducing smallholders' welfare loss.
CAH initiatives started being implemented during the 1970s and 80s as a
consequenceof the SAPimposed in most developing countries. Implementation
processof CAHsystemsin rural and remote areaswas heavily driven by economic
development objectives given that livestock represent one of the main sourcesof
livelihood for smallholders in marginalised areas.Asopposedto the HHsector, no
high level institutional initiative similar to the Health For All PHCapproach took
place in the AHsector.
At the same time as PHC was implemented, NGO-led CAH systems started
growing in rural areas to overcome the lack of AHSdelivery and fill the demand
gap for these services. While ethical objectives (i.e. health as a right) were the
driving forces of PHC, economic growth remained at the centre of CAH
initiatives. WhereasPHCwas perceived by local communities and researchersas
'top-down', CAHprogrammeswere community-generated. While the AH sector
lacked of institutional focus, the HH counterpart lacked participatory rural
appraisal methods to increase community involvement in the implementation
process.
The comparative analysis between the animal and human health sectors enables
gaps in the evolution of CAH systems within the animal health system to be
pointed out. These are mainly institutionalisation of CAHWs,monitoring of these
227
community workers and governancein animal health service delivery in rural and
remote areas. CAH systems have thus been put into a wider policy context
labelled as PAHC,so as to improve current service delivery in rural areas through
CAHWs.
Six main criteria have been devised here as guidance in the assessmentof CAH
initiatives within the context of PAHC delivery. These criteria are equity,
efficiency, accessto services, quality of services provided, financial and human
resources. Given the similarities existing between human and animal health
service delivery in rural areas, these criteria need to be taken into account when
considering the scaling-up at national level of community-based programmes.
Choices and trade offs between them will be heavily influenced by political
decisionsat national and/or local levels.
Although the literature on CAHsystems in certain geographical regions such as
Latin America and West Africa is relatively scarce, regional differences have
been highlighted. Even if the majority of the reviewed initiatives prioritise the
sustainability of CAH·systems, monitoring models differ. Thus, in Asia most
initiatives tend to link CAHWswith government staff whereas in East Africa
linkages are more likely to be established with private practitioners, government
involvement thus being significantly lower in comparison to Asia. It seems
however that institutionalisation of CAHWsis being recognised at international
level and that reluctant members of the animal health profession (especially in
East Africa) are becoming more aware to the usefulness of these workers in
delivering services in rural areas.
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Therefore, this chapter aimed at learning from the human health sector's
experience on scaling up' community-based initiatives at a national level.
Ultimately, and bearing in mind the public health objective and poverty
reduction potential of these systems, it would be desirable to develop a
comprehensive animal health scheme to cover rural populations against the
spread of animal diseases and enhance productivity in those areas. Although
other factors suchas infrastructure, accessto market and information are crucial
when trying to reduce poverty amongst rural smallholders, the chapter has
argued the need to include CAH systems into a wider animal health policy
context, drawing lessonsfrom the HH sector.
Nonetheless, having laid out a framework for the evaluation of community based
initiatives as well as pointed out the governance issues associated to CAH
systems, questions remain regarding their wider linkages to trade concerns and
their role in this arena. Suchconcernswill be further elaborated in the chapter
6.
The next chapter focusesexclusively on the human resource criterion mentioned
in section 4.3.6 through a case study on the selection process (especially
workers' 'ideal' qualities as expressed by community members and policy
makers), impact and sustainability of CAHWsin pastoral areas in Kenya.
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5 Case study: Community-based animal health
workers' selection process, impact and
sustainability in Kenyan arid and semi-arid lands
(ASAL)
5. 1 Introduction
5.1.1 Background
Due to the SAPoutlined in the introduction chapter (section 1..1'>, during the
1980sthe poor state or virtual lack of animal health services in a large part of
the developing world where livestock are a basic asset economically and socially
for a significant share of the population caught the attention of various
development organisations. One of the responses that sought to remedy this
situation has been based on a mainly NGO-led proliferation of various CAH
systems(seesection 4;2.1 on the origins of PHCand PAHC).
Community-based approaches to animal healthcare in the Horn of Africa,
implemented by NGOsor other organisations, are regarded generally as having
performed well with substantial positive outcomes for the communities
concerned (Catley 2002; Catleyand Leyland 2002). However, it has been noticed
that when these organisations withdraw, CAH systems do not continue to
operate. Although such failures are generally attributed to the withdrawal of
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funds, issues of participation and policy or legal aspects are also likely to be
involved (Catley, Blakewayand Leyland2002).
Particularly in community-based human healthcare systems, there is evidence to
show that community involvement in the selection of primary healthcare workers
helps to ensure local acceptance and support for these workers. This enhances
the sustainability of health care proviston even when organisations pull out
(Rifkin 1983; Rifkin, Muller and Bichmann 1988; Bentley 1989; Katabarwa,
Habomugisha and Richards 2000; Katabarwa, Mutabazi and Richards 2000;
Katabarwa, Richards and Ndyomugyenyi 2000; Katabarwa, Habomugisha,
Ndyomugyenyi et al. 2001; Katabarwa and Richards 2001; Katabarwa,
Habomugishaand Richards 2002). It is thus hypothesised that addressing the
differences in selection criteria between communities and professionals could
potentially contribute to an increase in the sustainability of CAH.
Policy makers involved in the AH arena in EastAfrica started in 2002 reviewing
policy and legislation on CAHWs.This processis coordinated by veterinary boards
but involves various central-level stakeholders such as State Veterinary Services,
veterinary associations, veterinary schools and NGOs. The Community-based
Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology (CAPE) Unit of the AU/IBAR
supports policy and legislative change in the Horn of Africa (HoA) region. Linking
. to the CAHsystem evaluation framework outlined in chapter 4 (seesection 4.3),
one of the aims of CAPE is to standardise CAHW selection, training and
supervision procedures with a view to ensuring quality at national level.
Experience to date indicates that draft pouctes and guidelines tend to prioritise
the views of central policy makers above the perceptions and needsof livestock
keepers. For example, in the area of CAHWselection it is widely believed by
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veterinarians that CAHWsmust have received some education and be literate.
Theseviews tend to contradict field experience and the relatively high drop-out
rate of literate asopposedto illiterate workers",
Information on community and professional preferences about selection criteria
is largely anecdotal in the AH field. In addition to CAHWselection criteria, the
processof CAHWselection is also considered to be important. For example, are
the CAHWs selected primarily by professional or project staff, or by the
'community'? Within the community, who makes the decisions concerning CAHW
selection: a few powerful individuals or the community as a whole? How are
women involved, if at all? What would explain the relative high drop-out rate of
literate CAHWs?
Experience to date within CAPEproject indicates that CAHWselection is often
rushed and driven by project staff with deadlines to meet. This approach can
lead to inappropriate selection of CAHW trainees. Providing research-based
evidence to the above mentioned processof political and institutional changeon
communities' desired -qualities in a CAHWand an appropriate CAHWselection
systems are thus of primary importance for further development and
sustainability of community animal health care systems. This chapter therefore
examines two areas associated to the human resource criterion outlined in
section 4.3.6: the 'ideal' qualities against which CAHWsmight be selected and
the selection processitself.
5.1.2 Objectives
The objectives of the casestudy are therefore:
23 A. Catley, personal communication, 2002.
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1. To identify the ideal qualities of CAHWsas perceived by veterinary policy
makersand pastoral livestock keepers;
2. To investigate the relationship between CAHWsselection criteria, selection
proceduresand the sustainability of CAHsystems.
However, before elaborating on the methodology used to attain such objectives,
a brief description of the researchsites is needed.
5.1.3 Description of the research sites
The three areas selected for the field collection arid and semi-arid lands mostly
populated by pastoral (i.e. nomadic) people. They are located in the north-
western and north-eastern parts of Kenya. Reasonsfor selecting these three
geographical areas were (i) that the three districts were representative of ASAL
areas in Kenya, (ii) the lack of infrastructure and poor service delivery in those
areas and (iii) the ongoingCAHprogrammes run by different NGOs.Nonetheless,
each of the studied .areas has its specific characteristics, which are briefly
outlined in the following sections.
5.1.3.1 West Pokot
West Pokot district is one of the 20 districts of Kenya's Rift Valley Province. It
covers an area of 9,100 square kilometres. Its limits are with the Turkana region
in the North, the Karamajongcluster in Ugandain the West, Trans Nzoia on the
South and Baringo and Marakwet on the East (see map in annex 4). In 1993 the
Kenyan Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of the District at
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320,000 with an annual growth rate of 4.2%. The predominant religion is
Christianity.
According to 1997 estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock
Development and Marketing, West Pokot is mainly constituted by rangeland (44%)
and marginal land (28%).19%of the land is not suitable for agricultural and only
3%and 6%are considered as high potential and medium potential respectively
(Southernpart).
Annual rainfall is.critical to the food production of the district in order to support
its population. Rangelandsand marginal areas (72%)are the most affected by
rainfall variations. Drought appears commonly each 5 - 7 years. Livestock is
essential for the subsistence of the Pokot people in the low land areas of the
district as almost one third of the residents are characterised predominantly as
pastoralists.
A local practice that interferes seriously With social and economic life in range
areas is cattle rustling. Raiding livestock is characteristic of pastoral economies
in many parts of the country. But accessto modern weaponshas radically altered
the custom. Its practice today has degenerated into something that has no
resemblance to the original tradition. The presence and history of the Ugandan
international frontier on the West side (a part of West Pokot - from Kongelai
(SwanRiver) to Alale - was until 1971still Ugandan- see map of West Pokot in
annex 4) has also contributed to cross-border raids in recent years. These raids
between Pokotsand Karamojong(north-eastern Uganda)contribute to drive away
an important number of headsof cattle and have claimed several human victims
as reported in the news (IRIN 2003; IRIN 2003). Cattle rustling has not only
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effects at economic and human levels, but has also repercussions in access to
schooling and health facilities.
The most important source of livelihood for these pastoralist families is the sale
of livestock. Bulls, goats and sheep are commonly sold to meet household's cash
needs such as hospital bills, school fees and food expenses. Cows are rarely sold
except as culls or due to old age, as they are a primary source of milk, the main
nutritional element for Pokot population. Bulls are often sold for major needs,
goats and sheep for relatively smaller cash needs such as purchase of food,
clothes and farm inputs. Livestock prices are lowest in the middle of the wet
season when food is scarce and farmers need to sell their animals to buy food.
Prices increase during the festive season, which normally coincides with the dry
season.
5.1.3.2 Wajjr
Wajir district is situated in the North-eastern Province. It covers an area of
56,599 square kilometres and has borders with Ethiopia and Somalia, and the
Kenyan districts of Mandera, Garissa, lstolo and Marsabit (see Wajir map in annex
~). The population of the district, and in the whole North-eastern Province, is
predominantly Somali. In Wajir there are clans of Kenyan Somali, namely Ajuran,
Oegodia and Ogaden.
Pastoralism in the district has been subject to constant changes and adaptation.
These processes have been accelerated in the past 50 years due to an increase in
the number of water points, settlements and the livestock and population
growth. The backbone of the economy in Wajir is nomadic pastoralism. Wajir is
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based on herding of camels, cattle, sheep and goats. Most of the pastoralists
remain nomadic and movement is dictated by the availability of grazing and
water.
During the colonial period development efforts in the district were limited. Few
schoolswere built and the percentage in of schoolingyearswas much less than in
other parts of the country. Most of the civil servants who came to work in Wajir
therefore were neither of Somali origin nor from a pastoral setting. There was
limited medical and veterinary care in comparisonto other areasof the country.
Following the independence of Kenya in 1963 there was a prolonged period of
insecurity. Consequently, government's main concern was insecurity and little
attention was given to development aspects. Following the end of the
secessionist "shifta" rebellion in the Northern Province of Kenya, government
started getting more involved in development. From the 1970sonwards there
was an expansion in the government provision of services in all fields. However,
in relation to pastoral development, two issuesneed to be highlighted. First is
the top down perspective taken by the government in development. There was
little consultation with the communities regarding their own priorities during
planning and implementation processes.The fact that most of the government
officials came from other parts of the country made it more difficult for them to
understand the needs and setting of the Somali pastoralists. Second, in addition
to the government top down approach, services were mainly directed to
.settlements. Therefore no attempt wasmade to reach nomadic pastoralists.
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In the 1990showever a new approach to pastoral development was taken. There
are four main factors underlying this approach. First, reduction of government's
role in service provision was a consequence of the SAP debated in the
introduction chapter (section U). Given that the government was not able to
sustain previous spending levels on services, cost-sharing was introduced in a
wide rangeof fields including human health, animal health, education andwater.
User charges for health services, cost recovery for AH services and handling
management of boreholes to the community emerged as cost-containment
measures. These measures fall in the debate elaborated in chapter 2, section
2.4.1.1, along Stiglitz's lines. Second, a 'new' development thinking started,
which empowered communities over development projects. Government, NGOs
and donors continued to be highly entrenched in the process. Third, the number
of Somali civil servants steadily increased during the 1980s. Therefore, in the
1990sa core group of Somali (as well as non-Somali) civil servants, who were
more concerned with Wajir pastoralist issues,was established. Finally, the 1991-
1992 drought pushed towards long term focused programmes in the district.
These included Oxfam's Pastoral Development Programmeand the Government
of Kenya/World BankEmergencyDrought RecoveryProgramme (later called Arid
LandsResourceManagementProgramme).
The shift in the pastoral development perspective came with the launch of the
NGONomadic Primary Health Care Programme (NPHC).The idea came from a
core of local civil servants and UNICEFas a catalyst. The latter had the aim to
raise child immunisation rates across Kenya but it seemed apparent that they
were failing because they did not reach arid areas. It was suggested by local
districts that existing (human) health delivery systems were not adapted for
nomadic populations. Hence, local ministries and UNICEFagreed on training
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pastoralists on the delivery on both human and animal health and as nomadic
teachers. The term Daryelle was used to refer to the community health worker
for both human and animal. This approachwas agreed between partners andwas
different to that applied in other districts. The term Hanun;ye was used for
describing a nomadic teacher (WASDA2000).
5.1.3.3 Marsabit
Marsabit andMoyale districts are located in the Northern Province of Kenya.They
border with Ethiopia, Wajir, Turkana and Samburu(seeMarsabit map in annex4).
The area covered is of 78,078 square kilometres and has an approximate
population of 175,000 (55,000 in Moyale and 121,000 in Marsabit). There are
several ethnic groups in each district including Borana, Gabra, Rendille, Burji,
Samburu and Ariaal. Other minority groups included are Somali, Turkana and El
Molo communities (CIFA2002). Boranaand Gabbra ethnic groupswere the most
frequented during the field researchin Marsabit District.
The area is characterised by a bimodal pattern of rainfall varying between 150 to
800mm per annum. Geographically, the landscape can be divided into the
"Ethiopian side" where the Boran Plateau steadily rises towards the Ethiopian
Highlands and hilly mountains along the border, and the "Kenyan side" which is
composed by dry desert plains (Didigalgallo, Did Golla plains and Chalbi basin).
The soil type is volcanic and the main land use is for pastoralism with
opportunistic cultivation. Both districts are characterised by long periods of
drought, famine, high poverty levels, endemic animal diseases, insecurity and
poor infrastructure. These factors contribute to the communities' vulnerability,
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anxiety and dependency for their livelihood (CIFA2002). In addition, as in the
caseof West Pokot, insecurity is an important concern in the area.
Land use pattern in MarsabitlMoyale district is predominantly pastoralist and
agro-pastoralist with approximately 85%of the population practising nomadic and
semi-nomadic pastoralism. Agro-pastoralism is concentrated on 3%of the total
land area mainly in the highlands of Mount Marsabit, Mount Kula, Hurri Hills,
Sololo Hills and Moyale. As the area is composed mostly by nomadic pastoralist
the main occupation is livestock keeping. Alternative economic activities are the
sale of livestock and livestock products and petty trade. However the remoteness
of the area and the lack of infrastructure hinders access to services in these
communities.
As in other pastoralist communities, formal employment constitutes
approximately 1%and informal employment 10-15%of the total population. The
dependant population is therefore of around 85%.Most pastoralists in the area
depend on food aid supply and have lost their traditional drought coping
mechanisms.During the 1999/2001 period the MarsabitlMoyale areawas affected
by a severe drought. This led to massive livestock deaths, worsened by the fact
that little public animal health facilities were available, the absenceof private
veterinary services in the area and the long distances to agrovets centres in
Marsabit and Moyale. The main consequenceof the drought was an increase in
the poverty index. The situation was worsened as some of the families lost all
their cattle due to lack of livestock diseasecontrol (CIFA2002).
Having introduced the settings where the field researchwas performed, the next
section debates the methods usedfor data collection and analysis.
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5.1.4 Methodology
Following the comparative rationale of the thesis between human and animal
health systems, the methodology chosen for the field research was based on a
study by Ruebush_lI, Weller and Klein (1994) on community malaria workers
(CMW)in Guatemala. Briefly, Ruebush'sstudy aimed at identifying the 'ideal'
qualities of CMWas perceived by community members and by PHCstaff and
health policy makers. Suchcomparison, it was hypothesised, would shed light on
the reasons why community members did not use the community malaria
services, which were free of charge.
The study was basedon the Pacific Coastal Plain of Guatemala "in an agricultural
area producing cotton, sugar cane and cattle" (Ruebush_lI, Weller and Klein
1994). In rural areas, illiteracy level may be as high as 60-70%, whereas in urban
settings it rangesfrom 30 to 40%.Three villages in the department of Escuintla,
representative of the Pacific coast, were selected for Ruebush'sstudy purposes.
In order to develop the interview materials, observational as well as interview
data was collected in the three villages "in order to understand residents' and
NMSworkers participation in and perceptions of the CV [community volunteers]
system" (Ruebush_lI, Weller and Klein 1994). Following the pilot protocol
conducted in the selected areas, interviews were conducted with 22 residents
and 12NMSfield workers (total of 34 interviews). Eachparticipant was askedthe
following: "if you had to choose a person as a Volunteer Collaborator, what
would you want that person to be like?" (Ruebush_lI,Weller and Klein 1994).The
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11 qualities most frequently mentioned by respondents were used for the
analytical part of the study.
Once the interview materials developed, the study samples, which included
residents and NMSworkers, were randomly selected in the three villages. The
two samples of residents' interviews were taken one in 1985 and the second in
1988. The first sample was composedof 30 people, 15 literate and 15 illiterate
and was stratified by gender. Given the result obtained from the first sample and
becausewomen tend to have a primary role in family health, the secondsample
consisted of women only. In addition, an additional sample of 27 NMSwas
interviewed in 1985.
The Ruebush study aimed at systematically assessing perceptions between
community residents with regard to CMWs.Residentswere thus asked to priority
rank the 11qualities obtained during the development materials phase.A paired-
comparison format, where each quality was paired with each other quality, was
used (total of 55 pairs). Pairswere randomly presented during the oral interview
with each resident. A single ordering of qualities was consequently obtained for
each of the individuals interviewed.
The analytical part of the study was based on Pearsoncorrelations of the rank
orders obtained from each individual. In addition, demographic data such as age
and literacy was used for descriptive statistics purposes. Concordance was
calculated with the average correlation coefficient between sub-sampleswhen
there was low intracultural variation (i.e. high agreement in responses).
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Given that the Kenyan context and time frame were not exactly the same as
those of Ruebush's study, the methodology had to be adapted to the Kenyan
pastoral setting. A detailed description of the methods used for the study is
elaborated in section 5.2.
5.1.5 Organ isation of the chapter
Havingoutlined the backgroundand context of the Kenyancase study on CAHWs
in pastoral areas, section 5.2 presents a detailed description of the methods used
during the field data collection. Main results are provided in section 5.3,
followed by the discussion in 5.4, which is organised following the framework
outlined in section 4.3.6 (i.e. human resources). Finally, section 5.5 brings the
main conclusionsderived from the field study.
5.2 Methods
The aim of this field research followed the lines of Ruebush's.Thus, one of the
objectives was to elucidate the ideal qualities as perceived by community
members and livestock keepers, and compare that to policy makers' perceptions.
In addition, it aimed at exploring the linkages between selection criteria,
selection processand sustainability. Given the timeframe available for the field
research (4 months - from the 10th of September 2002 to the zo" of January
2003) it was not possible to strictly follow Ruebush'smethodology.
Two sets of semi-structured questionnaires were created for each group: policy
makers (PM)and livestock keepers or community members (LK). The sample of
PMinterviewed was of 28 and that of LK was of 189 (West Pokot n= 72, Wajir
n=59,Marsabit n=58). Total interview samplewas therefore of 217. Individuals in
the communities were randomly selected and an ageand sex balancewas sought.
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Nevertheless, it was not always possible to recruit females in someof the areas
for various reasons(which varied from cultural to religious reasons- refer to the
description of the setting section 5.1.3). Thus, in West Pokot it was only possible
to interview 8 women, in Wajir 2 and in Marsabit 18.
5.2.1 Qualitative-quantitative mixed methods
The credibility debate underlying studies based exclusively on qualitative
methods has already been discussedin the literature (Green and Britten 1998;
Mays and Pope 1999; Patton 2002; Tashakkori and Teddie 2003; Green and
Thorogood 2004a). Following Patton (2002), the credibility paradigm is basedon
three main aspects: (i) methodological rigour in data collection and analysis, (ii)
researcher credibility in terms of background and experience and (iii) "the
philosophical belief in the value of qualitative inquiry, that is, a fundamental
apprectation of naturalistic inquiry, qualitative methods, inductive analysis,
purposeful samplingand holistic thinking" (Patton 2002)24.
Semi-structured questionnaires aimed at gathering the views of respondents in
relation to the study.objectives (in section 5.1.2) not only through qualitative
data but also through the collection of numerical quantitative data (on age,
gender; wealth and years of schooling for LK; on years of field experience, of
policy involvement, gender, educational level and affiliation). The underlying
reason for mixing qualitative and quantitative methods was basedon looking for
"patterns of convergence to develop or corroborate an overall interpretation"
(Maysand Pope 1999). The use of such a "triangulation method" - a concept
developed by Campbell and Fiske in 1959 for social science research (Seale
1999a; Bazeley 2003) - was meant to limit misinterpretations and enhance
24 Page 571.
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credibility of the results among policy makers. Reasons for choosing the
triangulation method relate to policy makers' tendency of being positively biased
towards numerical data (Patton 2002). Qualitative data was considered the basis
of the analysis, while quantitative data was used to complement (confirming or
not) the results obtained through qualitative analysis. As mentioned by Patton
(2002), "in essence,triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data constitutes
a form of comparative analysis,,25.
Several authors have argued that standard guidelines in qualitative research
would be difficult to obtain (Hammersley 1990; Murphy, Dingwall, Greatbatch et
al. 1998; Maysand Pope1999). However, Tashakkori and Teddle point out several
validity issues that were taken into account during the process of design the
research protocol - including the questionnaire. These validity concerns, which
were first stated by (Webb,Campbell, Schwartzet al. 1966), are:
(i) "Respondent effects", whereby the respondent is aware that he/she is
the target of the study;
(ii) "Investigator effects", referring to errors incurred by the investigator;
(iii) "Varieties of sample error", which result from the inability of the
research to obtain perfect samples (in terms of space, time and/or
individuals);
(iv) "Access to content errors" which reflects the inability of the researcher
to obtain "perfect samplesof relevant content", and finally;
(v) "Operating ease and validity checks". This is linked to the irrelevant
material obtained through the collection method and also the ability to
25 pa,ge 558.
244
replicate the results obtained (i.e. an observation might be more difficult
to replicate than answersfrom a close-ended questionnaire).
However, asmentioned by Tashakkori and TeddIe, it is important to bear in mind
the errors that are associated to the specific data collection chosen for the
study, in this case: semi-structured questionnaires.
5.2.2 Questionnaires
It is widely known in the qualitative research literature that the choice of type of
questionnaire may be influential over the results obtained (Tashakkori and
TeddIe 2003; Green and Thorogood 2004b). The choice of questionnaire depends
on the aim/s of the research (Greenand Thorogood2004b). This holds especially
true for settings in which the principal investigator does not speak the local
language (Green and Thorogood 2004b). Questionnaire design and interview
process were critical in attaining the two objectives stated in section 5.1.2.
Designand translation were especially important in the caseof the questionnaire
targeting the LK group (i.e. Kenyan rural and remote areas). Questionnairesare
available in annex 3.
Tashakkori and TeddIe have outlined a set of "principles of questionnaire
construction" to follow when preparing a questionnaire (Tashakkori and TeddIe
2003). These served as guidance for the construction of the questionnaire. But as
stated by {Mays and Pope 1999) and others such as (Hammersley 1990) and
(Murphy, Dingwall, Greatbatch et at. 1998), validity and relevance are
fundamental in qualitative research. Each of these two factors involves making
judgements. Given the latter, the group in the AU were the research was
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performed was closely involved in the construction of both questionnaires as
suggestedby Green andThorogood (2004b).
Taking into account the importance of appropriate phrasing and language to be
used in the formulation of questionnaires (Sapsfordand Jupp 1996; Green and
Thorogood 2004b), context and setting of the interviews, as well as the
backgroundof the interviewees, were taken into account by closely involving the
research assistant whose background is from pastoral areas (from Turkana, north
of West Pokot). This contributed to reduce both the "investigator effects" and
"context errors" mentioned in section 5.2.1. In order to facilitate the interview
process, a "recall" question (Green and Thorogood 2004b) was used at the
beginning of the LK interview to remind the interviewee of the last person who
performed asCAHWin their area. In addition, the questionnaire included several
"cross-checking" questions in order to ascertain what respondents answered,
hence addressing the "respondents' effect" cited in the previous section. An
example is the question where the community member has to state the reasons
for choosingeach of the qualities mentioned (i.e. question 5 of the first section
of the LK questionnaire "state the reason/s why you have chosen these
qualities").
Wording was also important in the pastoral context (Green and Thorogood
2004b). But given that the interview process included the use of translators,
attention focused on the type of answers required from the questionnaires
(measurable or precise events). It was therefore crucial for the LKquestionnaire
to meticulously explain to translators the questionnaire they had to perform (see
account in annex 5). Initially, in the field research protocol, it was envisaged
that translators would perform the individual interviews themselves and take
246
notes in the local language. Ideally the notes would have been translated into
Englishand back translated in the local languagein order to check the quality of
translation. Nonetheless, it became clear in the first of the Districts visited (i.e.
West Pokot) that such procedure would not be possible follow because of time
constraints and lack of willingness from translators". As a consequence,
translators directly took notes into English.The same procedure was followed in
each of the districts visited. Inevitably, this might have incur bias in the note-
taking process and hence in the results of the research (see section 5.3.4 for
weaknessesof the field collection). The questionnaire was tested in Alale (in
West Pokot District) and consequently modified.
PMinterviews tended to be more conceptual. The principal investigator worked
closely with CAPE'sHeadof Unit in the designof the questionnaire. Hisextensive
experience in the animal health policy arena in the Horn of Africa as well as his
previous experience in PRAin rural and remote areas were valuable assets for
interview design and content. The questionnaire was tested with two officers of
the AUconsequently inserting the necessarymodifications.
A detailed account of the people interviewed, field NGOsinvolved, the process
and the composition of the samples is elaborated in section annex 5 for both
groups (LKand PM)and for each of the locations.
Nonetheless, intellectual and analytical rigour in the collection and
interpretation of data is another important factor influencing the results
obtained from the field research. This is discussedin the following section.
26 The choice of translators in pastoral areas is very limited.
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5.2.3 Data analysis
The field collection aimed at gathering both qualitative and quantitative data.
The rationale for choosinganalytical methods for both types of data, as well as
for the quality ranking correlations, is presented in the following sections.
5.2.3.1 Qualitative data
Several softwares have been developed and updated in order to perform
qualitative data analysis. Examplesof these include NUD*ist, NVivo, or "Decision
Maker" for theory building, "Ethno" for structural analysis and "Ethnograph" for
descriptive/interpretative analysis (Green and Thorogood 2004a). These
softwares are exclusively a way of "assisting" the analysis, they do not "analyse"
the data. The programmesfacilitate data storage, coding, retrieval, comparing,
and linking but, as mentioned by Patton, "human beings do the analysis"Z7
(Patton 2002). Indeed, as put by Green and Thorogood (2004a) "computer
packages do not 'do analysis', but they can help both manage and allow to
retrieve data quickly"z8. Analysis programmes may speed up the process of
locating themes, grouping data together in categories and comparing passagesin
transcripts. However, the analysis of qualitative data "involves creativity,
intellectual discipline and analytical rigour"Z9 (Patton 2002). Softwares are thus
tools facilitating data managementduring the analysis.
Given the sample size (total n = 217) and needs of the field study and the
supposedly different perspectives in relation to the research subjects (i.e.
qualities and selection process, impact and sustainability), manual coding and
27 Page 442.
28 Page 191.
29 Page 442.
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analysis was considered feasible and the preferred option in order not to miss
important links between samples and sub-samples. Thus patterns and themes
were obtained through an iterative and systematic process of codification of
terms into categories and analysingrespondents' citation frequency.
Qualitative data obtained from the semi-structured interviews was systematically
collected and entered into Word format by clerk assistants provided by one of
the collaborating organisations, the Intermediate Technology Development
Group's (ITDG) Community Livestock Initiative Programme (CLIP). Semi-
structured interviews' data was analysedmanually following an iterative process
in order to highlight recurrent themes in respondents' answers. Similarities and
differences in relation to the quantitative variables of each group (see below)
were also analysed through this systematic and iterative process. In relation to
the comparative analysis between sub-samplesobtained though the quantitative
variables gathered, focus was given to the "selection process" section of the
semi-structured interviews as it was considered the most susceptible to
variations.
5.2.3.2 Quantitative data
Quantitative data gathered for the PMgroup was used to stratify the sample in
relation to (i) years of field experience, (ii) years of policy involvement, (iii)
gender, (v) post graduate qualification and (iv) group. LK group was stratified
into (i) gender, (ii) age, (iii) literacy and (iv) wealth. These variables were
systematically entered into and analysed with SPSSsoftware. Chi Square Test
analysis was performed in the LK group to highlight homogeneity or
heterogeneity between districts. Descriptive data was used for PMgroup analysis
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given that the sample size did not allow a Chi Square (Bland 2000). Results
related to variables distribution within sampleswere used to push forward the
comparisonsin the qualitative data analysis, as previously mentioned.
5.2.3.3 Quality ranking and correlations
In order to rank the qualities and obtain correlations between sub-samples, a
different approach to that taken by Ruebush's study was used to develop the
interview materials. Indeed, the timeframe and logistics did not allow going
twice to each of the districts were the field research was performed. Hence,
overall rankings for the two groups were obtained by adding the times each
quality was mentioned for both groups. At a sub-group level, comparisons
between quality ranking were made by attributing a weight to the qualities
ranked asfirst, secondand third (weight being 1, 0.6 and 0.3 respectively).
The choice of this precise rank-ordering weighting technique was based on the
majqrity voting and the voting paradox. The voting paradox, also referred in the
literature as "paradox of cyclical voting", highlights the fact that no clear winner
exists in majority voting (Cullis and Jones 1998; Stiglitz 2000). It has been
extensively quoted in the economic literature that the characteristics of the
"ideal" political mechanism or set of rules for making social decisions should
follow four criteria. These are transitivity, non-dictatorial choice, independence
of irrelevant alternatives and unrestricted domain (Stiglitz 2000).
However, in 1963Arrow showed that such an "ideal" systemwould not exist, as
no system would satisfy all these desired characteristics (Arrow 1963). This is
referred to in the literature as Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. As mentioned by
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Stiglitz and others, rank-order voting (where individuals rank the alternatives and
each rank is assimilated to a specific coefficient then scoresare added together,
also known as Borda Count) does not satisfy Arrow's Impossibility Theorem as it
fails the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" criterion. However, the
present study was not aiming at making social decisions but to represent the
preferences in respondents' choices in relation to the qualities they desired in
community workers fairly.
As mentioned by Weller in her study on shared knowledge and knowledge
aggregation, "the weighting procedure maximises information, either achieving
higher levels of validity for a given sample size or requiring smaller sample sizes
for equivalent levels of validity" (Weller 1987). Given the nature of the LK
questionnaire and the flexibility given to respondents on ranking qualities (as
they were the ones to state the qualities), the failure of attaining Arrow's
criteria would incur in minor biases in ranking. Hence, rank-order voting and
weighting in the context of the research study was adequate for the data
analysis. Therefore, Weller's 'cultural consensusmodel', which refers to the
abovementioned voting paradox, was chosen for the field collection data
analysis.
Suchquality rankingswere used for the Pearsoncorrelation analysis. Correlation
coefficients were usedto describe the agreement amongpriority qualities of sub-
samples and between samples. Following Weller, "descriptions of 'typical' or
'average' beliefs or behavioural patterns can be problematic when intracultural
variation is large. The accuracy and validity of aggregated responsesis a function
of the degree of concordance among respondents and the number of
respondents" (Weller 1987). In her article, Weller examines the relation between
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concordance, sample size and the validity of aggregating acrossindividuals. Two
different modelswere used:
(i) The 'cultural consensus model', which is a generalised solution of the
Condorcet problem. The Condorcet Jury Theorem refers back to the French
philosopher of the eighteenth century, le Marquis de Condorcet, who stated that
"there may not be any majority voting equilibrium" (in Stiglitz 2000), this
parallels the aggregation of responsesproblem and concerns the accuracy of a
"majority (voting) rule" and hence relates to the aforementioned "voting
paradox", and
(ii) The 'common elements or process model', which focuses on a single
unidimensional concept defined by a set of elements that form the pool of
cultural knowledge.
,
Weller's article highlights that the results obtained through the two different
models show that the aggregateconvergesupon the "culturally correct" answers
as a function of the concordanceamongindividuals (which in turn is a function of
shared knowledge) and sample size. For the two models however, it was found
that even with moderate levels of concordance, sample sizesas small as 15 may
be adequate to create an accurate aggregate. The validity of an aggregation
across people increases as the number of respondents increases as long as the
correlations among respondents are positive. "Aggregated responses of more
than one informant will be better than a single best informant" (Weller 1987). In
relation to the standard deviation (Sd) levels, Weller's study concludes that
"standard deviations of 0.20 in knowledge estimates may be due purely to
sampling variability, although we would expect more variability to be due to
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5.3.1
5.3.1.1
chance with fewer number of items «40) and less variability with greater
number of items (>40)" (Weller 1987).
Therefore, for data analysis purposes, given that it is only justifiable to
aggregate responseswhen there is moderate to high agreement in responses(i.e.
low intracultural variations), concordance among respondents was measured
prior to aggregating responses.Concordance was measured by the average of
correlation coefficients calculated for each subset of respondents. The
correlation coefficient was also used to describe the agreement between sub-
samplesand samples.
Having described the methods used for the data collection, the next section
presents the results.
5.3 'Results
Results include descriptive data, quality ranking and main recurrent answers
obtained from semi-structured interviews for both groups, LK and PM.
Correlations between LK and PMare subsequently presented. This section also
discussesthose factors that might have influenced or biased the results.
Livestock keepers (lK)
Descriptive data
The main characteristics of the samples interviewed in West Pokot, Wajir and
Marsabit are presented in table 4 below. Literacy levels, gender and wealth
(measureas a function of the animal possessed)are the main criteria exposed.
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West Pokot Wajir Marsabit Total
(n=72) (n=59) (n=58) (n=189)
Age 39.15 ± 11.35 41.18 ± 14.20 40.71 ± 12.87 40.25 ± 12.70
Literacy (%)
D literate 47.2 54.2 27.6 43.4
D illiterate 52.8 45.8 72.4 56.6
Gender (%)
D male 88.9 94.9 65.5 83.6
D female 11.1 5.1 34.5 16.4
Number of
Animals
D Cattle 17.80 ± 18.36 23.12 ± 26.60 2.91 ± 4.49 14.88 ± 20.51
D Camels 1.03±6.10 9.31 ± 15.22 5.16±5.15 4.90 ± 10.26
D Sheep 37.99 ± 40.75 41.66.± 44.53 32.24 ± ,30.54 37.33±39.13
and
goats
D Donkey 2.78 E-02 ± 0.19± 1.45 0 7.41 E-02±
0.24 ' 0.38
D Poultry 9.18 ± 1.54 5.09 E-02 ± 0.16 ± 0.56 0.13 ± 1.24
0.29
Table 4: Livestock Keepers group descriptive data
5.3.1.2 Quality ranking
Overall quality ranking of the ten most frequently mentioned "ideal" qualities for
CAHWs for the three districts can be seen in table 6. Ranking for these qualities
was based on samples as similar as possible for each district. Hence, for West
Pokot the sample consisted of 21 villagers (8 female -all-, 6 male illiterate and 7
male literate), for WaJir 22 (3 female -all-, 9 illiterate male and 10 literate male)
and for Marsabit 23 (11 female, 6 illiterate male, 6 literate male). Each quality
was defined through a series of characteristics (adjectives and short descriptions)
mentioned by interviewees themselves (see table 6). Question 5 in the LK group
questionnaire ("state the reason/s why you have chosen each of these qualities"
- see annex 3) allowed verifying the meaning of the qualities stated, as well as
helped omitting the aforementioned "respondent's bias" (in section 5.2.2).
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The three most mentioned qualities were "trustworthy", "committed" and
"responsible". However their position in the ranking varied between districts, as
seen in table 5, which point out slight differences between districts (this will also
be highlighted through the Pearson correlation analysis in section 5.3.3).
West Pokot Wajir Marsabit
Trustworthy Trustworthy Committed
Knowledgeable Committed· Responsible Responsible
Social person - Polite· Available Trustworthy
Literate
Committed Literate Social person
Table 5: Ranking of preferred qualities per district
Rank Quality , Terms included in the definition of the Times
quality mentioned
1 Trustworthy honest 58
2 Committed committed / hard working / responds to 40
calls/ responds quickly to needs of
community / act quickly / obedient/
able to work/ an active person / loyal
, person/ devoted
3 Responsible responsible / has a family / with 30
children
4 Knowledgeable knowledgeable / experience in AH/ 29
bright/ can grab concepts/ when
I~' • trained/ passmessages / pass skills toothers (advisor) skilful/resourceful!
brave / clever
5 Literate r- literate / learned 20
6 Mobile can walk and cover large areas / fit! 19
;. young / healthy
7 Social person social person/ good public relations/ 18
accepted by community
8 Available available/ willing to stay in the 16
community/ loves/familiar with local
community/ local person
9 Owning livestock being a livestock keeper/owner / 13
familiar with livestock / cares for
animals
10 Polite .,,' ~ good behaviour / polite/ can listen 10
Table 6: Livestock keepers' group "ideal" qualities ranking
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5.3.1.3 Semi-structured interviews
Main results from the LK semi-structured interviews regarding selection process
and impact and sustainability are summarised in the following sections (for
further details, refer to annex6).
• Selection process
With regard to consultation over the selection process, the majority of the
interviewees in Wajir and Marsabit were consulted (76.3% and 66.6%
respectively). However in West Pokot 55.5% of the respondents were not
consulted. These include mainly women and young men, the main reason stated
being that they were "not allowed" to participate.
Candidateswere selected by the whole community in Marsabit (96.5%).However
in West Pokot elders, opinion leaders or selected members of the community
were often those choosing candidates. In Wajir, respondents stated the whole
community made the choice in 50%of the cases and selected members of the
community in 45.7%of the cases. Nearly all respondents in the three districts
were familiar with the candidates. In West Pokot and Wajir, the 38.9%and 41.4%
of the interviewees respectively were not aware of the decisions taken during
the processbut were informed of the result by the elders of the community. In
Marsabit, community members were only informed of the final decision taken
through a community meeting (34.5%) and through a meeting with the NGO
(22.4%).
When asked about how to improve the selection processmembers of the Pokot
communities interviewed suggested the involvement of the black market seller
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and traders ("they should be trained as they deal yet with drugs"). Other
suggestionsincluded the increase in the involvement of women in the selection
processand as potential candidates to become CAHWsas "they are most of the
times with animals - goats, sheep and calves- and they are crucial for the
cleanness of cows and cattle and key elements in milking". It was also
highlighted that "they should be able to administer drugs to animals". Special
attention was given to the criteria used in the selection processand to the need
of more CAHWs.It was markedly noted that selection criteria should be made
public and should be available for all community members. In order to increase
fairness to the. process, chiefs or authorities should not be involved and an
interview should be included during the selection processof the candidates.
The communities in Wajir did also highlight the need for instituting a clear
selection process with specific criteria and guidelines. The need to increase
participation of women was a recurrent theme, aswell as the involvement of the
whole community in the selection process, not letting the candidates be selected
exclusively by the elders, leaders or Pastoral Association officers. Again, the
ideas of including an oral interview of the-candidate during the selection process
and the need for more CAHWswere mentioned. Most importantly was the
insistence of respondents on the need for recognition and accreditation of the
CAHWs.Respondentswere also keen on enhancing CAHWs'training, equipment
and monitoring.
Finally, respondentsin Marsabit tended to think the selection processwas "good"
so that there was no need of any improvement. Especially they highlighted they
were "very happy" with the fact that they did not have to pay each time they
required the CAHWsservices as well as by not having to pay for transport to
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Marsabit to buy drugs. However the majority stated the need and availability for
more cheap drugs and on giving refresher courses or retraining CAHWs.
• Impact and sustainability
All respondents in the three districts unanimously thought CAHWs "are useful".
,
Reasons for that slightly varied between locations (table 7) .
West Pokot . .
Animal treatment 54.2%
Drug availability 37.5%
Access to services 34.7%
Wajir "" " .Drug availability& price 50.7%
Access to services 43.5%
Animal treatment 30.4%
Marsabit
Animal treatment 51.4%
Extension 44.1%
Drug availability 35.3%
Table 7: Reasons why CAH systems are useful as seen by livestock keepers group
(frequency in %)
When asked about "[animal] health improvements" seen in the community, all
districts respondents coincided on the "reduction of death rates and animal
sickness" due to CAHWs' presence. The decrease in disease incidence was mainly
attributed to tick-borne infections control and worm control. Hence, followed an
increase in animals' body condition and production (milk specially) and
reproductive levels. As one of the respondents mentioned, the "[animal] health
improvements" noticed were an "increase in livestock production, and this has
improved our means of survival as livestock is our main source of livelihood".
All districts agreed that CAHWs could have been more effective had it not been
for the lack of training or lack of supplies (see table 8).
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West Pokot ,
Lack of drugs 85.1%
Lack of training & refresher courses 12.5%
Wajir
Lack of drugs 89.7%
Lack of skills 23.1%
Marsablt '. "
Lack of drugs 58.1%
Lack of skills 54.8%
Table 8: Reasons why the CAH system did not work as perceived by livestock
keepers (frequency in %)
Improvements to the system suggested by interviewees are presented in table 9
below.
West Pokot
"To be paid a salary":" as it would "make the job more interesting" 36.1%
Increase in drug supply (including human drugs) 34.7%
Increase means of transport 33.0%
More refresher courses. 27.7%
Wajlr ,',
Supply of enough and cheap drugs (on a loan basis) 61.0%
More regular training or refresher courses 55.9%
Provision of salary 16.9%
Increase in the means of transport 13.5%
Regular monitoring of workers 11.9,%
Provision of accreditation 10.2%
Marsabit
Increase of drug supply 72.4%
Construction of a drug store (in the location) 53.4%
Increase means of transport 46.5%
More refresher courses 43.1%
Provision of salary 34.5%
Table 9: Improvements of the CAH system as suggested by LK
30 By the government or the NGO
259
<I,
Main reasons for community workers to leave their job were the following:
West Pokot .. ' " .. ,Ie
Lack of drugs 16.7%
Lack of profits 16.7%
Lack of salary 15.3%
Drugsearnings misuse" 15.3%
Lack of transport 11.1%
Commitment 9.7%
Wajir' , ' "'.
Lack of salary/profits 33.9%
Lack of drugs 20.3%
Migration 13.6%
Lack of Jncenttves or profits 11.7%
Travelling distances 6.8%
Lack of payment of services by users 6.8%
Marsabit ii .j . .' '\C, ;. -Lack of salary/profits 12.1%
Lack of drugs 8.6%
"Found another job" 5.2%
Table 10: Reasons for CAHWdrop out as perceived by community members
Therefore, incentives mentioned by interviewees to motivate CAHWs to continue
working were:
West Pokot ;;
Salary / economic 75.0%
Provision of means of transport 37.5%
Availability of cheap drugs 34.7%
Refresher courses and advice from professional staff 13.9%
Wajir "
~
Salary / economic - 42.4%
Availability of cheap drugs ) 33.9%
Training and refresher courses 22.0%
Increase in margin profit from' drug selling 16.9%
Marsabit
Salary / economic 81.0%
Availability of cheap drugs 67.2%
Provision of means of transport 60.3%
Construction of drugstores 43.1%
Table 11: Incentives for CAHWs to remain working as perceived by community
members
The, extension messages most frequently passed to livestock and community
members were the following:
31 Especially because of drunkenness in West Pokot.
260
West Pokot
Dosagesand administration routes 51.1%
Dipping/spraying 29.8%
Treatment of specific diseases and early reporting 21.3%
Wajir ,~ , u
Dosagesand administration routes 96.5%
Treatment of specific diseasesand early reporting 29.8%
Diseaseprevention 19.3%
Marsabit
Dosagesand administration routes 86.2%
Hygiene and public health education" 36.2%
Treatment of specific diseases 34.5%
Table 1.2: Exte~sion messages to community members by CAHWs
Note: the terms public health education indudes "covering of food after cooking" and the
hygiene of the house and the animals' locations. Still in the public health extension, special
attention was also given to advising livestock keepers on not drinking milk or eating meat of an
animal that has recently been treated, on how to bury the carcasses of animals which died of
Anthrax, on not eating dead animals, on burning dirt, on boiling water and on flies and
mosquitoes control
Having highlighted the main results of the semi-structured interviews with the LK
group, the next sections focus on the PMgroup.
5.3.2 Policy makers (PM)
5.3.2.1 Descriptive data
Main characteristics of the sample of policy makers interviewed are presented
below in table 13.
Years of field experience . T ' 4.34 + 6.48
Years of involvement in policy 9.18 ± 9.48
Gender (%) ,i i
c male 85.7
c female 14.3
Postgraduate qualification (%) '.; ,le "
C none 28.6
n MSc 10.7
c PhD 60.7
Group-Affiliation (%)
c academic 32.1
o private sector 17.9
c government 21.4
c Kenyan Veterinary Association / Board 28.6
(KVAlKVB)
Table 13: Descriptive data for policy makers group
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5.3.2.2 Quality ranking
The ranking of the ideal qualities of CAHWs as seen by the Policy Makers group
are shown in table 14.
Rank Quality Terms included in the definition of the Times
I" 1 quality mentioned
1 Literate educated / literacy 17
Trainable/ basic AH knowledge/ husbandry / handy / 17
Knowledgeable skilled / able to be trained / with training
2 - Ethnic tol knowledge of local culture 13
knowledge of
the area
3 Trustworthy trusted / accepted by communities 10
honesty/integrity able to diagnose
4 Available available in local areas/ accessible / local 9
person
5 c::ommitment commitment / responsible/ motivated / 8
hard working
6 Owning livestock 7
7 Social person . , public relations / friendly accepted as 6
leaders
-
8 Qualified qualified 5
Community 5
generated
Mobile willing to follow (mobile) /live in the 5
communities physically fit / young
9 Ethical. ethics 3
Interface acting as an interface/ reporting (vet/ 3
government / communities/ market)
10 Knowledge on 2
ethno-
"
veterinary ,
medicine
Table 14: Ranking of the "ideal qualities" in a CAHW (policy makers group)
The ranking of qualities was based on the whole sample of interviewees in the
group (n=28) and on the times the quality was mentioned. As in the previous
ranking, a definition of the terms considered in each quality is stated, based on
the answers of question number 3 in the PM questionnaire (refer to annex 3)
"Explain why you have chosen these qualities" as, even if the same quality was
stated, the meaning could sometimes differ. As seen in the table, ranking of
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qualities does not overlap with the livestock keepers' one. Hence, the four most
stated qualities in that group are "literate", "knowledgeable or trainable",
"ethnic to the area" and "trustworthy". It can be seen from the list that new
qualities are mentioned, such as "ethnic to the area", "qualified", "trainable",
"ethical", "interface or link" person.
5.3.2.3 Semi-structured interviews
• Selection process
Regarding PM's interpretation of the role of CAHWs, respondents with field
experience agreed it was "disease reporting and link person" (94.1%) and
"delivering animal health services in ASALareaswhere there is no other qualified
professional" (including preventive medicine and simple curative treatments)
(88.2%). Some of the respondents highlighted however that services given by
CAHWsshould exclusively focus on epidemiological surveillance and not on
curative or clinical services. Other roles suggestedwere (i) extension (on feed
and marketing of products) (17.6%), (ii) record keeping (5.9%), (iii) production
improvement (5.9%),.and(iv) supplementing government services (5.9%).
Regarding how the selection processwas done, 35.3%of the respondents with
field experience stated the authorities or the government selected the CAHWs
(the "chief of -the village" being the authorities, and the OVO being the
government). In 41.2% of the cases it was the elders or opinion leaders who
appointed the candidate/so In fewer cases(11.8%)the communities and the NGOs
were involved in the process.
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Strengths of the selection process were only highlighted when the community
(with or without NGOpresence) was involved. It was stressed that the strength
was the "involvement of the community in the selection process". Such
involvement would enable communities to select candidates they "trust" (linking
with the "ideal" qualities above stated) andwho are "motivated to work".
However, when the elders or the authorities selected candidates, only
weaknesseswere mentioned. These were mainly that the effectiveness of the
system was hindered as elders tended to select their relatives. Other reasons
included the following: (i) the selected candidateswere illiterate, (ii) there were
no women candidates, (iii) the selected person was not accepted by the
community, (iv) the processwas not participatory so the community did not know
what the purpose of the project was, (v) mistrust, and (vi) the "business
orientation" of the process. When the NGO was involved, main weakness
mentioned was the "dependency syndrome" from the community towards the
NGO.
When asking the group of interviewees without field experience (n=10), 70%of
them thought the whole community should be involved in the selection process
as opposed to involving exclusively opinion leaders or elders. They mentioned
also the importance of integrating field NGOsin the process so that the CAH
systemwould be more likely to be sustainable;
When asked about the usefulnessof the CAHsystem, all respondents with the
exception of 2 thought it was useful. Reasonsmentioned were that CAHWsfill
the gap of service delivery in pastoral areas as they are available in the
community, can live and work in harsh areas and follow nomadic communities.
264
However, reluctance and scepticism in some of the answers could be noted,
mentioning that the best alternative to deliver the services would be the
veterinarian. A recurrent theme was the strong need for supervision and control
of CAHsystemsaswell asgood quality training.
21.4%of the PMrespondents stated a contradiction existed between the will of
the communities and that of private veterinarians in terms of service delivery to
poor farmers. Main reasonsbeing that (i) the private veterinarian servicesare too
expensive for poor livestock keepers' affordability, (ii) community members do
not differentiate quality services, (iii) literacy in CAHWsbeing a primary request
from private veterinarians is not always fulfilled and finally (iv) the "work of the
private veterinarian is taken over by the CAHW".
However the rest (78.6%)thought there is a link between the two actors citing
two main areas of synergy. The first was based on the objective of increasing
service delivery to dryland areas, and the second on the idea that private
veterinarians are interested in profit-making. Concerns were also raised
regarding the economic viability of the system as workers do not always
understand the purposeof profit making and drug kit replenishment.
Finally, suggestionsand remarks given by the interviewees varied and did not
only cover selection process but also other issues. Therefore livestock keepers'
accessto markets and slaughterhouseswas raised as well as concerns regarding
the viability of the system. The latter referred to the presence of black market
for drugs where these are found at cheaper price, hence continuing to be of
interest for CAHWs. Centring more in the selection process, the need for
women's involvement was repeatedly mentioned as well as the need for
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supervision and training of CAHWs. Finally, it was suggested the suppression of
NGOs in ASAL areas as they are "undermining the economic viability of CAH
systems". Some respondents also insisted on the veterinarians being paid by the
government to work in those areas.
• Impact and sustain ability
Following PM's answers, main reasons for CAHWs to leave their duties were:
Lack of salary or payment 42.9%
Drug kit replenishment and drug availability 42.9%
Disagreements with the community 32.1%
Finding other activities 32.1%
Donor-driven problems 32.1%
Infrastructure 17.9%
Lack of commitment 17.9%
Failure in the selection process 10.7%
Lack of supervision 10.7%
Family matters 7.1%
Lack of good training 7.1%
Institutional support 3.6%
Drunkenness 3.6%
Table 15: Main reasons for CAHWsto leave (policy makers group)
Therefore, incentives stated to encourage CAHWs to remain active were:
Economic (i.e. salary or payment) 71.4%
Social status or recognition by the community and lor government 46.4%
Enhanced amenities (water access, roads and security) 17.8%
Availability and regular supply of drugs 17.8%
Refresher courses 10.7%
Means of transport and equipment 10.7%
In kind presents (e.g. animals) to be given by the community 3.6%
Table 16: Incentives for CAHWsto continue working (policy makers group)
Most (42.8%) of the policy makers interviewed did not know what CAHWs did
after leaving the community work. The remainder however suggested few
alternatives, the most popular being returning to livestock keeping (46.6%)
followed by opening a drug store (referred to as 'duka' or 'agrovet') (33.3%) and
going for further training (26.6%). Other suggestions were turning to the black
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market becoming an illegal drug seller (20%), migration to towns in search of
higher wages, and livestock trade.
Policy makers thought a livestock keeper would be more interested to go to a
CAHW instead to another supplier of similar services due mainly to their
availability (53.6%)and to the low prices and flexibility of payment methods
(46.2%).Other answerswere the understanding of the local culture, lack of other
alternatives, becauseof the quality of the drugs, trust, respect, and follow up of
the animals.
PM's perceptions of what were the "other suppliers of [similar] services" are
stated below:
Black market or illegal drug sellers" 64.3%
Agrovets or dukas (shopkeepers) 53.6%
Government veterinarians 46.4%
Animal health assistants/technicians 46.4%
Traditional healers 21.4%
Livestock keepers and traders 17.8%
Non governmental organisations 14.3%
Human medical professionals and chemists were also mentioned 10.7%
Pharmaceutical industries 7.1%
• Note: Illegal drug sellers and black market do not include, for the purpose of this study,
"agrovets" and "dukas" even if it could be argued that they might also be considered as illegal
if not supervised by a veterinarian. Illegal drug sellers include quacks and peddlers.
Table 17: Other suppliers of similar servicesasperceived by policy makers
Black market and illegal drug sellers were considered as a "threat" in 46.4%of
the answers as they sell "[bad quality] cheaper drugs", hence increasing drug-
selling competition. The issue of "bad quality drugs" was linked to the lack of
ethics (a desired quality mentioned in the ranking) of drug sellers as opposed to
these of veterinarians or AHAs.Black market competition had different origins as
reported by respondents. These could either be from the borders (Somalia,
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Southern Sudan etc) or from private veterinarians or government officials buying
drugs in Nairobi at cheaper price and re-selling them to quacks. With regard to
"agrovets" and "dukas", reference was made to their competitive advantage in
selling also human drugs so that it "makes it easier for the livestock keeper to
buy there".
Statements were made against CAHWs such as "(CAHWs) are also illegal but they
will disappear after the new government because it will enforce the law". Others
insisted that "the country can afford health services to livestock and men so that
services are available there". It was also suggested the creation of a drug
inspectorate for law enforcement. However others thought community workers
could be a solution to reduce public health concerns regarding drug residues in
milk and meat. One suggested solution was to train these quacks or peddlers so
that they sold quality drugs. Supervision and good quality training for CAHWswas
commonly agreed.
Proposed solutions from policy makers to counteract the competition problem
mainly included:
Educating communities about the concept of "quality" 28.6%
Supervision by veterinarians and/or AHAof CAHWs 28.6%
Creation of a drug inspectorate allowing only veterinarians (private or 17.9%
from the government) to sell drugs
Enforcement of the law 14.3%
Enhancing economic or business capacity of CAHWs 14.3%
Liberalisation of the market 7.1%
Training of quacks to become CAHWs 7.1%
Table 18: Policy makers group suggestions on how to increase CAHWsvisibility
Other suggestions to solve the competition issue referred to (i) institutional
change, (ii) banning government veterinarians from selling drugs, (iii) creation of
farmers' organisations, (tv) accreditation of shops through logos, (v) recognition
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of CAHWsin the Veterinary SurgeonsAct, (vi) registration of "dukas" by the
Kenyan Veterinary Board (KVB), and (vii) improve infrastructure. Finally it was
suggested that private veterinarians should exclusively work on clinical
treatments whereas the government officials should exclusively concentrate on
surveillance.
When asked about what kind of support should be given to CAHsystems, 67.9%
mentioned the government and 57.1% the private veterinarians. Government
support focused mainly on "training and retraining" (26.3%) as well as
institutional support through recognition and certificates (15.8%).Supervisionof
the workers was stated in 10.5%of the answers related to government support.
Other suggestions were lending money to private veterinarians, to the
communities and finally to provide drug supply (5.3%each). Regarding private
practitioners' support, it focused mainly on supervision (25%), on drug supply
(18.8%)and on "training and retraining" (12.5%). In 10.7%of the cases it was
stated the NGO should be supporting the systems but functions were not
specified.
Suggestions for CAH system improvement coincided, for 32.1% of the
interviewees answers, in a structure whereby CAHWswould be supervisedeither
directly by the veterinarian or by the AHA (who in turn would be supervised by
the veterinarian). Veterinarians would then be supplying drugs and training to
AHAsand CAHWs.Further comments on the sustainability and effectiveness of
CAH systems were raised. They included taking a uniform approach to CAH
systems, empowering farmers, improving productivity, enabling access to
markets and monitoring of the systems. Few interviewees pointed out concerns
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regarding CAH systems in relation to international sanitary and phyto-sanitary
standards (SPS)for export of live animals and animal derived products.
Having exposed the results obtained through the questionnaires for LK and PM,
the next section details the correlations between these groups in terms of
ranking qualities.
5.3.3 Pearson correlations
As stated in section 5.2.3.3, the procedure of obtaining the rankings differed
from that of Ruebush'sand were basedon the proportional voting theory (Stiglitz
2000). Hence weights were given to the first 3 qualities mentioned by the
interviewees. The first quality coefficient was 1, 0.6 for the second and 0.3 for
the third. These coefficients were multiplied to the times each quality was
mentioned. Pearson correlations were performed for each group (livestock
keepers and policy makers). Correlations and agreement within and between sub-
samples for each group were calculated in order to enable the comparison of
each district's perceptions of the first three qualities to those stated by policy
makers. First was analysed the sample for livestock keepers and second, the
policy makers'. A full account of the results of the Pearsoncorrelation analysis
can be obtained from annex7.
5.3.3.1 Livestock keepers
Correlation between sub-samples of the livestock keeper respondents was
calculated in order to explore significant variations within and between districts
with regard to the ideal qualities stated (i.e. variations between sub-samplesof
literate and illiterate respondentsand between men andwomen).
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• Correlation within districts
The results of the analysis show significant correlation between sub-samplesof
literate and illiterate respondentsin each district (West Pokot, r = 0.645; Wajir, r
= 0.761; andMarsabit, r = 0.833, all with P<0.01).The samplewas made up of 10
literate and 10 illiterate respondents randomly selected, for each district. In
West Pokot and Marsabit the illiterate group up was made of 5 men and 5
women, in Wajir it was made of7 men and 3 women, due to the lack of women
interviewed in the district. All correlations being significant, aggregation of
answersbetween literate and illiterate male respondentswas therefore possible.
Concordance, .as measured by the average Pearson correlation among
respondents in each sub-sample,was however higher within literate (0.573) than
within illiterate (0.359) respondents across districts. The lower level of
concordance within the illiterate sample might be the reason for obtaining
different trends in quality prioritisation, as seen in the semi-structured interview
analysis.
Correlation between men andwomen within a district was statistically significant
in Wajir and Marsabit (r = 0.664 and r = 0.744 with P<0.01). The correlation
between men and women subgroupswas not statistically significant within West
Pokot (r = 0.399) district but following Weller's rationale (1987), was sufficiently
high to warrant aggregation (0.602). Samples, for men, were made of 10 literate
and 10 illiterate randomly selected men for each district. In the case of women,
all women in each district were included in the sample. It must be borne in mind
that there was a low level of women participation in Wajir, which might have
hindered the results. Concordancebetween men and women within each district
was high (0.602), showing no significant variations in the ranking of the first 3
desired qualities. This confirms the results obtained from the semi-structured
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interviews, where the two first qualities mentioned by both sub-groups were
"trust" and "commitment". However, minor differences in perceptions and
prioritisation of the subsequent qualities were found in the semi-structured
interview analysis.
• Correlation between districts
Regardingcorrelation between men acrossdistricts, the study sample was made
of 10 literate and 10 illiterate men for each district. Marsabit and West Pokot
men and Marsabit and Wajir men were significantly correlated (r = 0.460, P<0.05
and r = 0.617, P<0.01respectively). But West Pokot and Wajir men's correlation
was not statistical significance (r = 0.339). However, the coefficient was high
enough to warrant aggregation between districts, so concordance between men
acrossdistricts was of 0.492.
Correlations between subgroupswithin each district and acrossdistricts have so
far been analysed. These correlations have mostly been significant or high
enough to warrant aggregation. This made it possible to consider each district as
a homogeneoussub-sample. Hence, calculating correlations between districts'
quality preferences was possible. Samples for this analysis were made of 20
respondents per district, these being: 8 women and 12 men for West Pokot, 3
women and 17 men for Wajir and 10 women and 10 men for Marsabit. (Men
samples were randomly selected and were equivalent in the number of literate
and illiterate men). Results obtained showed that West Pokot and Wajir were
significantly correlated (r = 0.500, P<0.05) as well as Marsabit and Wajir (r =
0.463, P<0.05). However, correlation between West Pokot and Marsabit was not
statistically significant (r = 0.165) but, following Weller, high enough to enable
aggregation and therefore allowing us to consider the three districts as a single
sample. The overall concordance between districts remained however high
(0.376).
These results indicate that there was little variation between livestock keepers'
group respondents in terms of preferred ordering of the first three "ideal"
qualities of a CAHW.There were no significant variations in the ordering of the
first 3 qualities between sub-samples. However, as seen in the analysis of the
semi-structured interviews trends could be seen amongst these sub-groups for
the subsequentqualities.
5.3.3.2 Polky makers
Correlation between respondents belonging to different groups can be found in
annex 7. Rankingmethods followed the samepattern as for the LKgroup.
In relation to quality ranking preferences between those respondents with and
without field experience, correlation was significant (r = 0.583) at P<0.01. Little
variation could therefore be expected from the quality ranking between these
two sub-samples.Hence, field experience did not seem to be an important factor
in the quality prioritisation. Differences existed however between interviewees
with and without policy involvement. Correlation between these two sub-samples
was not statistically significant although relatively high (0.360). More variations
could be expected in their ranking priorities. This corroborates the results
obtained in the analysis of the semi-structured interviews, where respondents
with policy involvement tended to highlight qualities such as "qualified". Those
with field experience correlated higher with those having policy involvement
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(0.910 with significance level of P<0.01) than with those without policy
involvement (r = 0.455).
Agreement level between academics, private sector members, KVAlKVB
members and government officials sub-samples in the policy makers group was
higher (0.489) than concordancebetween livestock keepers' subgroups(0.376). It
should be noted the high correlation between the private sector and the
KVAlKVBmembers (r = 0.625 with a significance level of P<0.01). This can be
explained by the fact that some private sector respondents were also KVAlKVB
members. The small number of members in each "group" sub-sampleof PMmust
be taken into account.
5.3.3.3 Policy makers - distrtcts correlations
As expected, correlation between Policy Makers' group and West Pokot and
Marsabit districts was not statistically significant (r = 0.358 and r = 0.074
respectively) but was however significant with Wajir (r = 0.760 with P<0.01).
Hence, Policy Makers' quality ranking for the first 3 stated qualities of the
"ideal" CAHWwas not similar to the qualities requested by West Pokot and
especially Marsabit members but similar to those of Wajir's. Similarities with the
latter case might be due to a greater involvement of chiefs in the interviews,
which in turn is a result from the translators' choice of respondents (see annex
2). Qualities mentioned and their priorities in Wajir were therefore comparable
to government officials' perceptions of "ideal" qualities.
5.3.4 Weaknesses of the field study
Factors influencing the researcharose in the two interviewees groups. In relation
to the livestock keepers group and given the nature of the study, which was
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highly focused on qualitative data, one of the crucial parts of the field research
was the choice of translators. These were selected in each of the districts
through the contact NGOswho had been previously briefed about the needs of
the research team. Hence, the quality of the translators appointed was
dependent on the field NGOsknowledge and the lack of choice (as there were
very few locals speaking both English and the local language). Attention was
given to the careful explanation of the questionnaires to translators. As
mentioned in section 5.2.2, it appeared not to be feasible to undertake the
initially planned translation and back translation of each interview in order to
check its accuracy. This may have affected the notes taken and hence the
results. Nonetheless, the careful explanation of the questionnaire to each
translator aimed at reducing the possible interpretation errors.
Besides the accuracy of the local translators while in the community, it is
important to highlight both advantagesand disadvantagesof their backgrounds.
In West Pokot and Wajir districts, translators were familiar with the CAHsystem.
This might have biased the notes taken (becauseof preconceived ideas on CAH
systems). In Marsabit however, only one of the translators was familiar with the
CAHsystem. This might have allowed them to have unbiased views during the
interview process. Nonetheless, their lack of knowledge of CAH systems may
have had repercussions in the interpretation of respondents' answers. In
addition, it should however be mentioned that the quality of their translations
was lower in terms of written Englishthan with the previous two districts.
Another factor to be highlighted was the difficulty in interviewing women in West
Pokot and especially Wajir. Given the small number of women in the samples,
the analysis of the data might have been biased as a result of the sample of
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women not being sufficiently representative (especial attention to be given to
Wajir).
The political climate in all districts was characterised by a certain level of
anxiety due to the KANU(KenyaAfrican Nationalist Union) district parliamentary
election (November 21st, 2002) and the imminent general election (December
zs", 2002). These factors, in turn, increased the insecurity situation in the study
areas, which asmentioned in section 5.1.3, was already a problem. Theseevents
influenced the mobility and availability, and probably perceptions of needsin the
communities visited. It should also be noted that the period of study in Wajir -
mostly a Muslim area- coincided with Ramadanand that somepart of West Pokot
respondentswere affected by somedegree of drunkenness.
In relation to the policy makers group, concerns could arise in relation to the
"truth" in mentioning the years of both policy and field experience. Given the
nature of the subject studied, which was hotly debated in the animal health
arena in Kenyaduring the period of the field research, PMmight have "inflated"
the answers.
Finally, with regard to data analysis, two factors might have influenced the
results obtained. First, it should be noted that it was the principal investigator
who performed the analysis. Biases might have occurred due to the lack of
another analyst opinion. However, analysis and calculations were performed
twice at least in order to limit this effect. Second, the coding of the qualities
and themes was dependent to the author's interpretation of the answers of the
questionnaires. Obtaining the code categories was facilitated by the structure of
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the questionnaire given that respondents had to define each of the stated the
qualities.
Having presented the overall results of the data collection, the next section
focuseson the discussionof the field research results.
5.4 Discussion
The organisation and discussionof the results will follow the structure previously
outlined in chapter 4, section 4.3.6. Thus, the next sections focus on the
selection processof CAHWs,and on the impact and sustainability of CAHsystems.
However, other factors mentioned in the framework outlined in section 4.3 for
evaluating CAHsystemswill inevitably overlap in the discussionsection (mainly
with accessto services, quality of servicesand financial resources).
5.4.1 Selection process
Two recurrent aspects likely to highly influence the selection of candidates refer
first, to the perceived 'ideal' qualities of workers and second, to the influence of
local politics in the selection process.Theseare discussedbelow.
5.~.1.1 'Ideal' auaitties
Several studies dealing with selection of community health workers have
attempted to correlate demographic characteristics (education, age, gender etc)
of the workers with their performance (Rifkin 1983; Rifkin, Muller and Bichmann
1988; Gagnon 1991). While these characteristics have to be considered when
selecting candidates, they might not be as important to the success of the
worker as their personality. In this field study, semi-structured interviews with
livestock keepers and community memberswere used to elicit the qualities and
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characteristics both groups believed were the most important. Respondents were
subsequently asked to rank these qualities in order of importance.
Studies conducted in the human health field relating to CHW have highlighted
"trust" as one of the main reasons for systems to be sustainable (Walt, Perera
and Heggenhougen 1989; Bennett, Creese and Monasch 1998; Voyle and Simmons
1999). Following the same lines, the present case study highlights "trust" as the
most desired quality in workers by community members (see table 19 below). In
view of the setting and context of the interviewed communities (such as
remoteness, insecurity, lack of infrastructure etc - refer: to section 5.1.3 for
more details) it is not difficult to understand why respondents mentioned in
addition to "trust" other qualities such as commitment and responsibility. Similar
qualities have also been put forward by. community members in other CAH
projects and geographical locations, such as Peru (CARE-Peru 2001) and Ghana
(Hanks, Oakeley, Opoku et al. 1999) .
Rank .QUALITY• PMGROUP QUAliTY- LKGROUP ,.
1 Literate Trustworthy
Trainablel Knowledgeable
2 Ethnic tol knowledge of the area Committed
3 Trustworthy Responsible
4 Available Knowledgeable
5 Commitment Literate
6'" Owning livestock Mobile
7 Social person Social person
8 Qualified Available
Community generated
Mobile
9 Ethical Owning livestock
Interface
10 Knowledge on ethnoveterinary Polite
medicine.
Table 19: Quality ranks for PMand LK groups
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•As seen in table 19, a gap exists between the desires and demands of the
ultimate consumersof the services, the livestock keepers in pastoral areas, and
the perceptions of the policy makers, being the ones to set the legal framework
for the criteria of candidate selection. This gapwas also put forward through the
Pearsoncorrelation analysis (in section 5.3.3).
It appears that there is a higher agreement in relation to the ideal qualities of
CAHWsamong policy makers than among districts. Taking into account that the
curriculum of CAHWshas recently been debated and drafted by the Kenyan
Veterinary Board (KVB) members (The-IDL-Group 2003), it seems logical that
policy makers tended to have more similar opinions concerning-CAHWsqualities.
Lower agreement among livestock keepers in the three districts might be due in
part to the existing geographical and cultural differences. But special attention
should be drawn towards the CAHproject organisational plan, which although
"business-oriented" in all three settings, greatly differed between districts,
hence might have influenced the needs and perceptions of the "ideal" CAHW.
Given the business orientation of such systems, it is useful to examine them
through a Williamsonian lens.
Yet, Williamson's analysis of 'trust' (1996) in the context of transaction
economics (see section 2.2.5) and governance (see section 3.3.3) applied to AH
systems is of special relevance for this field study. He classifies trust into three
categories, namely (i) calculative trust, (ii) hyphenated trust, and (iii) nearly
non-calculative trust.
In relation to the first category, he considers trust as a risk. He therefore quotes
Dasguptawho pointed out that "for trust to be developed between individuals
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they must have repeated encounters, and they must have some memory of
previous experiences. Moreover, for honesty to have potency as a concept there
must be some cost involved in honest behavior. And finally, trust is linked to
reputation, and reputation has to be acquired?" (Oasgpupta1988, in Williamson
1996). Hence, as put by Williamson, "risk entails exposure to probabilistic
outcomes"!'. Risk can thus be calculated by taking into account the following
variables: (i) the "range of possibleoutcomes and their associatedprobabilities",
(ii) the "cost-effective actions" that need to be taken in order to "mitigate
hazards and enhance benefits", (iii) proceeding with the transaction "only when
expected net gains can be projected", and (iv) when the largest net gain is
projected on the secondparty involved in the transaction.
Hence, taking Williamson's analytical approach to trust and transaction situations
in a CAHsystem context where a pastoralist (P) and a CAHW(C) are transacting
an output (0) (e.g. a service such as vaccination etc), the probabilistic equation
could be summarisedas it follows: 0= qP + (1-q)C (given the Agency implications
in such setting argued in section 3.2.2), where q is the probability of a good
outcome (i.e. that the transaction is made).
32 Page 259.
33 Page 259.
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p = price k = hazard s = safeguards
Node A" P1 0 0
Node B P2 K2 0
NodeC P3 K3 S3
Figure 11: Simple contract representation (adapted from Williamson 1996)
Following Williamson's rationale, node A does not imply any hazards so that
goods or services are swiftly provided and paid for. In that case trust is not
involv~d in the transaction. Node B, however, involves contractual hazards (k).
With the buyer not providing a safeguard (s=O), the break-even price is p2. In
Williamson's words, this scenario is considered as a 'low-trust' one. Node C does
also involve hazard (k3) but is backed up by a safeguard (s3). Break-even price in
that case is p3, which will logically be smaller than p2. Here the transaction is
therefore classified as a 'high-trust' one.
Regarding the second category, 'hyphenated trust', Williamson regards human
behavioural patterns as being embedded in the environment where actors
perform transacti,ons. Thus, "socialtzatton and social approvals and sanctions are
also pernnent?". Trading hazards are hence dependent not only on the risk
borne by the transaction itself, but also on the trading environment in which the
transaction takes place. In the case of CAH systems, no legal enforceable context
exists (yet). However, as with the example of diamond dealers provided by
Williamson (1996)35, societal sanctioning provides a framework to check on
opportunistic behaviour. However, he also argues that such type of sanctioning
may have negative effects over the efficacy of contract because it prevents
"strategic behaviour" , bribery is common so that "court enforcement is
34 Page 267.
35 Page 263.
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'"
problematic", and "individuals feel slight remorse when they behave in
opportunistic ways,,36.
Finally, 'nearly non-calculative trust' or 'personal trust' is viewed by Williamson
as the absence of calculativeness in actors performing a transaction.
Nonetheless, he pursues saying that "if however, the decision to suppress
calculativeness is itself purposive and calculative, then the true absence of
calculativeness is rare if not nonexistent?". He characterises personal trust by (i)
the "absence of monitoring", (ii) having "favourable or forgiving predilections",
and (iii) "dtscreetness?" (Williamson 1996).
Given the setting were CAHsystems exist, one might be inclined to think that
trust as perceived by community members would fall into the third category,
'nearly non-calculative' or 'personal' trust. However, Williamson's trust
classification is especially interesting when associated with that of 'governance
structures' (Williamson 1981) (i.e. 'internal spot market', 'primitive team',
'obligational market', 'relational team') under the governance of PAHC. Indeed,
the analysis in section 4.4.3 showed that CAH systems tend to be structured,
following Williamson's categorisation, as 'primitive teams'. When linking such
classification to that referring to contract law mechanisms (Williamson 1979) in
section 3.3.3 (i.e. classical, neoclassical, and relational), where CAHsystems in
pastoral areas were classified as a 'relational' contract type, it seems logical to
think' of the quality most mentioned by community members, 'trust', as
'calculative trust', thus viewing trust as risk and not as 'personal or non-
calculative trust' .
36 Page 268.
37 Page 272.
38 Page 273.
282
Indeed, it is even more meaningful when taking into account the economic
motivations behind the origins of CAHsystems and PAHCelaborated in section
4.2.1. It is whether the CAHsystem and the actors involved fall into node B or
node C that would affect more or less the sustainability of the CAHsystem (i.e.
with low-trust (B) the system is likely to be unsustainable, whereas with high-
trust (C) the system is likely to be more sustainable). In addition, the
environment where these transactions take place has no legal sanction
mechanismand is therefore based on societal sanctioning as stated above. This,
as already argued, might have detrimental effects over the effectiveness of the
contract between CAHWsand villagers.
Moving away from the debate over trust, it can be concluded from the results of
the field collection that PM highlighted technical qualities whereas LK valued
personal characteristics of the candidates. This is similar to Ruebush'sfindings.
Hence, sustainability of CAH systems might be undermined if community
members' desired qualities are not taken into account. In that case, although
technical quattttes are needed to perform the community health work,
community membersmight still not accept workers if personal characteristics are
not taken into account for the Williamsonian reasons above explored. Policy
makers quality preferences related mostly to "literacy", "knowledge/training on
animal health" and on "ethnicity". These preferences point out the wide gap
between communities and policy makers' wills in terms of qualities. This is of
most importance given that they are the ones influencing policy and legislation in
relation to community animal health. If CAHWs' qualities and guidelines for
selection are given exclusively following policy makers desires, it will not be
surprising to observea failure in the CAHsystemssustainability.
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Turning to LK desired qualities, "trust" and "commitment" remained the most
desired ones for both men and women, whereas "availability" was ranked 8th
(ranked 1st in Ruebush's). Different priorities were however given by both sub-
groups in relation to the subsequent qualities mentioned. Deriving from the
results, women preferred "personal" qualities in contrast to the more "practical"
ones required by men. This brings forward an important issue, which relates to
the way information is transmitted to community members by CAHWs.Given that
women are "with the animals most of the time", the interaction between CAHWs
and women is a key element in the planning of a CAHsystem. However, given
women's low recognition among most of the visited communities, their
interaction with (especially) men CAHWmight be severely hindered. Hence, this
might be one of the reasons why women tend to seek advice from their
neighboursor relatives, a finding that hasalso been pointed out in other studies
(e.g. GI-LSP 2003). This behaviour might have repercussions in terms of
information asymmetry, which as argued in section 2.2.5, is one of the prevailing
market failures in the rural and remote settings.
However, the way in which the CAHWcandidates are selected may influence the
sustainability of the system.
5.4.1.2 Influence of local politics
It is often mentioned, both in human and animal health, that influential
community members such as elders, wealthier community members, clans or
'kinships' are likely to lead to an unfair selection of workers (Ruebush_lI,Weller
and Klein 1994; IFAD2004).
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The results of the field research point out that the experiences from PMdid not
differ from the answers of LKwith regard to the way the selection of workers
was performed. It was markedly noted that, in most of the cases, elders or
opinion leaders and occasionally the authorities were those involved in the
selection of the candidates.
Their involvement in such processhas been largely debated in the human health
literature concerning community health workers. As mentioned by Twumasi,
"when a new idea [community-based health systems] is introduced into a local
community it should not be taken for granted that the idea will be readily
absorbed by the local system. The structure of local polittcs and interests need
to be taken into account. Traditional power holders are concerned with changes
occurring in their communities and are naturally concerned whether the new
idea will threaten their position or will erode their power" (Twumasi and Freund
1985). This conclusionwas basedon a study in Zambia on the selection processof
community health workers and referred to the finding that "[ ...] the councilor [in
Luampungu] regarded the CHW's role as a potentially powerful one and was
evident in his attempts to manageand manipulate the initial selection process.
Soonafter the District PHCCoordinator asked the Luampunguvillagers to select
people to be trained as CHWs, the councilor subverted the normal community
decision processand submitted a list of 12 people who, it was later discovered,
were all his close kinsmen" (Twumasiand Freund 1985).
Other studies in different countries have recorded similar problems in relation to
the existing conflict between local politics and the selection of community-based
health workers (as for example in Java (Williams and Satoto 1983), India (Bose
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1983)and Brazil (Macedoand Vieira 1983)). The conflict highlighted in Twumasi's
study in Zambia resulted mainly from the fact that the CHW'srole was new and
had not been properly institutionalised and legitimised by the local power
structure. The specific conflict areas centered around three issues,all related to
.political power, namely the authority to establish a "village health committee",
the control of resources (i.e. drugs), and the perceived political threat of the
CHW(Twumasiand Freund 1985).Most of the aforementioned findings follow the
same lines of the situation encountered in the three Kenyandistricts studied for
this research as stated by LKs' answers. Therefore, in order to improve the
selection process and increase its "fairness", opinion leaders and authorities
should limit their involvement.
Additionally, community members suggestedthat clear guidelines were needed.
Suchguidelines referred to, not only the qualities required, but most importantly
to the procedures that needed to be followed during the selection process.
Clearly stating such procedures, as well as making them available to all
community members would help limiting interference from village elders or
opinion leaders in the community.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that there was a high level of
concordance between PMon how CAHsystems should be modelled in order to
increase sustainability and quality of services. This structure is described below.
5.4.2 Impact and sustainability
Since the start of CAHsystemsin Kenya, concerns regarding their sustainability
have been raised. Lately, new perspectives taken in the planning process have
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been focusing on the sustainability of the systems, as when the NGOpulls out
CAHWstend to drop out.
The analysisof the semi-structured interviews showsthat both respondent groups
mentioned two main reasons for the workers to leave, hence undermining
system's sustainability. These were (i) lack of salary or profits and (ii) drug
availability. These findings follow the lines of Holden's study in 1997 (Holden
1997).
As debated in. section 4.4.2 (i.e. monitoring models and CAHW's behaviour),
these two reasonsfor system failure are closely related to the structure of the
system as well as to the monitoring models applied (i.e. perceived rewards and
feedback). Therefore, the discussionthat follows is organised along the lines of
the framework outlined in sections 4.4.2.1 and 4.4.2.2. Such framework needs
first to be adapted to the KenyanCAHcontext.
5.4.2.1 CAH system model in Kenya
Results from the semi-structured interviews performed with PM revealed that
there was agreement on a basic structure for CAHsystems. The organisational
. structure conceptualised by PM regarding CAH systems follows the same
principles stated in section 4.4.2 regarding CAHmodels.
Thus, PMargued CAHsystemsshould be organised through a structure whereby
the CAHW is linked either directly or indirectly, through an AHA, to the
veterinarian (private or government). It was argued by PMthat suchmodel would
ensure supervision, monitoring and supply of quality drugs to CAHWsin arid and
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semi-arid lands (ASAL)where veterinarians are generally not willing to work. On
the theoretical level, PM stated that supervision and monitoring would ensure
quality services (in terms of technical skills and drug supply) and a more accurate
knowledge of the (animal) diseasestatus of these areas.
These findings therefore show the willingness of policy makers to create a
consistent CAH system. In addition to the aforementioned set of specific
selection criteria and process guidelines, such model could provide the basic
structure for a nation wide system of community animal health. This is stated in
the recently created curriculum for CAHWsin Kenya (KVB2003).
However, the CAHsystems targeted in the field study were those including in
their planning processan exit strategy, thus labelled as "businessoriented" CAH
systems.The term 'exit strategy' refers to the sustainability component, not only
in terms of economic viability, but especially financial sustainability (as referred
to in section 4.3.5). These aspects are highly intertwined with the monitoring
system as previously outlined. Hence, the KenyanCAHsystems reviewed during
the fieldwork are discussedfollowing the framework exposedin section 4.4.2.
5.4.2.2 Systemmonitoring
Community-basedworkers' motivation and work performance in pastoral settings
may be affected by a complex set of factors. These include individual
capabilities and skills, the need for growth, rewards and feedback associatedand
the work environment. As outlined in section 4.4.2, the work environment for
CAHWsis the community and not a facility where the worker is in daily contact
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with the AHS. Indeed, CAHWsspendmost of their time in the community relating
to clients (in their own homesor villages).
Rewardsperceived by CAHWswill therefore be highly entangled with those of the
members of the local community, that is, those to whom the CAHWprovides
services. Following Robinson's framework (see section 4.4.2.1), intrinsic
rewards such as social status or recognition would be an important motivation
for the community worker. Indeed, results from the semi-structured interviews
show that PMconsidered "social status" or "government recognition" the second
incentive (after the economic incentive, discussedbelow) for CAHWsto continue
working (46.4%).Similarly, LK answers tended to put forward "accreditation" as
a meansto recognise the training received by CAHWs,thus also relating to social
status differentiation.
Nevertheless, extrinsic rewards were given more importance in terms of criteria
undermining the system's long-term financial sustainability. Extrinsic rewards
mostly referred to economic incentives such as salary, payments in kind, or
increased arnentttes. These answers were put forward by both respondent
groups. In particular, lack of earningswas considered the first reasonwhy CAHWs
tended to leave their community work activities.
It is however important to link these findings to the suggestionsof LK. Results
from the questionnaires show that the LK group in each of the three districts
mentioned that an incentive for CAHWsto continue working would be that they
receive a salary from the government, an NGOor a combination of both. Such
statements have the implicit meaning that service usersare not expecting to pay
for the services received. This is corroborated by results of PMquestionnaires
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were lack of payment by service users (i.e. livestock keepers) was mentioned as
a reason for CAHsystem failure. In effect, most of the community members and
livestock keepers' suggestionson how to improve the system (as seen from the
results) related to passivereception of goodsor services. Such lack of pro-active
behaviour by service end usersmay have important implications for the financial
sustainability of CAHsystems. Especially given that the areas covered during the
field research targeted "businessoriented" CAHinitiatives.
The lack of pro-active behaviour of service users may have several origins.
However, in the context of pastoral Kenya, it may well relate to the fact that
during the colonial period most services (including animal health) were publicly
provided and delivered through government structures. This does not mean that
previously the system was neither more efficient nor more effective than the
newly implemented market-based perspective. Nonetheless it gave community
members an incentive to behave as passive recipients of services, given that
serviceswere expected to be free of charge.
A similar passivebehavioural pattern from service recipients can be found in the
literature, mostly in relation to transition countries in eastern Europe (Saltman
1998). Although settings and political contexts greatly differ, the common
feature ts the fact of relying on government as a supreme structure looking after
its citizens needs.This led to an increasingly passiveconsumerbehaviour limiting
or undermining market liberalisation. In order to obtain sustainable market
oriented CAHsystems,community membersshould have a pro-active behaviour.
Still under the umbrella of extrinsic rewards, delayed payment was also put
forward by LK and PM as an important cause for economic viability failure.
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Indeed, even when service end usersare willing to pay for CAHWs'services, they
might not have the ATP.This finding links to the debate elaborated in chapter 2,
section 2.4 regarding public provision of private goods, and the equity section
(4.3.1) in chapter 4. Delayed payment, and to some extent payment in kind,
have the consequence of disrupting the cash flow of CAH systems, which, as
outlined in section 4.3.5, is mainly based on the margins earned through drug
selling. In addition, the physical lack of drugs was also recognisedas one of the
reasons for system failure. Similar problems have also been put forward in the
human health literature (see for example Abel-Smith and Rawal 1992). This is
debated later in this section under "instrumental feedback".
Indeed, when relating to the market failures outlined in section 2.2.5, it could be
argued that in the context of Kenyanpastoral areas most of these are present.
Especially, if AH services are available, they are delivered by one service
provider, hence incurring monopoly. In addition, market forces function only
when there is enough aggregated demand. It could be claimed that given the
remoteness of these locations and the nomadic nature of its inhabitants, it is
difficult to attain enough demand. Suchmarket failures were distinctively more
prominent in Wajir and especially Marsabit districts. West Pokot, probably due to
its geographical characteristics and smaller dimension of the district, was more
economically active than the two other visited locations (see annex 4 where
districts are described). In addition, lack of basic infrastructure suchas roadsand
the high level of insecurity work against the establishment of a market economy
in these areas.
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When turning to the feedback component of monitoring systems,asmentioned in
section 4.4.2.2 two factors may influence the sustainability of the CAHsystem.
Theseare human feedback and instrumental feedback.
First, human feedback, in terms of CAHWsupervision, is essential not only for
the workers' motivation, but also, and most importantly, for improving quality of
services provided. Indeed, results show that both groups (but especially LK)
highlighted "supervision" and "refresher or training courses" in their responses.
Although answersare similar between groups, the underlying reasonsfor bringing
forward the topic may havedifferent origins.
On the one hand, PMmay well consider supervision important, as it would give a
means for them to exert their power over technical staff. Following this
argument, the debate and contradictory opinions amongst PMregarding the tasks
CAHWsshould perform would corroborate these lines of reasoning. Hence, results
show that some PM argued CAHWsshould only focus on disease surveillance
(preventive medicine in general) and reporting, leaving clinical treatments to
"qualified personnel" suchasAHAsor veterinarians. Thus, clinical treatments are
still perceived as the main sourceof income for the veterinarian. This debate has
also been put forward in the human health literature at the beginning of the
implementation of community-based health programmes in the early 1980s.
Findings such as "the paramedical staff kept a distance from the CHW
programme" (Sauerborn, Nougtara and Diesfeld 1989) have been pointed out in
the human health literature. In addition, Nichter (1986) and Chabot and
Bremmers (1988) have also reported conflicting interests of nurses and doctors
with the emerging roles of CHWs.The lack of referral between nursesand CHWs
292
has been generally used as an indicator of this role conflict in the human health
field.
On the other hand, LK did also put forward the need to increase the number
and/or frequency of refresher coursesfor CAHWs.Understandably, such demand
may be related to improving the quality and variety of services provided to
community members. However, it could be argued that, given that CAHWsderive
their earnings from drug selling and provision of services, by improving their
knowledge they could increase the services provided, assumingthat community
memberswould have enoughATPand WTP. Hence, CAHWs'earningswould rise.
Such economic benefits may motivate the community worker to become more
independent vis-a-vis the monitoring system and may give rise to opportunistic
behaviour.
This behaviour is closely linked to Arrow's agency theory mentioned in section
3.2.2. Hence, attention should be drawn to the power relationships existing
within the systemand how they could affect animal and public health outcomes.
The relation existing between healthcare service providers and the client in the
private sector setting whereby the client paysa fee to the private provider for a
specific service has been extensively analysed in the literature (Arrow 1985). In
market-based CAHsystems, the private provider is the CAHWand the client is
the livestock keeper. Given the information asymmetry existing between the
client and the animal healthcare provider, the latter (especially in a private
sector setting) is interested in increasing his/her earnings (as it is their source of
livelihood). Two main consequencesderive from this behaviour. First, giving
information on preventive medicine to clients (livestock keepers) contradicts
CAHWs'economic interests, as there will have lesscasesof disease.Thus there is
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no economic reward for CAHWs to improve this specific service. Second,
following a similar reasoning, public health extension does not translate into
economic benefits. Thus, should these components of the CAHWcurriculum be
strengthened, more attention should be drawn towards the aforementioned
intrinsic rewards.
Hiding information in order to provide excessive treatment is referred to in the
literature as provider moral hazard if it is not legal or permitted (debated in
section 2.2.5). ~he latter is therefore highly intertwined with the funding
sources, as debated in chapter 3. Moral hazard in the case of animal diseases
exclusively, may have only economic consequences,thought they might be high
enough to bring the attention of the national and international community (e.g.
FMDoutbreak). Nevertheless, provider moral hazard in community-based systems
may have important public health implications should the diseasebe of zoonotic
nature. This has been the case lately in some Asian countries with AI, namely
Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia.
Second, instrumental feedback,as mentioned in section 4.4.2.2, refers mainly
to drug supply. Results obtained from the semi-structured interviews point out
that both respondent groupswere concerned with the availability and quality of
drugs provided and, ctosely related, the existence of black markets in the study
areas.
Thesesamepoints havealready been put forward in the human health literature.
Thus, PM raised concerns about the existence of (drug) black market in these
areas qualifying it a "threat" to CAH systems. In the human health field,
Sringernyuang, Hongvivatana and Pradabmuk (1995) pointed out that the
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"abundance and easyavailability of drugs in the villages constitutes an extremely
unsuitable environment for the enhancement of appropriate drug use by
consumers". Although contexts are different, it could be argued that public
health implications of drugs misuse may translate into, for example, human
antibiotic resistance (e.g. through antibiotic residues in meat or milk products).
In addition, semi-structured interviews pointed out that community membershad
limited knowledge on the use of drugs. As a consequence,veterinary drugswere
reported to be used in the human context (one of the interviewees mentioned
animal "eye droptets'"? usedin the humancontext).
Solutions proposed within the PMgroup in order to overcome the drug quality
and monitoring problem seemedhowever fairly opposed. On the one hand, it was
mentioned that the problem could be solved by creating a drug inspectorate and
by enforcing the law. On the other hand, proposals such as liberalisation of the
market to create more competition to enhance the effectiveness of the system
were suggested. Following these lines, community members saw a competitive
advantage in these quacks or illegal drug sellers. Hence community members
suggestedquacksshould be trained to become CAHWsas they already have their
drug supplier network, thus making the system more likely to be sustainable.
Experiences in other African countries, especially in francophone Africa,
corroborate this opinion (SalehandMamis 1999). Arguably, however, free market
competition is not always synonymousof enhanced effectiveness (Stiglitz 2000)
as mentioned in the economic analysis chapter. This holds especially true when
public health consequencesderive from drug misusein both sectors.
39 Wilson Chekeruk, personal communication, 2002 (Sigor, West Pokot, Kenya).
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The findings show the important gap existing especially within the policy makers
group. This relates not only to the proposed solutions for reducing black market
presence in those areas, but also to the advantages illegal drug sellers could
represent for the system's sustainability (asmentioned by community members).
Different opinions within the same group illustrate the controversy surrounding
CAHsystemsin the Kenyancontext. Suchdisagreements and reluctance of some
members of the veterinary profession are similar to those recorded in the human
health sector asmentioned in section 4.4.1.
However, it is also important to note that most respondents in the PMgroup
raised concerns regarding the role of CAH systems within the Kenyan animal
health structure. They especially pointed out concerns about the implications
such systemsmight have in terms of international or regional trade in livestock
and derived products under the context of WTOsanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS)
standards. Concernsregarding the SPSagreement and the livestock sector will be
debated in the discussionchapter (section 6.2.4).
Having discussed the results of the Kenyan case study in terms of selection
process and sustainability of CAHsystems, the next section brings forward the
conclusionsof the field data collection.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the human resource component of community-based
delivery systems in the AH field. The analysis was based on a field research
performed in Kenyan arid and semi-arid lands. The research methodology
followed the lines of a previous study in the human health sector on community
malaria workers in Guatemala. The aims were to compare the opinions of
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community members and policy makers regarding the perceived "ideal" qualities
of community basedanimal health workers and to explore the factors influencing
CAHsystemssustainability.
The results have shown that important similarities exist between human and
animal health settings with regard to the perceived "ideal" qualities of
community workers. Hence, "trust" appears to be the most desired quality by
community members when selecting CAHWcandidates. The meaning of "trust"
has been debated following Williamson's rationale and it has been concluded
that it is the calculative type of trust. The implications of calculative trust have
been pointed out in the context of CAHsystemsperformance.
Sustainability of CAH systems has been analysed following the framework
elaborated in section 4.4.2. The types of incentives and rewards embedded in
CAHsystems have been brought forward. For community-based systems to be
sustainable, the desires of communities need to be taken into account. Hence,
selection procedures are also important when targeting sustainability. Defining
clear guidelines is seen as essential for the fairness of the process. In addition,
interference with the selection processfrom elders of community leaders should
be avoided.
It needs to be pointed out that the field research shed light over a crucial area in
the animal health arena. This relates to role of the quality and availability of
animal health goods, in that case drugs. Thus, although all the aspects analysed
during the field research are crucial to the functioning of community-based
systems, these two qualities were reiteratively pointed out as problems during
the questionnaires in the rural communities.
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The next chapter will discuss the policy implications associated to the findings in
the previous sections. It will also draw the conclusions and recommendations of
the thesis.
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6 Discussionsand conclusions
6. 1 Introduction
6.1.1 Background
Building on the analysis performed in previous sections, this chapter debates the
policy and development implications associated to animal health. It puts AHS
within a broader context and discussesthe rationale behind focusing on animal
health. Under the public health umbrella, animal health systems, their role and
whether and how they could be financed are examined following Pearce's
environmental economics lens. In order to facilitate the flow of this discussion
chapter, a synthesis of each of the previous chapters is provided. In addition,
each of the objectives of the thesis is matched to discussionsections 6.2, 6.3 and
6.4.
The first objective of the thesis, which was to demonstrate the usefulness of
applying a new perspective in the economic analysis of animal health systems,
has been addressedin chapter 2. The chapter describes the economic rationale
used by international institutions such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund during the structural adjustment programme undertaken in SSA,
and how it affected AHS.The analysis.shows that the standpoint taken for SAP
followed Samuelson'srivalry and excludability principles. Countries proceeded to
privatise those AH services and activities deemed private under Samuelson's
classification of goodsand services. However, not enough attention was given to
the existence of market failures in the AHmarket, especially in rural and remote
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contexts. Yet, the literature suggests that the outcome of SAP has not reached
the expected effectiveness and efficiency improvements in the delivery of AHS.
It is especially the case in pastoral areas. Indeed, following Stiglitz's arguments,
market failure seems to be complete in rural and remote areas. Hence, there is a
rationale for government intervention. However, it has also been argued in the
literature (e.g. Stiglitz) that public failure exists. This is discussed later in this
chapter in section 6.2 in relation to AHS. The debate takes a public choice
approach potnting out that government failure in combination with SAP have
contributed to the weakening of AHS in most developing countries.
At the same time as AHS are deteriorating, there is a trend towards increased
animal production, particularly in developing countries. IFPRI estimates have
shown that meat and milk production in 2020 will be 40% and 60% higher,
respectively, that in the 1990s. This trend is particularly acute in Asia. The public
health consequences are currently increasing because of the spread of zoonotic
and emerging diseases associated to increased animal production (e.g. AI and
SARS). Consequently, the need to strengthen these AH structures has been
stressed. One way of attaining this is through increasing their financial resources,
cut back by adjustment programmes. The second objective of the thesis is
discussed in chapter 3 that describes the existing structures and components of
AHS, as well as their associated funding mechanisms. The chapter draws on
Musgrave's ~ublic finance theory. Additionally, the chapter includes the results
obtained from a thorough review of the scarce literature in the animal health
sector and a questionnaire administered in Senegal. A comparison with human
health system's organisation and funding strategies is elaborated through Murray
and Frenk's definition of 'health action'. Whereas AHS in developed countries
tend to be organised as a separate authority from governmental structures
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although closely linked, developing countries' AHS are articulated within the
ministry of agriculture or the ministry of health. The chapter points out that
emerging and re-emerging zoonotic diseasesare difficult matters to tackle as
they lie between the agricultural and health sectors (e.g. BSE in the UK).
Generally, weak linkagesexist between the ministries of agriculture or livestock,
ministry of health and, most importantly, with the ministry of finance.
Consequently, little attention is given to such diseases,which in most casesare
preventable. Emphasis is thus given to Williamson's theories of governance
related to delivery and funding. In the current chapter (6) the financing debate is
brought forward to find options on how to cope financially with such diseasesat
supranational level. A discussion over financing for animal health funds is
elaborated in section 6.3, where four options are debated, namely (i) risk and
private sector finance, (ii) modifying the flow of private funds, (iii) financial
incentives for private sector financing, and (iv) market creation and regulation
(seebelow in sections6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3, 6.3.4).
The third objective of the thesis focuses on AH service delivery mechanismsand
is explored in chapter 4. Community-basedsystemswere chosen as an example
of AH schemes given the similarities with the human health counterpart. This
chapter describes and compares the different origins of community-based human
and animal health systems. It points out that PHCwas driven by international
concern about diminishing resources and the concept of "health as a right".
Conversely, in the animal health counterpart, the increase in CAHsystems that
led to the creation of the PAHCapproach was driven by economic forces. The
lack of institutional framework in which CAHsystems have burgeoned from the
1970s contrasts, with the apparent top-down institutional approach of most
community-based health structures implemented under the PHCinitiative during
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the same time period. The two systems (animal and human) seem however to
converge. Economicforces (suchas the SPSagreement) point out the necessityof
an institutional framework where CAH systems would be linked to a national
structure. Conversely, financial sustainability issues have put into question the
top-down approach to PHC.Given the economic-driven need for integrating CAH
systemsinto a wider national animal health structure, a framework is developed
in order to guide their scaling up. Equity, efficiency, access, quality of services,
and financial and human resources are debated in this chapter with regard to
CAH systems. However, the last of the criteria, human resources, is more
extensively elaborated in chapter 5, hence addressingthe fourth objective of the
thesis.
6.1.2 Organisation of the chapter
In section 6.2, Stiglitz's framework of analysis is again used such as in chapter 2
section 2.2.5, but this time to analyse public failure, that is the reasonswhy
certain decisions at governmental level are not taken up when they are
seemingly welfare maximising. Section 6.3 recalls chapter 3 and debates the
funding opportunities at international level to cope with transboundary animal
diseases. This section follows Pearce's rationale in environmental economics.
Section 6.4, while linking to chapters 4 and 5, brings together the need for
bridging national and community -based strategies. Finally section 6.5 presents
the conclusionsof the thesis and the research needsin the area.
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6.2 Public failure as a cause for increasing public health
threats from animal origin
As outlined in the introduction section (U) Schatz stated that it is a "basic
misconception that Africa's economic stagnation is poor government
performance". Following the lines of the debate in section 2.4, "development
requires reform rather than rejection of states' efforts to improve upon the
functioning of the free market" (Schatz 1996). Schatz stated that "perhaps a
cumulative process will occur. If modest improvements could be achieved in
genuine development assistanceprogrammes, this might enhance the influence
of productive entrepreneurs, who would in turn support those persisting forces
that favour constructive government intervention" (Schatz 1996). Along those
lines, Helleiner (1992) pointed out that "in [...] Africa, where critical early
investments must be undertaken by government (in education, health and
infrastructure), where confidence in government has been shattered and where
much of the relevant private decision making is done by peasant farmers, the
first step has normally been to restore some public investment, generate some
early growth, and restore some government credibility" (Helleiner 1992). Not
only this quote points out the need for government support but most importantly
it puts farmers at the centre of the decision making process. As opposed to the
New Classical Economics school, the New Keynesians Economics searches to
adapt micro theory to macro theory (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1987). Adapting to
the rural setting this would mean linking farmers in rural areas to the national
economy. Indeed, Stiglitz emphasises that "focus should be given to
microeconomics in developing countries" and to the theory of rural as well as
industrial organisation (Stiglitz 1989).
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It logically follows that one major element of this school of thought is the study
of imperfect information and incomplete markets (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1987).
Still linking to the debate in section 2.4, Greenwald and Stiglitz pointed out that
"while new and old Keynesianswould disagree upon the exact form of their
policy recommendations, they would agree generally that government
intervention is at least sometimes (many would argue frequently) desirable to
stabilize the level of economic activity" (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993).
However, although government intervention is desirable to a certain extent, it is
difficult to understand why those measures taken to overcome market failures
are not as effective as they should be. This links to the debate elaborated in
chapter 2 section 2.2.4 regarding the public choice perspective of the thesis.
Following Wiseman's (1960) lines, Stiglitz (1989, 2002) criticises Musgrave's
(1959) approach to those failures arising within government structures. As
mentioned by Wiseman "at the analytical level, Musgrave seems to identify
'democracy' with 'maximization of economic welfare' in the technical case"
(Wiseman 1960). However, "not all economists will be as willing asMusgraveto
accept that welfare economics can provide unambiguous guidance for public
policy. The development of the second-best propositions has made clear the
general vulnerability of policy statements derived from welfare analysis" (Stern
2002).
Along those lines, Stiglitz debates the limitations of the market failure approach
when addressinggovernment structures (Stiglitz 2002). UsingStiglitz's words, "it
is now recognized that market failures are pervasive - markets do not result in
(constrained) Pareto efficient outcomes whenever markets are incomplete or
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information is imperfect, that is, always" (Stiglitz 2000) (emphasisby the original
author). There is therefore not enough information for governments to be guided
in their decisions on how to intervene. This has been pointed out in the
environmental economics arena (Pearce 1995) and holds especially true for AHS
in the case of transboundary animal diseasessuch as AI (with public health and
economics implications) or FMD (with economic implications). The limitations
are: (i) "government failures", and (ii) not adopting "seemingly Pareto improving
reforms". These will be debated within the context of animal health and
zoonotic disease spread. The justification is based on the similarities drawn in
section 4.3.2.2 between transboundary air pollution and transboundary animal
diseases,which include zoonotic diseases.
6.2.1 Government failures
Market failures have been extensively analyzed in several disciplines and have
been applied to the AHSin section 2.2.5. However, "much of the analysis of
public failures remains at an unsophisticated level" (Stiglitz 2002). Somedebate
over public failures hasalready been pointed out in section 2.2.4. Adding to that
debate, advances have been made in the understanding of the need for
collective action for example in order to cope with the free rider problem. This
refers back to the analysis elaborated on the classification of goods in section
2.3.1. Examples in the AHSwould include vaccination campaigns (whereby the
farmer decides not to vaccinate due to the positive externalities arising from
neighbouring farmers vaccinating their herds) or compulsory slaughter
compensation (where when there is no accurate censusof the number of animals
held by farmers, these are likely to inflate the real number in order to receive
higher compensation, as happened in Vietnam during the AI outbreak). However,
Pearce's rationale in environmental economics is useful when talking about
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transboundary problems. He mentions that one of the economic failures causing
environmental loss is the "global appropriation failure" (Pearce 1995). What he
highlights is the existence of missing markets in the environmental arena. The
samehasbeen pointed out in section 2.2.5 in the caseof AHmarkets. Noobvious
mechanism exists to capture the value of functions such as the control of
transboundary animal diseases (although CBAshave already been debated in
sections 2.3.1.2, 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.5.1).
Nonetheless, if governments have to tackle such situations they should be given
powers that need to be bigger than that of private organisations or individuals.
An example is the collection an earmarked tax to finance the compensation
scheme to control AI in Vietnam (Riviere-Cinnamond 2005) (other examples
would include the schemesexposed in section 3.4.3). At the same time, actions
need to be taken to control such power governments might have, so that they do
not incur abuse (e.g. misuseor corruption). However, these constraints may also
in turn limit governments' span of action. In addition, a particular feature of
governments is that when they enforce contracts with private parties, they
cannot ensure that- commitment will continue when the next government comes
into power.
Finally, following Stiglitz's reasoning, "public failures may be a consequenceof
inherent limitations of government" nonetheless, there is still scope for some
degree of rectification. Such rectification may take the form of increased
competition through quasi-market based mechanisms. Examples of such
mechanismsapplied in the AHShave been described in section 3.4. Nevertheless,
at the extreme of increased competition is the privatisation of certain public
sector activities. Following Laffont "privatization of public firms creates an
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asymmetry of information between the political power and the firm which makes
more difficult the pursuit of those private agendas[within public structures] and
whieh can then benefit citizens" (Laffont 2002). However, "the conditions under
which privatisation adequately resolves problems of public interest are closely
parallel to those of the fundamental theorems of welfare economies, e.g. no
externalities, complete markets, and perfect information" (Stiglitz 2002).
Stiglitz, though, insists on the need to continue searching for methods to improve
performance within the public sector on both theoretical and practical grounds
(Stiglitz 2002).
6.2.2 Adoption of Pareto improving reforms
It has already been shown that governments sometimes do not adopt reforms
that are "seemingly Pareto improving" (Stiglitz 1998).Oneof the reasonsappears
to be the presenceof interest groups at governmental level that affect the long
run prospects of reforms. Exampleswhere these interest groups have exerted
power have already been pointed out in the thesis (see the debate over
regulatory capture in sections 2.2.4, 2.3.1.2, 3.3.2 and 3.4.3.3). In addition,
when analysing the case of community-based service delivery in both human and
animal health, it has been shown that medical and veterinary professionalshave
tended to be reluctant to accept community workers (see sections 4.4.1 and
5.4.2.2). Along those lines but at another level, the debate surrounding the
reform of the European Common Agricultural Poliey (CAP) regarding farm
subsidies would be an appropriate example of interest groups hindering the
adoption of Pareto improving reforms. Such behaviour translates into market
distortions (due to subsidies), inequities (as the subsidiestend to reach wealthier
farmers) and environmental problems (as it tends to promote production
systems' intensification) (Stiglitz 2002). Pearce (1995) adds to the debate of
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"intervention failure" by bringing forward examples in environmental economics,
which have worsened initial conditions (e.g. subsidies to forest conversion for
livestock in Brazil up to the end of the 1980s). Similarly, the example of the
Vietnamese emergency compensation strategy represents an example of a
government failure. The initial compensation measures promoted the spread AI
given that compensation levels varied between Vietnamese provinces (implying
movement of animals between provinces, thus spreading the disease) (Riviere-
Cinnamond2005).
This section hasdebated the role of public failure in the increase of public health
treats from animal origin. It has pomted out that further attention needs to be
given to research on this area. Nonetheless, preventing the occurrence of such
diseases needs to be addressed and this implies finding funds. Given the
similarities brought forward throughout the thesis with the environmental
economicsarena, the next section will discussa possible framework for financing
emerging and zoonotic disease(i.e. transboundary) prevention adapting from the
environmental economics literature. The debate will be based on the examples
presented in chapter 3 regarding funding mechanisms.
6.3 Financing for animal health funds
In 1997Pearcedebated the different mechanismsthat would be available to fund
for environmental conservation (Pearce 1997). Linking to the above discussion
regarding the role of government in trying to solve market failures and the
similarities put forward throughout the thesis with environmental economics (see
sections 2.3.1, 2.3.1.2, 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2), this section presents the possible
mechanismsthat could be usedto finance animal health.
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One of the reasons given in environmental economics to explain why global
incentives to finance biodiversity conservation have tended to fail is that
"international environmental agreements seeking to conserveglobal public goods
have an in-built instability because of their failure to account more readily for
the role that has to be played by mutual economic incentive systems" (Pearce
1997). In the animal health arena however economic incentives exist
internationally to control transboundary animal diseases (TAOs). The earliest
example of such international willingness to control TAOswas the creation of the
OlE in 1924 (OlE 1924), hence much earlier than for example WHOor FAO.The
OlEmandate was enacted and ratified by 27 countries in order to control major
TAOsthat undermined trade at the beginning of the twentieth century. As with
most preventive measures,once OlE reached the aim of controlling several TAOs
important in trade terms, its role was reduced to monitoring. However, animal
production intensification, new technologies in food industry processing and
increased international trade of animal and derived products within the WTO
context have revamped OlE's mandate. Returns to controlling and preventing
animal diseasespread, including zoonoses,were put forward at the beginning of
the twentieth century and the same rationale is used nowadaysat the beginning
of the twenty first, even enhanced as it is an even bigger global scale with the
possibility of world wide implications.
However, it is obvious that depending on the nature of each of the diseasesthe
degree of 'publicness' debated in section 2.3 will vary. Thus, somediseaseswill
have features of 'localness' as put by Pearce (1997) in environmental terms given
that they will be more rival and excludable than others. However, SARS,AI or
arguably BSEwould be caseswith a bigger global public goodcomponent. Finally,
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even if there is a strong level of public good characteristic as it is the caseof AI,
the willingness to pay of stakeholders is likely to vary widely.
Pearce mentioned that a "Hume-Smith approach to global environmental
problems would suggest that the role of governments in solving such problems
should be confined to setting a framework and then leaving the parties to
negotiate the 'global bargains' in a context of mutual self-interest" (Pearce
1997). The same reasoning could be applied in the animal health arena. The
underlying idea is therefore to move away from a Pigouvian command and
control view of government's role towards a Smithian vision of market creation,
whilst bearing in mind that individuals act within a social context as exposed in
sections 5.4.1.1.
Drawing from Pearce's reasoning, the following options are debated to fund for
animal health: (i) risk and private sector finances, (ii) modifying the flow of
\
private, funds, (iii) financial incentives for private sector financing, and (iv)
market creation and regulation.
6.3.1 Risk and private sector finance .
Following a Smithian reasoning, there is a need to reduce the reliance on central
government finances. Pearce points out in the context of environmental
economics two main challenges faced when dealing with sustainable financing:
(i) directing aid flows towards countries where sustainable development
problems are greatest, and (ii) modifying how funds are channelled, thus making
them more consistent with sustainable development goals (Pearce 1997). These
lines of thinking draw some similarities with Stiglitz's when he mentioned that
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"borrowing has a greater impact at the beginning of [developing countries']
learning curves" (Stiglitz 1989).
In the first case, however, such flows will be confronted generally with high risks
for private markets, which as Pearce (1997) points out, could be diminished by
increasing information (also debated in section 6.1.1 along Stiglitz's lines). The
degree of market liberalisation would be an important factor in investment
decision taking. As pointed out by Pearce, although SAP have been largely
criticised (see also the introduction chapter section U), it does not seem
pragmatic to foresee private sector investment in a developing country where
protectionism and distorting policies hinder markets. In addition, political
instability in somedeveloping countries still remains an important private sector
deterrent.
International organisations might help in the role of reducing this risk for the
private sector. An enhanced risk-taking context might help influencing the
direction of private investment. Underwriting these risks might take several
forms varying from providing insider information for the private sector (as these
are a considerable barrier for private investment) to financial guarantees should
private sector agree to financial investment "over and above what conventional
risk appraisal would consider the norm for that country" (Pearce 1997). An
advantage of this approach is that it can be country selective (Pearce1997), thus
these mechanisms could be targeted to undertake development activities in
African countries when the focus is poverty reduction, and to Asian countries
when the objective is also to reduce public health hazards associated with
livestock production intensification.
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6.3.2 Modifying the flow of private funds
In the second case, modifying the nature of private funds' flow is related to
targeting the "proper" context for technology transfer. With regard to the latter,
community-based workers and their role as a health technology tool has been
debated in section 4.3.2 (i.e. 'selective' and 'comprehensive' PHC). If they were
seen as an animal health technology tool, the options presented below would
apply to the PAHCapproach.
Similarly, in Asian countries production intensification is related to improved
technology. However, technology transfer needs to take into account those
problems that may arise, which range from environmental pollution (animal
waste) to public health (e.g. increase of vector borne diseasesdue to the need of
water reserves or increased incidence of cysticercosis because of lack of food
safety inspectors). Changes in private investment in the animal health and
production sector might be influenced:
(i) By the evolution of markets, particularly due to consumers' pressures
(mainly in importing developed countries). Governmentscan facilitate this option
through market-based instruments such as taxes, user chargesor tradable quotas
(following Pearce, as a prerequisite, prevailing subsidies must be removed).
However, political interference is likely to arise with this option (e.g. regulatory
capture - sections 2.2.4, 2.3.1.2, 3.3.2 and 3.4.3.3). This has already been
pointed out by Kempin the contexts to environmental economics (Kemp1997);
(ii) By information programmes which would increase private sector's
financial benefits through the adoption of technologies conveying animal/public
health prevention and/or with poverty reduction potential;
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(iii) Through financing mechanismsthat effectively compensateprivate sector
investment for what remains a higher cost than otherwise would have been
should another technology had been used.
The last two options require the role of governments, international organisations
and NGOsas information and financial sources.Given that private sector seeksto
increase returns on investments, it is not to be expected that it would voluntarily
adhere to such options. Consumersneed to accept that they will have to pay for
the adoption of such technologies. In the case of environmental sustainability,
the Global En.vironmental Fund (GEF)was created with the aim to take into
account such "incremental costs" which convey certain degree of publicness
(e.g. infrastructure etc.). As highlighted by Pearce (1997), private investors "are
there to make an acceptable return to their shareholders. If the world in general
wants those investments to meet some sustainability objective, the world must
be prepared to pay the private sector for costs it otherwise have no incentive to
meet". The concept of incremental cost funding from private sector may be
more interesting when dealing with bilateral agreements as benefits could be
localised (as opposed to multilateral agreements which would seek global
objectives). Following Pearce's lines, what is suggestedis that somebilateral aid
is earmarked for topping up private investment so as to secure localised private
investment. This would allow for the funding of "free rider" goods such as
infrastructure or communications.
A similar reasoning may apply to the animal health sector. Consumers are
increasingly asking for safer products. Such demand translates in the private
sector into new technologies and measures applied along the food chain to
ascertain that food products from animal origin are safe. This move implies
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investments, which translate into higher prices for consumers. In developed
countries where the legal framework allows governments to act through indirect
regulation vis-a-vis food producers and processors (through tort liability laws
which translate into self-regulation and certification measures in food
companies) compliance with increasingly tight food safety and animal health
standards may be borne by industries, and subsequently by consumers (Riviere-
Cinnamond, Paschali and Wells 2005). However, due to the indirect regulation
approach, companies are allowed to search for the most cost-effective
technologies in order to comply with the national food safety standards.
Conversely, in developing countries where the legal enforcement framework
tends to be weak, government control over food safety and animal health (if at
all) tends to be direct regulation. This implies that food processors have to
implement specific technologies without being able to choose a more cost-
effective method. This translates into higher costs for the government (as it has
to perform the monitoring activities) and for the companies (as they it is
compulsory for them to implement a specific technology) (Riviere-Cinnamond,
Paschali and Wells 2005). In developing countries (as well as in developed)
regional bodies are seeking to harmonise animal health (especially important in
the case of TAOs) and food safety standards (e.g. UEMOA40, SAOC41,CAN42,
MERCOSUR43). In such cases, earmarking funds to finance these regional
initiatives would follow Pearce's reasoning and allow securing localised private
sector investment.
40 Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest-Africaine.
41 Southern Africa Development Community.
42 Comunidad Andina.
43 Mercado del Cornun del Sur.
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6.3.3 Financial incentives for private sector financing
In the specific context associated to the animal health-public health interface,
market forces do also apply. However, asmentioned by Pearce in the context of
'environmental markets', provision of incentives through proper pricing of
"environmentally bad" technologies may be a way to enhance this market
(Pearce 1995; Pearce 1997). Such policies refer mainly to taxes or subsidies to
the private sector (see chapter 3 regarding existing taxes associated to animal
health in section 3.4). As well meaning as these interventions may be, they
should be carefully examined given that they might have pervasive
consequences.An example refers to the subsidy for intensification of agricultural
and livestock production in the EuropeanUnion. Consumers' concerns regarding
public health hazards derived from processedfoods, their origin and production
procedures of animals in the EUare increasingly under scrutiny. Such tendency
points an opposite direction to that which the EU Common Agricultural Policy
aimed at after World War II. Production systemsin the EUtend therefore to focus
on extensive environmentally friendly production.
In a similar way, the Vietnamese government is currently aiming at restructuring
the poultry production system. Indeed, poultry production in Vietnam is
characterised by being small-scale backyard production. This, as recently seen,
conveysimportant public health and economic consequences.The government is
therefore seeking to concentrate production (not only poultry) away from
villages. Incentives are being sought to encourage farmers to get together in the
periphery of Vietnamese rural provinces (called "production zones"). These
incentives refer to subsidies to those farmers willing to join "farmers groups"
(which conceptually remind of a cooperative structure, but cannot be called
315
cooperative as it has political connotations) in "production zones" (Riviere-
Cinnamond 2005). Thus, financial incentives are used here to promote private
sector restructuring. Nonetheless, such restructuring confronts Vietnamese
government to several problems varying from cultural (as backyard poultry
production is highly entangled to the Vietnamese lifestyle) to environmental
(e.g. waste managementetc.) and land availability for suchzones.
6.3.4 Market creation and regulation
An important aspect of public health and poverty reduction activities is that
returns to investment seem lower than for other commodities. This is because
there is generally no market for non-monetary benefits and refers to the missing
markets elaborated under section 2.2.5 following Stiglitz's market failure
analysis. Under such circumstances there is lack of motivation to invest in, for
example, community-based animal health systems, cysticercosis control or
trypanosomosis control. Adapting from Pearce's rationale, it is therefore
important to 'demonstrate' not only the economic significance of public health
hazard avoidance through cost-benefit procedures, but also to capture this
significance "in the form of cash flows" (Pearce 1997). Such cost-benefit
procedures as a tool for decision-making have already been painted out in
sections 2.3.1.2 and 4.3.2.2.
In the environmental economics literature examples abound on missingmarkets.
To overcome this failure emphasishas been put in International Property Rights
in the Convention on Biodiversity. Several possibilities for market creation have
been elaborated in the environmental economics literature (e.g. Pearce 1995,
2004). One interesting example put forward by Pearce is that of "regulation
induced markets" (Pearce 1995). Such type of induced markets is increasingly
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being implemented in the food safety and animal health arena. The trigger for
this has been the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS).The SPS
agreement (WTO 1994) seeks to settle the minimum sanitary requirements in
food safety, animal and plant health in the international trade arena. These
sanitary requirements are set by standard setting bodies, which in the case of
food safety and animal health are Codex Alimentarius (joint initiative between
FAOandWHO)and OlErespectively.
At national level, SPSarticle 3 (paragraphs1 ft 4)44 highlights that international
standards are. voluntary. Enforcement will exist through national regulation
(direct or indirect) and the level of its enforcement will depend on maturation of
the consumer's market approach, existing legal framework and level of state of
law ("etat de droit"). At international level, due to the structure of the
international trade, products will have to comply with the import/export
standards in order to enter a new territory. The import regulation, with a
compulsory nature, will comply with the international OlE, Codex and Plants
standards in order to be "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health" and "based on scientific principles" (SPSarticle 2, paragraph2).
As a consequenceof the SPSagreement, national governments adhering to the
WTOtend to set food safety and animal health standards at least at SPSlevels,
but they are often stricter. The manner in which governments set their
regulatory framework is likely to have repercussions over food producers and
processingindustries (Riviere-Cinnamond,Paschaliand Wells 2005).
44 Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/15-sps.doc
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Thus, two forms of regulation induced market may exist, and these are through
(i) direct (ex-ante) regulation, and (ii) product liability (or ex-post regulation)
(see figure 12). These two sorts of public regulation may be complementary or
substitutive (eventually they may conflict with each other) when trying to
establish incentives for producers and processorsto adopt effective food safety
quality controls.
Publicintervention
Indirect regulation: Product
liability
Direct
regulation
Privatequality control
systems
Figure 12: Types of induced regulation in the animal health and food safety
market .
Direct regulation refers to inspection, product testing, and other programmes
attempting to ensure the quality of the product by specifying how it is produced
and/or its final quality. Companies found not to meet the standards are
penalized. Suchex-ante direct interventions are referred to in the literature as
Commandand Control (CAC).CACmay be divided into:
(i) CACstandards for performance (e.g. sampling and testing for Salmonella in
the EU);
318
(ii) CAC standards for processing (e.g, Good Agricultural Practices (GAP), Good
Hygiene Practices (GHP)). GAP, which includes the livestock sector, may be
mandatory as it is the case in Thailand (FAO 2005), or HACCP, which is
compulsory in the meat sector in Mexico (Maldonado, Henson, Caswell et al.
2004). This would tend to be the case in many developing countries where the
legal contractual framework does not allow prosecussion of those food processors
that incur public health damage. Conversely, in developed countries GAP and
GHP tend to be used as guidelines. Given that the legal framework is effective,
government control is less direct, hence leaving public health responsibilities to
firms and producers. This is why EUREPGAP-IFA45 (which includes guidelines for
livestock - Integrated Farm Approach - IFA) is a private initiative of European
retailers;
(iii) CAC standards for mandatory disclosure of information (e.g. providing
information on the specific ingredients and quantities included in the product
through labelling).
Thus, direct regulation tends to be used in contexts were the legal framework is
not enforced or when decided by the government as a reaction to consumers' risk
perceptions. Government direct control is the only way in which a nation may
thus attain a certain public health and food safety level when little legal
enforcement exists. Although it can be argued that direct control may reduce
transaction costs (see debate at different levels in sections 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.4.1,
3.2.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.4.3), public procedures (e.g. monitoring) incur
high costs at governmental level.
45 http://www.eurep.org/farm/Languages/Englishlindex html
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Product liability on the contrary refers to ex-post regulation. It punishes
companies that produce products of insufficient quality. Such regulatory method
is described as incentive-based (Henson and Caswell 1999). The aim of this
regulatory method is to allow producers and processorsto achieve the adequate
levels of animal health and food safety standards in a cost effective way.
Examples include releasing information to consumers so as to allow them the
evaluation and avoidance of health hazard; reducing information costs by
subsidizing the development of tests for new pathogens; enabling and assisting
implementation of contractual agreementswith private entities to release public
certification of products meeting the minimum food safety standards (e.g. bodies
such as International Standard Organisations (ISO)); making rights and
responsibilities of the implicit contract in a private sale clear by imposing the
need for due-diligence (enforced through the country's legal framework) (Henson
and Caswell 1999).
Under indirect public regulation, food processingcompanies and producers have
a legal incentive to implement private quality control systems. Government's
tort liability laws create an incentive for firms to reduce safety problems. The
objective is to achieve the national level on food safety and animal health set by
each government. Governments generally follow Codex and OlE lines although
countries are free to implement tighter levels when dealing with their national
food safety and animal health levels. Private control systemsmay thus be divided
into (i) self-regulation, and (ii) certification.
Self-regulation refers to internal control systemsassuringa product's quality. In
that scenario, it is the company that sets, monitors and self-certifies the control
parameters. This type of regulation is, however, not limited to individual firms.
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As seen in the UK, self-regulation can be applied to trade organisationscovering
the majority of the market supply such as retailers (e.g. Sainsbury,.Tesco). An
example in the USAof self-regulated standard are the generous requirements on
cage size for hens, a welfare standard that is imposed by some large food
processorsand retailers in the USAand Canada;
Certification can take various forms. It is mainly based on third party
certification of product quality and monitoring. These third parties may be
customers, industry trade associations or other bodies such as International
Standard Organizations (ISO). Examples in the EU including accredited
certification bodies by EUREPGAPin the livestock sector are Agrar-Control GmbH
(based in Germany, approved for the sub-scopes:combinable crops, cattle and
sheep, dairy, pigs, poultry), Skal International Control Union
Certification (based in the Netherlands, approved for the sub-scopes:cattle and
sheep, dairy, pigs, poultry, combinable crops). In the USA, examples of ISO
abound. For example, certification for organic meat follows the "ISOguide 65 for
OrganicCertification Bodies,,46and has 17bodies approved.
Both private quality control systems (self-regulation and certification) can be
used as an offensive strategy, thus as a mechanism to increase market share by
delivering higher quality, or as a defensive mechanismto protect current market
share from erosion. In both cases thus, regulation induces market creation (see
debate over community animal health workers legislation in chapter 5).
The development of the food processing industry has sharpened information
asymmetry. Indeed, processing, additives, pesticides, antibiotics, growth
46 http://www .ams. usda. gOY/ Isg/ arc/ ARC1012. pdf
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promoters, preservatives etc. are increasingly used in the food industry,
including livestock. Such regulatory mechanismshave been put in place because
consumers "cannot ascertain the safety of many food products", thus "they are
unable to express preferences for great safety in the market place" (Unnervehr
and Jensen 1999). Food is decreasingly becoming an experience good as for
example, in the case of BSE,incubation period (in humans) tends to be of 15
years. Thus technology through new processingmethods widens the information
asymmetry gap (refer to section 2.2.5). In addition, producers or retailers may
find it difficult to ascertain the safety of their products given the increasingly
complex food. chain. The complexity of such structures leads to Williamson's
transaction cost economics and the mechanismsof governance. Complexity here
refers not only to the physical processingof products but also to the contractual
relation between agents in the chain (Williamson 1979). Such contracts are set
over longer periods of time, thus classical contract law does not apply (see
debate in section 3.3.3). Mechanisms need to be set to ascertain that the
outcome of the contract, given the time span, is going to be fulfilled. Hence, the
natural evolution in the food market sector leads to new contractual relations
between the actors;
Indeed, in developed countries where regulatory frameworks are enforceable
through a consistent legal system, indirect regulation through product liability
laws allows food processors and producers to apply either self-regulatory or
certification measuresto comply with the national requirements. In developing
countries however, direct government control is likely to be the principal
regulatory measure given that their legal framework tends to be weaker and
hence law enforcement is more difficult. In developed countries thus, firms are
allowed to find cost-effective measures to attain the required levels, hence
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lifting the economics away from public resources. Conversely, in developing
countries direct regulation implies that food producers and processorshave to
comply with pre-established guidelines, which might well not be the most cost-
effective alternatives. Hence, costs fall not only in the industry sector, but also
in the national treasury as direct regulation implies important government
intervention suchasmonitoring (Riviere-Cinnamond,Paschali andWells 2005).
This kind of regulation-induced market is managedto capture the value of public
health interventions (through animal health and food safety) by implementing
the beneficiary pays principle. In this type of market it is the end consumerwho
paysa higher price for safer food (dependingon the relative elasticities of supply
and demand).
The tendency to move away from Pigouvian command and control procedures
(debated at the beginning of this chapter) is therefore taking place in the animal
health and food safety arena. However, the move towards a less interventionist
approach in this arena tends to happen mainly in developed countries becauseof
the established legal framework. Such situation potnts out what has been
debated earlier in this section: that government intervention is nonetheless
needed to some extent, and especially in the initial phases (Stern 2002).
However, the Coasian theorem encourages the use of less interventionist
mechanismsof regulatory options (i.e. not commandand control).
6.4 Bridging community-based structures to national level
Chapters 4 and 5 have extensively debated CAHsystems from the qualities of
workers to the criteria to evaluate them at national level. Previoussections have
put forward and discussedthe possible financing strategies to fund for animal
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health. However, questions remain about the existing option to link community-
based initiatives to a wider national systemand the role of government. Indeed,
how to help those at community level to link with national structures is a crucial
question in the development arena. Researchersat the International FoodPolicy
ResearchInstitute (IFPRI)have put a similar question forward (Orden, Torero and
Gulati 2004).
Section 5.4.2 has highlighted one of the crucial aspects of these communities:
the need to "trust" the community worker. In addition, this trust has been
qualified as "calculative trust". Trust in the community based context is highly
associated to the social rules applying in those communities (see section
5.4.1.1). It thus appearsthat the community member aswell as the worker make
decisionswithin the societal context of the community.
Several authors consider the individual at the centre of rational decisions taken
in an economy. It has been labelled in the economics literature as
"methodological individualism". This school of thinking argues that decisions
taken by individuals are not influenced by social values. As opposed to Adam
Smith's point of view, which emphasisesthat individual actions exist within a
given social framework, others argue that it is the individual action that will
change institutional rules. Arrow in his 1994 paper also states that there is an
"ineradicable social element in the economy" (Arrow 1994), which reminds of
the issuesdebated in the previous chapter regarding trust (see section 5.4.1.1).
He therefore follows the lines of Buchanan and Hayek in acknowledging that
there is a link between methodological and normative individualism. It is
important to bear in mind this debate within the rural setting.
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Linking community-based systems to national systems involve two sets of
societies: the rural ones in remote areas, and the public institution or
government ones. The latter, as mentioned earlier in this section, incurs public
failure especially when targeting remote areas (becauseof the reasonsstated in
section 6.2). Thus, policy decisions tend not to be Pareto efficient at that level.
In addition, rural community members' economic decisions are taken in
associationwith their social context and structure. It seemsobvious at this stage
that a rapprochement between these two contexts is needed in order to enable
the bridging.
On the one hand, public institutions need to be more aware of the difficulties
encountered at community level. As mentioned in the introduction section in
chapter 5, decision makers tend to base their decisions regarding rural
communities on technical criteria. However these criteria are not a priority for
communities. If public institutions want to overcome public failure, further
knowledge of the rural context of their country needs to be acquired. This might
translate in employing more inhabitants of those areas in public institutions or
persons with experience in the rural context. This would allow government
strategies to be more in line with the actual situation on the ground, hence
converging towards the same goal. On the other hand, communities need to
behavemore proactively. This is only obtained by exposing these communities to
market forces, which requires time. In order to expose them to market forces,
markets need to be created. Market creation depends heavily on availability of
information. Information comes through improving telecommunications and
infrastructure aswell aseducation.
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Market creation is thus crucial at community level. Should the government
intervene in the animal health-public health arena, and if so, how?These are
essential questions for the development of rural communities. It has been shown
that this area is entangled with poverty reduction activities. Bearing that in
mind, the aspects that need to be taken into account in any given country in
order to assesswhether, how and by whom funds should be disbursed for AHS
under public health and/or poverty reduction groundsare the following:
1. Shareof agricultural GOPgenerated from livestock.
Given that not all provinces in a country would concentrate on livestock
production, for an accurate allocation of resource the share of agricultural GOP
generated from livestock at province level would be more appropriate. However
it could be argued that in somecountries obtaining these data may be difficult.
2. Production systemstypes.
Generally intensive or semi-intensive production systemstend to be concentrated
in peri-urban areas; whereas extensive production is located in rural areas, and
finally subsistence systems in remote and pastoral areas (Orden, Torero and
Gulati 2004). The implications in terms of public health threat and/or poverty
reduction potential of livestock will therefore vary in relation to the setting
analysed.
3. Trade in livestock and derived products.
Linked to the previous criteria is the type of market where livestock products are
directed to and commercialised. Hence, in most developing countries livestock
production contributes mainly to the domestic market economy. However, some
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cases exist (e.g. Thailand) where the extent of livestock production
concentration has enabled the participation of the country in the international
arena (in the case of Thailand, poultry production). The income generated at
national level from this activity is not negligible and trade bans imposed by WTO
derived from animal health risks and/or public health hazardsmay considerably
undermine the country's GOP(e.g. Avian Influenza). It is thus important to bear
in mind the types of production systemsaswell as the markets targeted.
4. Existing animal health structures, budgets and servtce delivery mechanisms.
As described in chapter 3, the manner in which AHsystemsare structured will be
highly influential in terms of delivering services. Hence, the degree of central
government intervention, decentralisation, privatisation, and whether an animal
health fund already exist will be critical in influencing the system's performance.
Thus, when applying the aforementioned criteria in a country like Vietnam, for
example, the analysis will point out that, although livestock have poverty
reduction potential (especially poultry), the main reason for fund allocation to
AH structures witt lie in the public hazards derived from poultry production
intensification. Thus, following the previously outlined criteria:
(i) The percentage of agricultural GOPderived from livestock in provinces
such as Ha Tay, Ho Chi Minh, Tien Giang and An Giang are 39.8%,25.7%,
17%and 18%respectively (Riviere-Cinnamond2005);
(ii) Production types tend be semi-intensive and concentrate in rural areas.
However, the presence of smallholder producers at village level is
important. This is relevant in public health terms as smallholders
maintain production in the same householdwhere they live. In the case
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of AI it increases disease-spread potential especially when considering
that backyard raising tends to mix animal species (notably important is
the presenceof pigs in the caseof AI);
(iii) Nonetheless, livestock production in Vietnam is mainly oriented towards
domestic market. It should however be highlighted that currently
negotiations within the WTO arena are taking place in order to allow
Vietnam to adhere to the organisation;
(iv) Finally, Vietnamese animal health structures are undergoing a
decentralisation process, aiming at giving provinces more responsibility
regarding their expenditure of public funds. However, to a certain extent
central government is still important as only 15 of the 64 Vietnamese
provinces generate income. Thus, the remaining provinces still depend on
central government disbursement of funds 47.
A different scenario is that of Kenya,where the need for AHScould be argued on
groundsof poverty alleviation. Hence:
(i) Livestock share of agricultural GOPmight not be significant as in Kenya
the 80%of livestock keepersare concentrated in arid and semi-arid lands.
Pastoral farmers therefore follow a subsistenceproduction pattern;
(ii) Trade, logically is minimal, if existing at all, given the previously debated
market failures in the pastoral context;
(iii) As opposed to the Vietnamese context, animal density in KenyanASALis
remarkably lower. Hence the public heath risks conveyed are of different
nature. Thus, remote and rural areas, where density is lower, will tend to
47 Personal communication: Son, N.T., Deputy head of livestock production division, Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development. 2005: Hanoi.
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convey "classical" zoonotic disease spread, such as trypanosomosis or
brucellosis. Conversely, highly populated areas (both in humans and
animals) will have the potential of generating highly contagious zoonotic
and emerging and re-emerging diseases (e.g. Rift Valley Fever, or as
predicted, Avian Influenza through migratory birds), thus linking to the
"livestock revolution" implications previously debated in section 3.1.1.
(iv) Finally, animal health structures as debated throughout the thesis have
been dismantled following the SAPprogrammes. Hence, rural and remote
areas tend to be underserved given their relative low potential for
developing market oriented service delivery.
Having debated the role and extent of government intervention in the animal
health and associated public health market, aswell as the criteria necessaryfor
appropriate disbursement public funds, the next section brings together the main
conclusionsof the thesis.
6.5 Conclusions
The thesis aimed at tackling four main objectives. These were: (i) to
demonstrate the usefulness of applying a new perspective in the economic
analysis of animal health systems; (ii) to identify the structure and components
of animal health systems and the possible mechanisms for financing animal
health activities; (iii) to elaborate a conceptual framework in which to assess
community-based animal health service delivery in rural areas at national level;
and (tv) to assessthe "ideal qualities" needed in animal health workers in order
for community-based animal health systems in Kenyan pastoral areas to be
sustainable.
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The discussionin this chapter has brought forward the debate over incentives to
develop sustainable market structures and the role of government. The role of
public failure as a cause for increased public health threats from animal origin
has been elaborated. This section concludes that a certain degree of public
intervention is needed with regard to the development of the animal health
market. However, other interventions than Pigouvian command and control
procedures may be applied depending on the degree of development of the
animal health market.
The existing strategies for financing for animal health at supranational level,
which in turn contribute to poverty reduction, are discussed in that section.
Criteria for fund allocation have been elaborated. These are (i) the country's
share of agricultural GOPgenerated by livestock, (ii) types of production systems
existing in the country, (iii) trade in livestock and derived products, and (iv)
existing animal health structures.
The analysis in the discussionsection concludes that the contractual framework
in which transactions take place becomes increasingly important when
communities' production activities increase. In this case, regulation induced
markets are seen as a powerful tool in the public health arena taking into
account the context of the increasingly stringent WTO sanitary and phyto-
sanitary (SPS)standards.
However, the design and implementation of community-based animal health
systemsare crucial to the sustainability of the systems.Thesesystemsneed to be
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market oriented and workers need to be selected following the criteria of the
community members. Otherwise, the likeliness of system failure is high.
Three main areas where further research is needed have been identified. These
are:
(i) obtaining the appropriate balance between market forces and public
intervention to enable. the evolution from a self-sustaining situation
towards a functional market situation,
(ii) examining the reasonsfor public sector failure in the animal health
arena,
(iii) improving animal health market creation within rural communities
The stimulus of the thesiswas to study the causesthat have led to an increase of
public health threats from animal origin. The thesis has contributed significantly
to the research arena by analysing critical institutional aspects in public health
systemsassociatedto the prevention of zoonotic diseasespread.
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Annex 3 - Questionnaire for livestock keepers and
policy makers
• Livestock Keepers Group Questionnaire
Key questions regarding the selection process
1. Who was the last person to be eligible to be a CAHW?
2. What were the criteria needed for his or her selection?
3. In your point of view, identify as many qualities as you can that you would
like to see in a CAHW.
4. Rank the qualities in order of importance.
S. State the reason why you have chosen these qualities.
6. Were you consulted about the selection?
7. Who chose the candidates? The whole community, selected members of the
community, the authorities, others?
8. Were the candidates appointed by the authorities and presented to you/ the
community?
9. Did you know/were you familiar with the candidates?
.10. Were you aware of the decisions taken? If yes, how did you know/ who told
you?
11. How do you think the selection process could be improved?
12. How the last appointment was made?
13. Is there anything else you would like to say about the process?
Key questions regarding the effectiveness and sustainability of CAH
systems
1. Do you think CAHWare useful?
Please explain how and give illustrations of cases in which they have
helped. .
2. Are there any examples in which they were not able to contribute because of
lack of training, skills or supplies?
3. Have you noticed an improvement in the animals' health?
If yes, in what way?
4. What improvements could be made to the system?
Explain with examples
S. How many have left in past XXyears?
6. How long on average do they stay?
7. Why do you think they leave?
8. Doyou know why the last person left?
9. What could encourage them to stay? What are the incentives that could be
used for encouraging CAHWto stay?
Give examples
10. Have they passed on their skills to others? What has the community learnt
from the CAHWs?Give examples
• Policy Makers Group Questionnaire
Key questions regarding the selection process
1. As a veterinarian in your current position, what would be the qualities you
would like to see in a CAHW?Please identify up to 11 qualities (or as many
as you can) that you would like to see in a CAHW.
2. Please rank the qualities you have stated in terms of importance.
3. Explain why you have chosen these qualities (for the first 5).
4. Do you have field experience with CAHsystems?
• If 'yes',
a. For how long?
b. Where?
c. While in the community, did you spoke with any CAHW?
d. In your point of view, what the role of a CAHWshould be?
e. In the community you were involved, how was the selection process
done?
f. What were the strengths and weaknessesof the process?
g. Was the whole community involved?
h. Were there women involved?
- If no, do you know why?
- If yes, how were they involved/ what was their role?
• If 'no', explanation of the selection process of CAHW => CAHW can be
selected by the whole community, selected members of the community or
the authorities. Who do you think would theoretically be more
suitable for the selection process?
5. Do you think CAHsystems are good/ useful? (yes/no) Why?
6. With this study we are trying to see if a link between CAHsystems and the
private (veterinary) sector could exist.
Do you think there is any contradiction between what the communities
want and what the private sector wants?
7. Is there anything else you would like to say about the process?
Key questions regarding the effectiveness and sustainability of CAH
systems
To date several CAH systems have been implemented. However, after the
initial financial help pulls out, some of these systems are not anymore
sustainable as CAHWsmight drop out. The fact is that different projects
have different CAHWsdrop out rates.
1. Why do you think CAHWsleave?
2. What do you think is the incentive for a CAHWto continue working
as a CAHW?
(For example: social status, recognition among the community, financial,
others ... )
3. Do you know what they do after leaving? If 'yes', what?
4. Why do you think a livestock keeper would go to a CAHWinstead of
other suppliers?
5. Who are these other possible suppliers of services for the livestock
keeper?
(For example: traditional healers, black market, dukas, drug stores,
others?)
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6. Why do you think they are competitors of the CAHWs?
7. How do you think this could be solved?
8. Should there be any support from the government or private vets
for the CAHsystem?Why?
9. How do you think CAHsystems could be improved?
10. Is there anything else you would like to add regarding the
effectiveness and sustainability of CAHsystems?
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Annex 4 - Description of the field study locations
Three Districts were selected for the interview process: West Pokot, Wajir and
Marsabit. Reasonsfor selecting these three geographical areas were (i) that the three
districts were representative of ASALareas in Kenya, (ii) the lack of infrastructure
and poor service delivery in those areas and (iii) the ongoing CAHprogrammes run by
different NGOs.
Kenya
SUDAN
Map 1: Locations of West Pokot, Wajlr and Marsabit districts
Specific NGOsworking in these districts were identified with the help of ITDG's
Community-based Livestock Initiative Programme (CLIP). The criteria for selection
were based on (i) the available connections of CLIP with field NGO!;and (ii) the
perspective taken by the field NGO regarding the implementation of CAH systems.
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The perspective selected was towards "business oriented" CAH programmes. This
choice was made based on criteria of sustainability of CAHsystems. Given the current
low government funds available for animal health service delivery, business oriented
community-based programmes are believed to contribute to the system's
sustainability after the NGOpulls out or available funds for the project are over.
• West Pokot
Annual rainfall is critical to the food production of the district in order to support its
population. Rangelands and marginal areas (72%) are the most affected by rainfall
variations. Drought appears commonly each 5 - 7 years. Livestock is essential for the
subsistence of the Pokot people in the low land areas of the district as almost one
third of the residents are characterised predominantly as pastoralists. Herd sizes have
greatly varied in recent years. Impact studies indicate that most households own
between 2 and 20 head of cattle. But, as in the Pokot tradition it is usual to count
cattle in terms of "not many" (below 10), "many" (between 10 and 100) and "very
many" (more than 100), it is often difficult to obtain accurate estimates. Moreover,
animals lent to relatives under "Tiliantany"S7 arrangements are often not included in
the count. Their herds are a mixture of cattle, goats and sheep. Donkeys and chicken
are common but are not highly valued (donkeys are used for transportation especially
of food). To survive in this arid to arid and semi-arid habitat, livestock keepers have
to move their animals from place to place accordingly to the availability of grazing
lands, shrubs, disease-free area and water.
57 TllIantany: is an "insurance system" among pastorallsts. Pokot minimise the risk of complete loss of livestock
through "loaning" cows to relatives and friends in other parts of the district in exchange of steer. The cow
provides milk for the person who receives it, but calves are property of the original owner. Loaning cows to
other people gives prestige to the pastoralist and more importantly it gives him the right to claim assistance
from his "tiliantany" partners when needed.
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West Pokot
•
Map 2: West Pokot District
The contact person in West Pokot was a private veterinarian (Dr Ripimpoi) who had
started an agrovet store in ~kutano in 2001 under the privatisation scheme
supported by the AU - IBARCAPEUnit. The background of the project goes back to
1997 when the predecessor to CAPE (called the 'PARC-VACProject' of AU-IBAR) in
collaboration with the district veterinary services, started an initiative on CAH
delivery services based in Alale (Northern part of-the district). In 1999, SNV, a-
Swedish NGO, took over the project until 2002. Meanwhile, other NGOsin the district
stated to implement CAH components in their programmes (as for example WVK,
ELCK,Ortum PH~D, Sigor NRMand KEDDA). In 2002, as SNVwas not able anymore to
sustain financially the project, a collaboration with the AU-IBARCAPEUnit was made.
The objective of the two partners was to enhance the privatisation process of CAH
systems under the supervision of a private veterinarian while supplying drugs and
giving advice.
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Dr Ririmpoi served as a link person who introduced the team to the DVO(Dr Kirui) and
the Deputy DVO(Dr Njagi) with whom was laid out the strategy for the interviews and
locations to visit. Two routes were identified and suggested to be followed for the
interviews. These were East, including Kapenguria, Lelan, Chepareria, Sigor and
Ortum, and West which covered Alale, Kasei, Kodich, Konyao, Kacheliba and
Kongelai. As West Pokot's local language is Pokot, two translators/note-takers (Mr
Philip Kigen and Mr Magal Kashmir) were identified with Dr Ririmpoi's help.
Translators were the two Livestock Officers of the region. Reasonsfor choosing them
were that they spoke the local language, had knowledge of the region and about
animal health. Contrary to the planned field work concept note, translators suggested
the interviewees' answers to be directly transcribed into English. They argued that
the process of writing in Pokot language and then translating into English (and back-
translate into Pokot) might incur in important biases as the context and set-up of the
interview process must also be interpreted while performing the questionnaire.
Following this logic, in the two other district studied, translators were also English
note-takers.
• Wajir
Wajir district is situated in the North Eastern Province. It covers an area of 56,599
square kilometres and has borders with Ethiopia and Somalia, and the Kenyan districts
of Mandera, Garissa, Isiolo and Marsabit. The population the district, and in the whole
Northeastern Province, is predominantly Somali. In Wajir there are clans of Kenyan
Somalia: Ajuran, Degodia and Ogaden. Rainfall is unreliable and averages about
200mm per year. Drought is periodic, occurring most recently in 1996-7, 1991-2, and
1984. Pastoralism in the district has been subject to constant changes and
adaptation. These processes have been accelerated in the past 50 years due to an
increase in the number of water points, settlements and the livestock and population
growth. The backbone of the economy in Wajir is nomadic pastoralism. Wajir is based
on herding of camels, cattle, sheep and goats. Most of the pastoralists remain
nomadic and movement is dictated by the availability of grazing and water.
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Wajir
Ethiopia'
Marsabit
Map 3: Wajir District
Somalia
The field NGO contact was WASDA(Wajir South Development Association). WASDA
was created in 1993 by professional and business persons from Wajir South operating
withln and outside the district. It is a non-profit making organisation, which
supplements Kenyan government efforts in development. It aims to support the
improvement of livelihoods of pastoral communities in Wajir District and lower Juba
in Southern Somalia. WASDAoperates in pastoral areas where communities are highly
dependent on livestock for their social and economic well being. These areas are
drought, epidemic diseasesin livestock and conflicts (WASDA2002).
highly vulnerable to unpredictable climatic changes and are constantly faced with
A multidisciplinary board member and staff run the organisation. The board has the
role of policy making and the management has the task of implementing. Its mission
is the "improvement of quality of life of pastoral communities in Wajir and its
environs with respect to livestock, human and water development in an
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environmental friendly way". Two translators/note-takers were recruited with the
assistance of Mr. Abdinoor (WASDACo-ordinator). One of the translators was a water
technician in the Department of Water Resources (Mr Muktar) whereas the other was
a newly graduate of the KenyaMedical Training College (Mr Abdi Sheik).
• Marsabit
Borana's economy and lifestyles are organised around cattle, though the formerly
taboo camels are becoming more important, and they now herd sheep and goats.
Young men do the daily herding while the women do all family nurturing. The
homestead groups may be required to move three or four times each year, often as
far as 100 km, because of the low rainfall and poor land. Sturdy modular houses,
constructed by the women, consist of interwoven branches thatched with grassall the
way to the ground. This is in contrast with the Gabbra who weave mats to cover the
framework. They settle temporarily in groups of 10 to 30 houses. Their traditional
religion is monotheistic with communication through intermediary priests or "Qalla".
The traditional name for God is Waq (or Wak). Islam has become influential in Borana
society in the last 70 years. Borana people have had only minimal contact with
Christianity, due in part to their nomadic life style. Yet an indigenous church exists
and about 10%of the Borana are Christian (Omondi and Jerkins 1996). Regarding
Gabbra customs, polygamy is accepted but rare. The family is the foundation of
society. The Gabbra make round houses of bent pole frames covered with skins and
grass mats. Up to 25 housesmake up an "olla" (village) of up to 75 people. Ten to 15
families in a village is common. Women do the packing and unpacking of the house at
moving time. The men care for the animals. Gabbra religious beliefs are inseparably
linked to their herds. Animals are more than food: they are needed for sacrifice to
ensure fertility, health and co-operation from spirits. Muslim influence is stronger in
some areas than others. They traditionally believe in one God, whom they call Waka.
The religious attachment between Boranas and Gabbras is maintained through the
qallu or holy men whom they recognise between groups. The lifestyle of Gabbra has
limited contact with Christian influences (Jerkins and Anonymous 1996).
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lsiolo
MARSABIT
Map4: Marsabit District
The NGO Community Initiative Facilitation Assistance (CIFA) branch on livestock
health and production branch operates in Marsabit, Maikona and Nort Horr while in
Moyale district it operates in Obbu, Uran and Central division. After the severe
drought of 2001, a PRA (participatory rural appraisal) was conducted in conjunction
with the animal health service-providers)of the area in order to identify the needs of
the communities. The objective of the programme was to achieve sustainability
through (i) improving the accessibility of services and veterinary drugs in the area, (ii)
develop communities' skills in viable business, (iii) establish professional supervised
system C?fCAH programme using state veterinary services, (iv) strengthen animal
health provider's forum to enhance harmonisation and (v) implementation approaches
and to enhance dialogue with policy organisations and government to influence
government policy regarding animal health services" (CIFA2002).
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Annex 5 - Case study interview process
• West Pokot
The study areas were identified on the basis of ongoing CAHprojects in West Pokot
district. The district was divided into two sections, based on geographical location
i.e. West and East. Semi-structured questionnaire was first tested in Alale (see
annex 4 for West Pokot map). The test pointed out that the questionnaire was only
possible to perform with those LKwho were knowledgeable or had been in contact
with CAH structures. Thus, changes in the itinerary were made, alongside some
minor modifications to the questionnaire. The latter was carefully explained to the
two chosen Pokot translators by going through each of the questions with the
research assistant so that no misunderstanding or misinterpretation could arise.
With regard to translation, it was initially planned that the note-takers would write
in Pokot language. Consequently, the Pokot text will be translated into English and
back translated into Pokot to crosscheck about the accuracy of the initial
translation. However, when explaining the process to the Pokot translators, it
became evident such process was not possible to perform. Translators argued that
the process of writing in Pokot language and then translating into English (and back
translating into Pokot) might incur in important biases as the context and set-up of
the interview process must also be interpreted while performing the questionnaire.
Consequently translators suggested the interviewees' answers to be directly
transcribed into English. Following this logic, in the two other districts studied,
translators were also English note-takers.
The areas covered in the West were Kutung, Kacheliba, Kasei, Kamketo, Kodich,
Kongelai, Konyao, Alale and Nasal. In the East Kapenguria, Ortum, Chepareria and
384
Sigor areas were visited (see annex 4). When arriving to each community the two
translators introduced the research team and its purpose through a general
meeting. Then, generally with the help of the chief or community elder,
respondents were chosen. Criteria used to sample candidates were age, gender,
literacy and status (i.e. CAHW or not) so as to obtain a balanced sample. The
interviewees were therefore community members, livestock keepers and CAHWs
(total of n=72). However, participation of women in the interviews was low (n=8) as
they were not willing to participate (for cultural reasons).
• Wajir
In Wajir district, the fieldwork started with initial planning in Wajir at the NGO
WASDA58office where the areas to be visited were selected. As part of planning
process, visits to Government Veterinary Department and other NGOs related to
delivery of AH service delivery in the district were included. OXFAMand ALDEp9
were visited. However, other NGOs present in the area (as NPHC6o, VSp1, Arid
Lands) were not visited mainly because of the particular period of the year when
the fieldwork was performed (i.e. Ramadan), as it was difficult to find the NGO
staff during daytime.
In order to obtain a representative sample of Wajir, the district was divided into
Northwest, South, and East. Centres with existing CAH delivery systems were
targeted during the exercise. Interviews started in the East and the communities
covered include Wajirbor, Riba and Kharof-harar. This was followed by a visit to the
South where interviews were conducted at Lagbogol, Habasweni, Abakore and
Dadajabula. Interviews concluded in the Northwest with questionnaires performed
in Hadado, Garsekoftu, Griftu and Bunaareas (refer to annex 4 for locations).
58 WASDA:Wajir South Development Association
59 ALDEF: Arid Lands Development Facility
60 NPHC: Nomadic Primary Health Care
61 VSF: Veterinaires SansFrontieres
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The same technique as in West Pokot was used to introduce the research team and
the purpose of the study. Therefore the two Somali translators went through the
village chief or elder to explain the interview process. It should also be highlighted
that the period of time in Wajir district overlapped with parliamentary regional
elections (21.November 2002). This caused sometimes a first misunderstanding from
the communities visited as they thought the research team was made of election
campaigners. There was also some tension in the district, especially in the South, as
result of unrest that characterises the election process.
Taking into account the particularities of Wajir district, livestock keepers,
community members and CAHWswere interviewed, and also officials of the Pastoral
Associations, as this a characteristic feature of development projects in the area
(n=59). It should be noted that the participation of Somali women was the lowest in
comparison to the other two districts. Only two women were interviewed in the
district.
• Marsabit
The planning process was organised with the assistance of the NGOCIFA. The areas
selected to perform the field study were Kalacha and Hurri Hills as these were
CIFA's areas of operation, therefore familiar with CAH systems (although other
NGOsas Farm Africa and VSFwere working in the same areas as CIFA). As for the
other districts, two Borana translators were selected. The first was hired at
Marsabit town and the second at Kalacha centre. Translators were slow in
conducting the interviews and this necessitated the hiring of a third translator while
in Kalacha centre. Two of the translators were primary teacher trainees and one
was a form four leaver. Compared to the other two districts, these translators were
less competent and it was therefore expected that the quality of their work might
have been compromised. It should also be noted that the translators were much
younger than those in previous districts and more importantly, they had no
knowledge on CAHsystems.
The research work started at Kalacha area where interviews were conducted at
Rage, Dibukutura, Arerite and Elgade villages. Hurri Hills area was covered last and
fieldwork was done at Jaldesa, Baqaqa, Ali Boru, Olla Guba, Olla Konso and Olla
Darga (see map in annex 4). As in the previous districts, translators introduced the
research team and its purpose, but this time in an individual basis given that the
size of the communities was much smaller than in the previous two districts.
Livestock keepers, CAHWsand community members were interviewed (sample size
of n=58). It should also be highlighted that there was a marked participation of
women in the interviews (n=18) with a few women CAHWsalso involved.
• Policy makers group
The semi-structured questionnaire for the PMgroup was performed on a one-to-one
basis. The research assistant was also present during the interview sessions. The
principal investigator mentioned the organisations involved in the research project
and presented the general purpose of the research study trying not to influence the
respondent's opinions. The principal investigator was the interviewer and the note-
taker.
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Annex 6 - Further results from semi-structured
interviews
• Livestock keepers group
Selection process
Referring to the selection process in the districts, the majority of the interviewees
in Wajir and Marsabit were consulted regarding the selection (76.27% and 66.6%
respectively). However in West Pokot 55.5%of the respondents were not consulted.
These include mainly women and young men and the stated reason was that they
were "not allowed" to participate. Candidates were selected by the whole
community in Marsabit (96.5%), however in West Pokot elders, opinion leaders or
selected members of the community were often the ones choosing the candidates.
In Wajir, respondents stated the whole community made the choice in 50%of the
cases and selected members of the community in 45.7% of the cases. Nearly all
respondents in the 3 districts were familiar with the candidates. In West Pokot and
Wajir, the 38.9%and 41.4%of the interviewees respectively were not aware of the
decisions taken during the process but were informed of the result by the elders of
the community. In Marsabit, community members were only informed of the final
decision taken through a community meeting (34.5%) and through a meeting with
the NGO(22.4%).
When asked about how to improve the selection process members of the Pokot
communities interviewed suggested the involvement of the black market seller and
traders ("they should be trained as they deal yet with drugs"). Other suggestions
included the increase in the involvement of women in the selection process and as
potential candidates to become CAHWsas "they are most of the times with animals
- goats, sheep and calves- and they are crucial for the cleanness of cows and cattle
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and key elements in milking". It was also highlighted that "they should be able to
administer drugs to animals". Special attention was given to the criteria used in the
selection process and to the need of more CAHWs. It was markedly noted that
selection criteria should be made public and should be available for all community
members. In order to increase fairness to the process, chiefs or authorities should
not be involved and an interview should be included during the selection process of
the candidates.
The communities in Wajir did also highlight the need for instituting a clear selection
process with specific criteria and guidelines. The need to increase participation of
women was a recurrent theme, as well as the involvement of the whole community
in the selection process, not letting the candidates be selected exclusively by the
elders, leaders or Pastoral Association officers. Again, the ideas of including an oral
interview of the candidate during the selection process and the need for more
CAHWswere brought. Most importantly was the insistence of respondents on the
need for recognition and accreditation of the CAHWs.Respondents were also keen
on enhancing CAHWs'training, equipment and monitoring.
Finally, respondents in Marsabit tended to think the selection processwas "good" so
that there was no need of any improvement. Especially they highlighted they were
"very happy" with the fact that they did not have to pay each time they required
the CAHWsservices as well as by not having to pay for transport to Marsabit to buy
drugs. However the majority stated the need and availability for more cheap drugs
and on giving refresher courses or retraining of the CAHWs.
Impact and sustainabHity
All respondents in the three districts unanimously thought CAHWs "are useful".
Reasonsfor that slightly varied between locations (table 20).
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West Pokot Wajlr Marsablt
Ammattreatment Drugavailability & price Animal treatment
54.2% 50.7% 51:4%
Drugavailability Accessto services Extension ..
37.5% 43.5% 44.1%
Accessto services Animal treatment Drugavailability
34.7% 30.4% 35.3%
Table 20: Reasonswhy CAHsystems are useful - LK group (frequency In %)
When asked about "health improvements" seen in the community, all' districts
respondents coincided on the "reduction of death rates and animal sickness" due to'
CAHWs' presence. The decrease in disease incidence concentrated mainly on tick-
borne infections control and worm control. Hence followed an increase in animals'
body condition and production (milk specially) and reproductive levels. As one of
the respondents mentioned, the "health improvements" noticed were an "increase
in livestock production, and this has improved our means of survival as livestock is
our main source of livelihood".
All districts agreed that CAHWscould have been more effective had it not been for
the lack of training or lack of supplies (65.3% West Pokot, 66.1% Wajir, 53.5%
Marsabit).
For West Pokot, the main reason was the lack of drugs (85.1%) followed by lack of
training or refresher courses (12.5%) (see table 21). It should be noted that
respondents thought that CAHWswho had previously been drug sellers performed
better in terms of replenishing the 'drug kit as they had previous knowledge of
supply networks. Improvements suggested were mainly "to be paid a salary" by the
government or the NGOas it would "make the job more interesting" (36.1%) and to
increase drug availability and variety (including human drugs) (34.7%). Increasing
means of transport and giving more refresher courses were also stated (33.0% and
27.7% respectively), the two to be funded by the government and/or the NGOs.
Regarding refresher courses, it was suggested they focus on animal health and
marketing to be performed one week, twice a year. It was also mentioned the
training of more CAHWs(19.4%) and the construct jon of a drugstore nearby so that
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drugs are more readily available (12.5%), again to be funded by the government
and/or the NGO. One suggestion on financing was to engage the CAHW in the
financing of the drugstore for involvement in the maintenance. Finally were stated
the provision of equipment (11.1%) (especially cooling boxes and dipping facilities)
and the supervision of the CAHWs(5.5%). Other suggestions, although there was less
consensus, for improving the system were (i) to give more extension to livestock
keepers, (ii) the government to provide assistance to CAHWs, (iii) recognition of
CAHWsby the government, (iv) the GoK to eliminate black market or quacks and (v)
to create a lab in the area, (vi) the supply of drugs free of charge, (vii) the ability
to sell small quantities of drugs so that they are affordable for the livestock keeper
and finally (viii) the donor to give the first kit on a loan or refund basis.
The same pattern could be drawn for Wajir, with 89.7%agreeing on lack of drugs as
the main problem, and shortage of skills or training in 23.1%of the respondents'
answers. Consequently, improvements suggested were the supply of enough and
cheap drugs (on a loan basis) (61.0%) and the provision of regular training or
refresher courses (55.9%). Providing incentives for the CAHWsto continue working
was also highlighted, the incentives being (i) the provision of salaries or wages by
the NGO, the government or a combination of both (16.9%), (ii) obtaining some
margin from drug selling, (iii) to be given animals, (iv) rewarding CAHWs to
encourage competition and (v) the contribution of the community to CAHWs
welfare. Other improvement suggestions related to the increase in the means of
transport (13.5%) and the regular follow up or monitoring of the workers (11.9%).
Provision of accreditation or certification of the CAHWs was also mentioned
(10.2%). Other suggestions mentioned fewer times were (i) reviving the Pastoral
Association (PA) management (6.7%) by extending membership to all community
members and evaluate and monitor the PA progress through regular general
meetings, (ii) training of more CAHWs, (iii) provision of more equipment, (iv)
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creation of a lab in the area, (v) research on livestock diseasesof the area and (vi)
reduction of political interference from the chief.
Interestingly, Marsabit respondents mentioned similar levels for lack of drugs
(58.1%) and lack of skills or knowledge (54.8%). Therefore improvements suggested
by the interviewees were the increase of drug supply (72.4%), the construction of a
drug store nearby (53.4%), the provision of means of transport (46.5%) and the
provision of refresher courses (43.1%).The salary issue was again mentioned (34.5%)
(to be supplied by the NGOand/or the government) as well as the training of more
CAHWs (17.2%). Other suggestions, which were given less emphasis, were the
provision of equipment and loans for drugs.
West Pokot Wajir Marsabit
Lack of drugs Lackof drugs 89.7% Lackof drugs 58.1%
.85.1%
Lackof training/refresher Lack of skills 23.1% Lackof skills 54.8%
courses 12.5%
Table 21: Reasonswhy the CAHsystem dtd not work - LK group perspective
Reasonsfor leaving the CAHWjob were mostly related to the above suggestions. In
West Pokot, lack of drugs (16.7%), lack of profits (16.7%), lack of salary (15.3%)and
drugs earnings misuse (15.3%) (specially because of drunkenness) were mentioned.
Lack of transport (11.1%) and commitment (9.7%) were also highlighted. However
other reasons were stated such as insecurity, drought! migration, competition with
black market, bad relations with community - especially with elders - and
drunkenness. In Wajir reasons for workers to quit were similar to the ones in West
Pokot, hence lack of salary (33.9%) and lack of drugs (20.3%) were the two most
mentioned reasons, followed by migration (13.6%), lack of incentives or profits
(11.7%), travelling distances (6.8%) and finally lack of payment of services by the
livestock keepers (6.8%). Other less mentioned reasons were similar to the ones
obtained in West Pokot, especially regarding insecurity, black market, political
interference and misuse of funds. In Marsabit most of the respondents were not
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aware why the CAHWswere quitting. However, the main reasons stated were lack
of money (12.1%), lack of drugs (8.6%) and that they "found another job" (5.2%).
Transport, unwillingness from pastoralists to pay for the drugs, family matters and
migration were other stated reasons.
Incentives for CAHWs to continue working were similar across the districts (see
table 22), salary or money given being the most suggested (75.0% in West Pokot,
42.4% in Wajir and 81.0%in Marsabit). In second position came availability of cheap
drugs for Wajir and Marsabit (33.9%and 67.2% respectively) and provision of means
of transport for West Pokot (37.5%). Third positioned was availability of drugs for
West Pokot (34.7%), training and refresher courses for Wajir (22.0%) and adequate
transport for Marsabit (60.3%). Fourth incentive in West Pokot were refresher
courses and advice from professional staff (13.9%), followed by supervision and
monitoring from private veterinarians or NGOs, construction of drugstores for drug
availability, good relations between community members, livestock keepers and
CAHWs, recognition from government and NGOs of CAHWs and creation of co-
operatives and associations. Other recurrent themes as prohibition of the black
market, increase equipment and materials and loans for drug-buying were also
mentioned. For Wajir, fourth came the increase in margin profit from drug selling
(16.9%), followed by recognition of CAHW status through certificates (13.6%),
enhanced supervision from NGOor government staff (10.2%), provision of transport
(6.8%)and the creation of a community contribution for livestock levy (6.8%). Other
suggestions considered as incentives in Wajir were the sensitisation of the
c~mmunity to pay for the services they are given, provide CAHWsanimals as an
incentive to continue working, provide kits and drugstores and create an association
of CAHWs.Finally for Marsabit, the fourth incentive mentioned was the construction
of drugstores so as for drugs to be readily available to community members when
needed (43.1%). As in the previous districts, the provision of refresher courses
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(22.4%) and equipment (15.5%), training more CAHWs(12.1%) and giving loans for
drug buying (5.2%)was highlighted.
West Pokot e ,,;' i',l Wajir ». Marsabit
Salary / economic Salary I economic Salary I economic
75.0% 42.4% 81.0%
Provisionof meansof Availability of cheap drugs Availability of cheap drugs
transport 33.9% 67.2%
37.5%
Availability of cheapdrugs Training and refresher Provisionof meansof
34.7% courses transport
22.0% 60.3%
Table 22: lncenttves for CAHWs- LK group
In all three districts respondents had learnt from CAHWs(table 23) (65.3% in West
Pokot, 98.3% in Wajir and 100% in Marsabit). In West Pokot the most common
themes been taught to community members were dosages and ways of
administration of drugs (51.1%) - including injection-, dipping and spraying (29.8%),
treatment of specific disease (21.3%), early reporting of cases of disease (21.3%) to
the CAHWs and diagnostic of specific disease symptoms (8.5%). Others were
extension on the importance of vaccination, differences between human and animal
drugs, animal nutrition, drug storage, usefulness of quarantines and knowing when a
drug is expired. Finally were taught basic procedures such as castration and de-
horning. In Wajir livestock keepers were taught about drug dosages and ways of
administration (96.5%) -including injection-, treatment of specific diseases (29.8%),
early disease detection (19.3%), information on disease prevention (19.3%) and of
diseases of the area (10.5%). Extension was also given on distinguishing fake and
expired drugs (10.5%), on animal husbandry, on the importance of accurate drug-
dosing, on the importance of vaccinations, and on disease reporting. Finally in
Marsabit community members were also taught on dosages and ways of drug
I
administration (86.2%), hygiene and public health education was an important,
component (36.2%) which has been rarely mentioned in other districts. This
included the "covering of food after cooking" and the hygiene of the house and the
animals' locations. Still in the public health extension, special attention was also
given to advising livestock keepers on not drinking milk or eating meat of an animal
394
that has recently been treated, on how to bury the carcasses of animals which died
of Anthrax, on not eating dead animals, on burning dirt, on boiling water and on
flies and mosquitoes control. Clinical animal treatment was stated in 34.5%of the
answers.
West'Pokot .~ " Wajir .,> , Marsabit "i it
Dosagesand Dosagesand Dosagesand
administration routes administration routes administration routes
51.1% 96.5% 86.2%
Dipping /spraying , Treatment of specific Hygieneand public health
29.8% diseasesand early education ,
reporting 29.8% 36.2%
Treatment of specific Diseaseprevention Treatment of specific
diseasesand early 19.3% diseases
reporting 34.5%
21.3%
Table 23: Extension messagesto community members by CAHWs- LK group
• Policy makers group
Selection process
As mentioned in the descriptive chapter, 60.7% had field experience of different
length. From those having experience, in 82%of the cases it was in Kenya (different
districts). Only 2 of them (11.8%) had had field experience exclusively outside
Kenya (Sudan and Zimbabwe). Most of the interviewees with field experience had
spoken with a CAHWwhile in the field. However 2 of them, with field experience in
Kenya, had never been in contact with a CAHWand 3 (17.6%)had spoken to AHAsor
"vet scouts" as an alternative.
As regarding the policy makers' interpretation of the role of CAHWs, respondents
with field experience agreed it was "disease r.eporting and link person" (94.1%)and
"delivering animal health services in ASALareas where there is no other qualified
professional" (including preventive medicine, and simple curative' treatments)
(88.2%). Someof the respondents highlighted however that services given by CAHWs
should exclusively focus on epidemiological surveillance and not on curative or
clinical services. Other roles suggested were (i) extension (on feed and marketing of
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products) (17.6%), (ii) record keeping (5.9%), (iii) production improvement (5.9%),
and (iv) supplementing government services (5.9%).
Regarding how the selection process was done, 35.3%of the respondents with field
experience stated the authorities or the government selected the CAHWs (the
"chief of the village" being the authorities, and the DVObeing the government). In
41.2% of the cases it was the elders or opinion leaders who appointed the
candidate/so In fewer cases (11.8%)the communities and the NGOswere involved in
the process. Only one respondent, although having field experience, did not know
how the selection process was done. Strengths of the selection process were only
highlighted when the community (with or without NGOpresence) was involved. It
was stressed that the strength was the "involvement of the community in the
selection process". They mentioned this process would enable communities to
select candidates they "trust" (linking with the "ideal" qualities above stated) and
who are "motivated to work". However, when the elders or the authorities selected
candidates, only weaknesses were mentioned. These were mainly that the
effectiveness of the system was hindered as elders tended to select their relatives.
Other reasons included the following: (i) the selected candidates were illiterate, (ii)
there were no women candidates, (iii) the selected person was not accepted by the
community, (iv) the process was not participatory so the community did not know
what the purpose of the project was, (v) mistrust, and (vi) the "business
orientation" of the process. When the NGO was involved, the weakness often
mentioned was the "dependency syndrome" from the community towards the NGO.
When asking the group of interviewees without field experience (10), 70%of them
thought the whole community should be involved in the selection process as
opposed to involving exclusively opinion leaders or elders. They mentioned also the
importance of integrating field NGOsin the process so that the CAH system would
be more likely to be sustainable. However, 2 out of 10 stated it was the role of the
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authorities to determine the CAHW selection and thought preference should be
given to diploma holders (AHA). Only one of the respondents of the group of policy
makers without field experience thought the selection should be done in
conjunction with elders and NGOs.
Interviewees with field experience had rarely seen women involved either in the
selection process or as candidates. However they all generally agreed on that their
involvement should be enhanced as they are available most of the time and are in
contact with the animals.
When asked about the usefulness of the CAH system, all respondents with the
exception of 2 thought it was useful. Reasonsmentioned were that CAHWsfill the
gap of service delivery in pastoral areas as they are available in the community, can
live and work in harsh areas and follow nomadic communities. However, reluctance
and scepticism in some of the answers could be noted, mentioning that the best
alternative to deliver the services would be the veterinarian. A recurrent theme
was the strong need for supervision and control of CAH systems as well as good
quality training.
6 out of 28 (21.4%) stated a contradiction existed between the will of the
communities and that of private veterinarians in terms of service delivery to poor
farmers. Main reasons being that (i) the private veterinarian services are too
expensive for poor livestock keepers' affordability, (ii) community members do not
differentiate quality services, (iii) literacy in CAHWsbeing a primary request from
private veterinarians is not always fulfilled and finally (iv) the "work of the private
veterinarian is taken over by the CAHW". However the rest (78.6%) thought there is
a link between the two actors basing their reasoning in the objective of increasing
service delivery to dryland areas, and that private veterinarians are interested in
profit making. It was also mentioned the concerns regarding the economic viability
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of the system asworkers do not always understand the purpose of profit making and
drug kit replenishment.
Finally, suggestions and remarks given by the interviewees varied and did not only
cover selection process but also other issues. Therefore livestock keepers' access to
markets and slaughterhouses was raised as well as concerns regarding the viability
of the system. The latter referred to the presence of black market for drugs where
these are found at cheaper price, hence continuing to be of interest for CAHWs.
Centring more in the selection process, it was repeatedly mentioned the need for
women's involvement and the need for supervision and training of CAHWs.Finally
was suggested the suppression of NGOsin ASALareas as they are "undermining the
economic viability of CAH systems". Some respondents also insisted on the
veterinarians to be paid by the government to work in those areas.
Impact and sustainabillty
When asked about the main reasons why CAHWswere leaving, 42.9% stated the
problem was economic (lack of salary or payment). The same level of attention was
given to issues relating to drug kit replenishment and drug availability (42.9%).
Disagreements with the community, finding other activities and donor-driven
problems were given the same level of importance (32.1%). Other suggested causes
were infrastructure (17.9%), lack of commitment (17.9%), failure in the selection
process (10.7%), lack of supervision (10.7%), family matters (7.1%), lack of good
training (7.1%)and institutional support (3.6%)and finally drunkenness (3.6%).
Incentives, from policy makers' point of view, to encourage CAHWs to continue
working were mainly of economic origin (71.4%). Social status or recognition of their
work by the community and lor government was also highly ranked (46.4%).
Enhanced amenities such as water access, roads and security were mentioned as
incentives (17.8%), as well as the availability and regular supply of drugs (17.8%).
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Finally came refresher courses (10.7%), means of transport and equipment (10.7%)
and in kind presents like animals to be given by the community (3.6%).
Most (42.8%) of the policy makers interviewed did not know what CAHWsdid after
quitting the community work. The remaining however suggested few alternatives,
the most popular being returning to be a livestock keeper (46.6%) followed by
opening a duka or agrovet (33.3%) and going for further training (26.6%). Other
suggestions were turning to the black market becoming an illegal drug seller (20%),
migration to towns in search of higher wages, and livestock trade.
Policy makers thought a livestock keeper would be more interested to go to a CAHW
instead to another supplier of similar services due mainly to their availability
(53.6%) and to the low prices and flexibility of payment methods (46.2%). Other
answers were the understanding of the local culture, lack of other alternatives,
because of the quality of the drugs, trust, respect and follow up of the animals.
Regarding their perceptions of who these "other suppliers of services" were, the
majority (64.3%) stated the black market or illegal drug sellers62, followed by
(53.6%) agrovets or dukas (shopkeepers). It was however noted these could only be
considered competitors in terms of drug selling, as they do not deliver other
services. Black market and illegal drug sellers were considered as a "threat" in
46.4%of the answers as they sell (bad quality) cheaper drugs, hence increasing drug
selling competition. The issue of "bad quality drugs" was linked to the lack of ethics
(a desired quality mentioned in the ranking) of drug sellers as opposed to these of
veterinarians or AHAs. Black market competition had different origins as reported
by respondents. These could either be from the borders (Somalia, Southern
Sudan... ) or from private veterinarians or government officials buying drugs in
Nairobi at cheaper price and re-selling them to the quacks. Relating to agrovets and
62 Illegal drug sellers and black market do not include, for the purpose of this study, agrovets and dukas even if
it could be argued that they might also be considered as illegal if not supervised by a veterinarian. Illegal drug
sellers include quacks and peddlers.
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dukas it was noted their competitive advantage of selling also human drugs so that
it "makes it easier for the livestock keeper to buy there". Government veterinarians
(46.4%) - as the government has the infrastructure and facilities - and AHAs (46.4%)
were also considered as alternatives to CAHWs. Less mentioned ones were
traditional healers (21.4%), livestock keepers and traders themselves (17.8%), and
NGOs (14.3%). Interestingly, human medical professionals and chemists were also
mentioned (10.7%) as well as pharmaceutical industries (7.1%). Pastoral
associations, production industry and church organisations were the least recorded.
Statements were made against CAHWssuch as "(CAHWs) are also illegal but they
will disappear after the new government because it will enforce the law". Others
insisted that "the country can afford health services to livestock and men so that
services are available there". It was also suggested the creation of a drug
Inspectorate for law enforcement. However others thought community workers
could be a solution to reduce public health concerns regarding drug residues in milk
and meat. One mentioned solution was to train these quacks or peddler so as they
sell quality drugs. Supervision and good quality training of CAHWswas commonly
agreed.
Proposed solutions from policy makers to counteract the competition problem
referred mainly to educating communities about the concept of "quality" (28.6%)
and on the supervision by veterinarians and/or AHA of CAHWs (28.6%). This was
followed by the creation of a drug Inspectorate allowing only veterinarians (private
or 'from the government) to sell drugs (17.9%). Enforcement of the law and
enhancing economic or businesscapacity of CAHWswere given the same importance
(14.3%). Liberalisation of the market and training of quacks to become CAHWswere
also given the same weight (7.1%). This was followed by other suggestions such as
(i) institutional change, (ii) banning government veterinarians from selling drugs,
(iii) creation of farmers' organisations, (iv) accreditation of shops through logos, (v)
recognition of CAHWsin the Veterinary SurgeonsAct, (vi) registration of dukas by
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KVB, and (vii) improve infrastructure. Finally it was suggested that private
veterinarians should exclusively work on clinical treatments whereas the
government officials should exclusively concentrate on surveillance.
When asked about which kind of support should be given to CAH systems, 67.9%
mentioned the government and 57.1% the private veterinarians. Government
support focused mainly on "training and retraining" (26.3%) as well as institutional
support through recognition and certificates (15.8%). Supervision of the workers was
stated in 10.5%of the answers related to government support. Other suggestions
were lending money to private veterinarians, to the communities and finally to
provide drug supply (5.3%each). Regarding private practitioners support, it focused
mainly on supervision (25%),on drug supply (18.8%)and on "training and retraining"
(12.5%). In 10.7% of the cases it was stated the NGO should be supporting the
systems but functions were not specified.
Suggestions for CAH system improvement coincided, in 32.1% of the interviewees
answers, in a structure whereby CAHWswould be supervised either directly by the
vet or by the AHA (who in turn would be supervised by the vet). Veterinarians would
then be supplying drugs and training to CAHWsand AHAs. Further comments on the
sustainability and effectiveness of CAH systems were raised and included taking a
uniform approach to CAH systems, empowering farmers, improving productivity,
enabling access to markets and monitoring of the systems. Few of the interviewees
pointed out however concerns regarding CAH systems' in relation to the OlE
(Organisation Internationale des Epizooties) international standards for export of
animal and animal products. These referred to the OlE standards being "too high"
for developing countries to access international markets and that bilateral
agreement between countries could be a possible solution for exporting animals and
animal products. Concernswere raised regarding CAHWsroles in that matter.
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When relating respondents' groups to the "ideal" qualities of community workers,
preferences in qualities could be observed. Hence government officials tended to
highlight literacy and trust as the main qualities (83.3% and 52% respectively),
whereas academics stated "literate" and "knowledgeable" (77.7% and 66.7%
respectively), KVA/B members "ethnicity to the area" with 75%, and availability
and trust with 50%,and finally private sector respondents gave more importance to
the ethnicity. or "knowledge of the area" (60%) and to training (60%). Trends in
highlighting qualities for each group were the following:
Government Academic KVAlB Private "
Literacy Literacy Ethnic to the area Knowledgeable /
Ethics
Trust Knowledgeable Knowledgeable
Knowledgeable Availability/Commi Availabili,ty/Trust!
tment Literacy
Table 24: Quality preferences in relation to group belonging- PMgroup
Tendencies were also found in relation to groups of field experience and policy
involvement. Hence, respondents with field experience (with or without policy
involvement) tended to highlight qualities such as "ethnicity to the area",
"knowledgeable". Those with policy involvement (either with or without field
experience) focused their preferences on "trust", "commitment", and "ethics".
The group of respondents most interested in the CAHW being "qualified" (62.5%)
was that where respondents had no field experience but were involved in policy
related activities (62.5% - 5 out of 8 - of these group being members of KVAlB).
"Literacy" and "social" were mentioned in 2 of the groups, namely the two extreme
groups: with the two experiences (group made of 35.7% government officials and
28.6% KVA/B members) - 71.4% for "literacy" and 28.6% for "social-, and without
experience in either subject (all academiCs) - 66.7% for each quality.
"Knowledgeable/training" and "ethnic to the area" were highly rated in every
group.
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No,field experience .No field experience .Field experience Field experience
and no policy I but '. policy and, no· policy and policy
I"involvement (n=3) involvement (n=8) .. involv~ment (n=3) involvement
(n=14) .'
Knowledgeable Qualified Knowledgeable Ethnic of the area
Knowledgeable Ethnic of the area
Literate Available/ Knowledgeable
Ethnic of the area Trustworthy
Social/PR .
Literate I Trustworthy/
Committed
Table 25: Quahty preferences In relanon to field experience and pohcy involvement -
PMgroup
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Annex 7 - Pearson correlation results
• Livestock keepers sub-groups correlations
Correlations
Variables2
West West
Pokot Pokot Marsabit Marsabit West
West male male Najirmale ~ajirmale male male Pokot Wajir Marsabit
Variables Statistics Pokot Wajir Marsabit literate illiterate literate illiterate literate illiterate women women women
I west t'OK t'earson
1.000 .399 .460· .880· .9OS· .554· .195 .338 .144 .386 .664· srrCorrelation
Sig. (2-tail~ .090 .048 .000 .000 .014 .423 .157 .557 .102 .002 .469
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Wajir Pearson
.399 1.000 .617· .514· .429 .939· .938· .754· .557· .351 .845· .593·Correlation
Sig. (2-tail~ .090 .005 .024 .067 .000 .000 .000 .013 .141 .000 .007
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Marsabit Pearson
.460· .617· 1.000 .365 .509· .592· .567· .845· .570· .318 .591· .744*Correlation
Sig. (2-taile .048 .005 .124 .026 .008 .011 .000 .011 .184 .008 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
West Pok Pearson
.880· .514· .365 1.000 .645· .713· .251 .321 .091 .465· .659· .153male Correlation
literate Sig. (2-taile .000 .024 .124 .003 .001 .301 .180 .710 .045 .002 .532
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
West Pok Pearson
.9OS· .429 .509· .645· 1.000 .484· .321 .353 .159 .337 .727· .202male Correlation
illiterate Sig. (2-tail~ .000 .067 .026 .003 .036 .181 .138 .515 .158 .000 .408
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Wajir maloPearson
.554· .939· .592· .713· .484· 1.000 .761· .682· .446 .522· .841· .452literate Correlation
Sig. (2-tail~ .014 .000 .008 .001 .036 .000 .001 .055 .022 .000 .052
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Wajir maloPearson
.195 .938· .567· .251 .321 .761· 1.000 .733· .598· .137 .745· .661·illiterate Correlation
Sig. (2-taile .423 .000 .011 .301 .181 .000 .000 .007 .577 .000 .002
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Marsabit Pearson
.338 .754· .845· .321 .353 .682· .733· 1.000 .833· .239 .600· .IISO·male Correlation
literate Sig. (2-tail~ .157 .000 .000 .180 .138 .001 .000 .000 .324 .007 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Marsabit Pearson
.144 .557· .570· .091 .159 .446 .598· .833· 1.000 .039 .304 .1100·male Correlation
illiterate Sig. (2-tail~ .557 .013 .011 .710 .515 .055 .007 .000 .875 .205 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
West Pok Pearson
.386 .351 .318 .465· .337 .522· .137women Correlation .239 .039 1.000 .317 .035
Sig. (2-tail~ .102 .141 .184 .045 .158 .022 .577 .324 .875 .186 .1188
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Wajir Pearson
.664· .845· .591· .659· .727·women Correlation .841· .745· .600· .304 .317 1.000 .365
Sig. (2-tail~ .002 .000 .008 .002 .000 .000 .000 .007 .205 .186 .124
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Marsabit Pearson
.177 .593· .744· .153women Correlation .202 .452 .661· .850· .800· .035 .365 1.000
Sig. (2-taile .469 .007 .000 .532 .408 .052 .002 .000 .000 .888 .124
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
..•-Oorrelatlon is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) .
···Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Correlations
West
West ~est Poko Marsabit Pokot Wajir Marsabit
Pokot Wajir Marsabit men Najir mer men women women women
West Pokot Pearson Oorrels 1.000 .500- .165 .846- .425 .335 .702- .608- .069
Sig. (2-tailed) .029 .499 .000 .070 .161 .001 .006 .778
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Wajir Pearson Correls .500- 1.000 .463- .454 .964- .626- .439 .876- .5.26-
Sig. (2-tailed) .029 .046 .051 .000 .004 .060 .000 .021
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Marsabit Pearson Oorrels .165 .463- 1.000 .208 .544- .774- .138 .344 .960-
Sig. (2-tailed) .499 .046 .393 .016 .000 .574 .149 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
West Pokot me Pearson Oorrela .846- .454 .208 1.000 .399 .460- .386 .664- .177
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .051 .393 .090 .048 .102 .002 .469
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Wajirmen Pearson Oorrela .425 .964- .544- .399 1.000 .617- .351 .845- .593-
Sig. (2-tailed) .070 .000 .016 .090 .005 .141 .000 .007
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Marsabit men Pearson Oorrets .335 .626- .774- .460- .617- 1.000 .318 .591- .744-
Sig. (2-tailed) .161 .004 .000 .048 .005 .184 .008 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
West Pokot wor Pearson Oorrels .702- .439 .138 .386 .351 .318 1.000 .317 .035
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .060 .574 .102 .141 .184 .186 .888
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Wajirwomen Pearson Oorrels .608- .876- .344 .664- .845- .591- .317 1.000 .365
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .000 .149 .002 .000 .008 .186 .124
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Marsabit womer Pearson Correl! .069 .526- .960- .177 .593- .744- .035 .365 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .778 .021 .000 .469 .007 .000 .888 .124
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
-·Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
--·Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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• Policy makers sub-groups correlations
Correlations
No Polic\
Private Field No Field Policy nvolvern
llovermen Sector kVAKVB ~cademi( xoerience xoerlencs nvolvmen nt
Goverment Pearson Oorrela 1.000 .267 .443 .568- .901- .429 .817- .224
Sig. (2-tailed) .270 .058 .011 .000 .067 .000 .357
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Private Sector Pearson correu .267 1.000 .625- .339 .485- .583- .548- .449
Sig. (2-tailed) .270 .004 .156 .035 .009 .015 .054
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
KVA KVB Pearson Correle .443 .625- 1.000 .694- .637- .921- .860- .388
Sig. (2-tailed) .058 .004 .001 .003 .000 .000 .101
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Academic Pearson correu .568- .339 .694- 1.000 .771- .776- .777- .744-
Sig. (2-tailed) .011 .156 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Field Experience Pearson Correia .901- .485- .637- .771- 1.000 .583- .910- .455
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .035 .003 .000 .009 .000 .050
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
No Field Experier Pearson Correia .429 .583- .921- .776- .583- 1.000 .811- .555-
Sig. (2-tailed) .067 .009 .000 .000 .009 .000 .014
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Policy Involvment Pearson Correia .817- .548- .860- .777- .910- .811- 1.000 .360
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .015 .000 .000 .000 .000 .1:30
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
No Policy Involve Pearson Correia .224 .449 .388 .744- .455 .555- .360 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .357 .054 .101 .000 .050 .014 .130
N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
-,Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
--·Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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